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CHAPTER I 
ON THE NOTIONS OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE 
1.1. INTRODUCTION. 
In the literature the terms "preference" and "choice" have often been 
employed informally, with the result that either their connection has 
been left largely undefined or that these terms have been proclaimed 
synonymous, preference then being identified with choice. This study is 
precisely concerned with the possible relationships between the notions 
of preference and choice. Although these notions require a rigorous and 
formal treatment, an attempt is made in the present Section to give an 
intuitive idea of the mam problems. Formal statements are presented in 
the subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
In the traditional approach to problems of choice it is quite customary 
to rely on a complete ordering axiom. The formal properties of ordering 
relations will be discussed in Section 1.2. Suffice it to say here that 
the complete ordering of a non-empty set of objects involves a ranking 
relation R with two specific properties, сompletenei i and tKano-t-t-LV-Ltij, 
to be presented formally in Section 1.3 together with other properties 
commonly used as axioms for preference relations. 
Completeness requires that an agent must be able to tell, for any two 
objects χ and у, that he prefers χ to и (symbolically, xRy) or that he 
prefers у to χ (yRx) , or possibly both. If both xRt/ and i/Rx hold, we 
can declare χ and tj as "indifferent" and refer to this as xli/. Hence, 
formally, completeness of the ranking relation is written as follows: 
XRÍ/, i/Rx or xly. If an agent chooses χ rather than t/ it is presumably 
because he prefers it. And an agent with a preference relation (i.e., 
a ranking relation R) that is complete knows his mind over every pair. 
So far so good, but if preference is operationally üefmed as choice, 
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then it seems unthinkable that the requirement of completeness can ever 
be empirically violated. Such a definition makes indeed for a simple 
but rather trivial theory of preference. 
The transitivity assumption goes as follows: for any three objects 
x,w,z such that an agent prefers χ to y and y to z, this agent is 
supposed to prefer χ to ζ. Formally, the transitivity condition states 
that кЯу and yRz together imply xRz. If an agent has a preference 
ranking over a set of objects and if choices are made in accord with 
these preferences, then the agent will generate transitive choices. 
Thus, when preference is identified with choice, the transitivity axiom 
guarantees an internally coherent choice pattern: if an agent chooses χ 
in preference to ij, and ij in preference to z, then he will choose χ in 
preference to z. In some straightforward sense this sounds "rational" 
and, indeed, transitivity has often been regarded as particularly 
indicative of rational behaviour, as we shall see in a subsequent 
section. 
Ihere is considerable evidence in the literature that indicates that 
agents, when faced with repeated choices between two given alternatives 
χ and y, are not perfectly consistent with their choices in that they 
choose χ in some instances and y in others. The findings of 
psychologists show that there is much of this "inconsistency" in human 
and animal behaviour. Hence, if an agent has chosen χ over y and ι/ over 
ζ in two separate trials, it may happen, for all we know, that, when 
presented with the pair χ and z, he chooses ζ to χ, violating the 
transitivity assumption. A triple к, y, ζ such that xRi/ and ij4z, yet zRx, 
is said to be intransitive and intransitive triples are indeed 
unavoidable when the pairwise choices are inconsistent over trials. 
These inconsistencies have led many authors to characteri7e choice in a 
probabilistic fashion and to d e ^ tic preference in terms of pairwise 
choice probabilities or, in practice, in terms of their estimates. In 
the most popular definition, preference is simply identified with a 
greater frequency of choice so that the inconsistency of the 
choices is incorporated into the preference relation and, indeed, 
transitivity of the preference relation is saved as long as the 
pairwise choice probabilities satisfy certain probabilistic consistency 
conditions, to be indicated in Section 1.4. 
As Section 1.5 tries to show, this is not the end of the story. The 
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whole issue of transitivity cannot be settled by imputing every 
observed violation of transitivity to the inconsistency of the pairwise 
choices. This would not solve the problem of the existence of "true" or 
genoíi/p-tc intransitivity of choices, that is, of the existence of 
choices that are really intransitive and not an epiphenomenon of 
inconsistency. We shall argue that inconsistency should be 
distinguished from intransitivity with which it has so often been 
confounded in the literature. This is the condition ¿-(.we qua иои for 
true intransitivity to enter theories of human or animal behaviour. By 
the same token we show how, quite naturally, truly intransitive choices 
may be related to intransitive preferences. 
Section 1.6 is concerned with models for intransitive choices. Our 
conception is that most of what appears to be observed intransitivity 
is but appâtent intransitivity, namely, inconsistent choice behaviour. 
In the absence of a model that guides the prediction of genotypic 
intransitivities, it may indeed be very difficult to detect consistent 
violations of transitivity. This is a call for models that provide 
genotypic intransitivities and that makes those violations plausible m 
terms of an analysis of the choice process. Although there has been 
numerous theoretical studies of choice behaviour, there are but a few 
exceptional models of choice that purport true (genotypic) 
intransitivity. Yet, despite the almost universal acceptance of the 
transitivity assumption, there exists experimental evidence that shows 
that, under appropriate experimental conditions, some behaviour may be 
genotypically intransitive. It is beyond doubt that we need proper 
choice models capable of predicting true intransitivity, the 
psychological phenomenon we are searching for. 
The transitivity assumption is not to be dismissed lightly though. It 
has ruled supreme in both the psychological and economic literature and 
transitivity is still a necessity for almost every psychological or 
economic theory. Its overwhelming prestige is probably due to the 
alleged relation between transitivity and rationality. In many 
instances the word "rationality" was even used as a synonym for 
"transitivity". Quite recently, there has been increasing recognition 
that the hypothesis of so-called rational behaviour should not be 
simply confounded with the hypothesis of transitivity. In Section 1.7 
support is lent to this evolution, as we set forth our discomfort with 
the prevailing notion of rationality. 
As the modern approach to problems of preference and choice mdkes good 
use of the algebra of binary relations, we have to edge our way through 
a few mathematical preliminaries before proceeding to the formal 
arguments. 
1.2. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES. 
In this Section we present, with an eye to subsequent use, some logical 
properties of general and specific binary relations. Many of these are 
well known, though several may have been obscured by the confusion that 
prevails in the scientific vocabulary. In order to treat the subject 
properly, we present a synoptic table with the terminology we have 
decided to adopt, along with a few alternative names used m the 
literature. 
Let A be a non-empty, not necessarily finite, set. A binary relation S 
over A is nothing but a specific subset of the Cartesian product ΛχΑ. 
If a particular ordered pair (*,«) is in the subset we write xSij or, 
alternatively, (x,i/)<-S; if the ordered pair (x.y) does not belong to 
the subset we write xStj or {K,IJ)</S. Binary relations may or may not 
satisfy a wide variety of properties. The following are important m 
the context of preference and choice (the notation used is standard in 
mathematical logic): 
( 1 ) COMPLETENESS : V X , ij •- A : (X f IJ) = xSi/ or i/Sx 
( 2 ) RCFLEXIVITY : V χ г A: xSx 
( )) IRRKFLEXIVITY : V x r A : xSx 
( 4 ) SYMMETRY : V X , ij с A : xSy -> ySx 
( Ъ ) ASYMMETRY : Ϋ χ , у с A : xSy = tjSx 
(6) ANTISYMMETRY: V Χ , ι/г A : (xSy and ijSx) =» X = ij 
(7) TRANSITIVITY: V χ , IJ , ζ < A: (xSy and ySz) -> xSz 
(8) INTRANSITIVITY : V X , ¡J, ζ r A : (xStj and ijSz) => <Sz 
(9) NEGATIVE TRANSITIVITY: V X, ¡J, ζ r A : (xSy and i/Sz) » xSz 
(10) SEMI-TRANSITIVITY: V 10, Χ , ι/, ζ r A : (xSy and ySz) ^ (xSiO or loSz) 
(11) QUASI-TRANSITIVITY : V X , (ƒ, Ζ с A : 
( x S y a n d ySx a n d y S z a n d z S y ) *» ( x S z a n d z S x ) 
( 1 2 ) A C Y C L I C I T Y : V X , . . . , χ ,, " A : 
( x . S x , a n d x . S x , a n d . . . a n d X ^ J S X J J * x l ^ x \ 
( I J ) INTERVAL ORDER P R O P E R T Y : V til, X , ц, ζ <" A : 
(xSu a n d ;Sio) » ( x S n o r zSu) 
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These properties call for a few remarks. Many binary relations are 
neither reflexive nor irreflexive; such relations are called 
nonmilix-Lve.. Similarly, a noni ymrmti-tc binary relation is a binary 
relation that is neither symmetric nor asymmetric, and by the same 
token, a nontKaniit-LVC. binary relation is neither transitive nor 
intransitive. Hence, according to the teaching of the "pure" logician, 
a relation that patit-caity satisfies the transitivity condition should 
be called nontransitive. In the psychological and economic literature, 
through popular usage, the term INTRANSITIVE has come to mean 
NONTRANSITIVE. We yield to this point (of no return) recognizing the 
exhortations of purists as useful guidelines rather than as commands to 
be followed to the bitter end. 
Transitivity is essentially a condition over triples. If transitivity 
holds for all triples in a set, then it must hold for the entire set. 
This is not true of acyclicity. Acyclicicty over triples does not imply 
acyclicity over the entire set: a relation may be acyclic over all 
triples and yet may violate acyclicity for the entire set. Obviously, 
acyclicity is a weaker condition than transitivity: acyclicity requires 
only that if an agent prefers χ to y and y to ζ, he им.££ not choose ζ 
in preference to x. even if he does not choose χ in preference to ζ. A 
stronger condition than acyclicity but weaker than transitivity, is 
quasi-transitivity, a property that will later also be referred to as 
PP-transitivity. Acyclicity, quasi-transitivity and transitivity are in 
fact close cousins. Their subtle differences are not intended to split 
hairs but to allow distinctions between different types of preference 
relations, as is attested by the literature. As for negative 
transitivity, note that it is equivalent to the following property: for 
all x,y,z in \, ii xSz, then xSy or ySz. 
Binary relations of certain standard types have been assigned specific 
names. Because the terminology is rather loose, we specify the names 
adopted in this study along with a few alternative terms used in the 
literature (see Table 1.1 ; the numbers in parentheses refer to the 
corresponding formal properties). The logical interconnections between 
various binary relations are legion; they will not be identified here. 
However, it may be worthwhile mentioning a few subtleties. In the 
literature, a strict partial order is sometimes defined as a binary 
relation that satisfies asymmetry (5) and transitivity (7), rather than 
irreflexivity (3) and transitivity (7). It can easily be verified that 
this is, in fact, only an alternative definition, since the con]unction 
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f asymmetry and transitivity implies irrcflexivity, while the 
onjunction of irreflexivity and transitivity results in asymmetry. A 
reorder (or quasi-order) is universally defined as a binary relation 
hat satisfies reflexivity (2) and transitivity (7); logically, a 
omplote preorder would thus be a binary relation satisfying 
ompletencss (1) in addition to the former two properties, but as the 
Name to be used 
in this study 
total order 
strict order 
weak order 
strict weak order 
preorder 
partial order 
strict partial order 
scmiorder 
interval order 
equivalence 
Properties 
satisfied 
(1) (2) (6) (7) 
(1)(5)(7) 
(1)(7) 
(5)(9) 
(2)(7) 
(2)(6)(7) 
(3) (7) 
(3)(10)(13) 
(3)(13) 
(2) (4) (7) 
Alternative names used 
in the literature 
proper order, full order, 
linear order, simple order, 
strict order, strong order, 
chain 
order, strong order, 
strict complete order 
conplete preorder, total 
preorder, connected preorder, 
complete quasi-order 
quasi-order 
order, weak order 
partial strict order 
Table I.1. 
onjuiiction of the properties (1) and (7) implies property (2), the 
erm "weak order" is to be considered as a synonym for "complete 
reorder", in accordance with Table 1.1. As will shortly be shown, a 
eak order, which is usually defined as α complete (1) and transitive 
7) binary relation, may also be obtaineci in a rather particular and 
ontrived fashion. 
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In general, a weak order R is distinguished from a total order, say S, 
because it is possible that xRt/ and yRx hold for dut-Lnct elements x,y 
in A. This view is formalized by two other binary relations as follows: 
corresponding to a weak order R we define 
xPy o (xRy and yRx.) 
χι ¿у «· (XRÍ/ and yRx) 
These two relations are referred to as the asymmetric and symmetric 
parts of R, respectively. It is quite easy to show that, when R is a 
weak order, the relation Ρ is a strict partial order (being asymmetric 
and transitive), while the relation I. is an equivalence relation 
(being reflexive, symmetric and transitive) which says that two 
elements are to be considered "equivalent". Hence, in a weak order, 
distinct elements can be equivalent; in the context of preference it is 
customary to call the relation I. an -cnd-t^c^enta relation. To 
distinguish the present (transitive) indifference relation from other 
(intransitive) indifference relations to be defined later, we decorate 
the letter Í (for indifference) with a small t (for transitive). As we 
shall see in Section 1.3, the above-mentioned definitions authorize the 
distinction between a "weak preference relation" (i.e., a preference 
relation satisfying the axioms of a weak order) and a "strict 
preference relation" (i.e., a preference relation satisfying the axioms 
of a strict partial order), where "strict" stands for "irreflexive". 
Traditional studies in preference have generally postulated a weak 
preference relation. But in some recent studies the primitive relation 
is a strict preference relation. These studies are based on a 
preference relation Ρ that is supposed to fulfil tre axioms of a 
strict partial order. It is then customary to define an indifference 
relation I as the symmetric complement of P. If Ρ is any asymmetric 
binary relation on a set A, its symmetric complement I is defined by 
Í = 'ч-( p up 1) where ^ means set-theoretical complement, and P' denotes 
the converse of Ρ (i.e., xP'у iff yPx). In the context of preference 
this definition is usually, and equivalently, written as follows 
xTу «=· {xVy and yVx) 
When Ρ is a strict preference relation, its symmetric complement I may 
be viewed as an indifference relation. The exact properties of the 
relation I are of course dependent on the properties of Ψ and hence, on 
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the propertxes of P. When Ρ is a strict partial order, its irreflexivity 
leads to Ρ being reflexive; what is more, it is readily shown that Ψ 
must be complete (P being asymmetric) even though the relation Ρ need 
not be complete! On the other hand, transitivity of the relation Ψ, a 
property known as negative transitivity, remains open to question: the 
properties of Ρ do not secure transitivity of P. This means that the 
indifference relation I is not necessarily transitive, contrary to the 
indifference relation I. introduced earlier. Of course, -ι <, negative 
transitivity is postulated, then the indifference relation I will be 
transitive and, in fact, will have all the characteristics of an 
equivalence relation. This is why a weak order is obtained by the union 
of a strict partial order Ρ and an indifference relation I that is 
aaumed to be transitive. Indeed, calling R the union of Ρ and I I i.e., 
R = (Ρ or I) ], it may readily be verified that Ρ satisfies asymmetry (5) 
and negative transitivity (9) if and only if R is complete (1) and 
transitive (7). A weak order R may thus be defined as a strict partial 
order Ρ that satisfies negative transitivity. When I is defined as the 
symmetric complement of a strict partial order Ρ and, when I is at the 
same time assumed to be transitive, Ρ will be referred to as a ií'tcí 
weafc o>ide>i: the union of Ρ and Í is then sinply a weak order. 
We havo ]ust seen that when indifference I is defined as the Symmetrie 
complement of a strict partial ordei P, it is net necessarily 
transitive. The literature provides some other cases where a formal 
system is based on the union of an asymmetric relation Ρ and an 
intransitive indifference relation I. The best known example has been 
introduced by LUCE (1956) and is called a òem-LCàden. (see Table Γ. 1 ) ; 
another example has been christened intex^ai cide.>i (see again 
Table T.l). In both cases, the indifference relation need not be 
transitive, but the relation Ρ doei satisfy the transitivity property: 
it is indeed not hard to show that the asymmetric part of both an 
interval order and a semiorder is transitive (the proof is omitted). 
Later in this study we shall present examples in which the transitivity 
of Ρ is indeed open to doubt, and under these circumstances it will 
become essential to distinguish between different forms of transitivity. 
We shall, in fact, discern the following four cases: V χ,y,ζ г Λ, 
(1) (χΡί/ and «Ρζ) -» χΡζ (PP) 
(2) (χΡί/ and ylz) =» χΡζ (PI) 
(3) (xlí/ and í/Pz) » χΡζ (IP) 
(4) (xlí/ and ylz) = xlz (II) 
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We shall refer to these four properties as PP, PI, IP and II, 
respectively. To be more precise: let R be the union of the relations Ρ 
and I, we then say that the relation R is PP-transitive (or PI- or IP-
or II-) over A if and only if PP (or PI or IP or II, respectively) 
holds. These properties can be violated in various ways. The kinds of 
intransitivities that may arise in the context of preference fall into 
three major categories called cijci-tc p>iz&елепсе, ¿em-t-cí/cí-tc рле^елеисе 
and íntianH-t-LVe (or nontlani^t^ví) •спсі.с^гігпсг. Formally, these 
violations of transitivity may be written as follows: for some x,y,zcA, 
(1) x.Py and yPz, but zPx (cyclic preference) 
(2) кРу and yPz, but xlz (semi-cyclic preference) 
(3) xlz and ylz, but xPz (intransitive indifference) 
The last type of intransitivity occurs typically in formal systems such 
as a semiorder or interval order. 
As transitivity is a property of triples, intransitivity can certainly 
be tracked down triple-wise. In the standard literature, the 
(in)transitivity issue has been almost exclusively analysed in terms of 
intransitive triples, i.e., in terms of triples which KENDALL (1948) 
called c-Llcatal for obvious reasons. A particular violation of 
PP-transitivity provides an example of such an intransitive triple; 
the circular triple due to xPy, yPz and zPx will be written xi/zx. Note 
that II-transitivity generates triples that, in a sense, are circular 
so that transitive indifference could also be called cyclic 
•Lnd-L&ti елепсе. But the intransitivity phenomenon is by no means limited 
to circular triples or triads! As we shall see in Section 1.6, there 
exists experimental evidence indicative of the existence of 
intransitive polyads (also called cyclei, P-cycZti or intransitive 
fe-tuples), that is, of sets of k elements x. , . . . ,x. (with fe>3) in which 
χ Px holds for all -t<-_f , except that "LPX, ; such a cycle will be 
written x.X-...χ,χ. . The integer fe is called the ondili of the cycle; 
circular triples are cycles of order three. Yet the study of 
three-element intransitivity is fundamental indeed, mainly because 
higher-order intransitivities involve at least one three-element 
intransitivity. Findings about three-element intransitivities thus 
apply to higher order intransitivities and this is perhaps why KENDALL 
(1948) resolved to conccnfLCLte on c-ciculai tl-tadi uih-Lch compoie. the 
tie.mcnta'iy •Lnconi-LitcnCLCi [and to] -сдпоіг thz mone, amb-iguoui c^ -cte-t-ta 
baòzd on polyadò of, gizat&n exien-t (p. 123). This decision, 
understandable as it is, probably initiated the deplorable habit of 
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thinking of intransitivity in terms of triples only. 
These remarks conclude this Section devoted to mathematical issues in 
the context of preference. We now turn to the latter subject-matter. 
1,3. AXIOMS FOR PREFERENCE RELATIONS. 
In this Section the notion of preference is formalized. Let A be a 
non-empty set, not necessarily finite. The elements of A will now be 
called attvinat-Lvei. These alternatives may be objects, events, 
experiences, decisions, "coirmiodity bundlrs" , candidates, alternative 
courses of action, and so forth. Preferences are then represented by a 
binary relation (defined on A) that is assumed to satisfy certain 
specific properties. 
Until fairly recently, studies in preference theory were usually based 
on a binary relation that was supposed to induce a weak order on A. 
Such a preference relation is called a weak рп&^ечепсе letation and, in 
this study, is symbolised by > ( ). The reflexive nature of this 
relation authorizes the interpretation of к * у as "χ is preferred or to 
be considered equivalent to ij" . A weak order is known to be complete 
and its symmetric part, i.e., the corresponding indifference relation, 
is known to be transitive. Transitivity of indifference judgments has 
been challenged over many years, not only by ARMSTRONG (e.g., 1939, 
1948, 1950) who is always quoted in this context, but also by 
GEORGESCU-ROEGEN (193b), LUCE (1956), COOMBS (1960), RKSTLE (1959), 
ROBERTS (1970), and many others. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, observations of indifference are rather difficult to obtain. 
Generally speaking, inequalities are more easily assessed than 
equalities: in the case of preference, all that has to be done is to 
select one out of two (or more) alternatives, whereas there is no 
comparable simple act which reflects indifference. In addition, 
observations of indifference are unreliable as an inevitable result of 
the finite sensitivity of every method of comparison, even if the 
compati 4'. η s were to be made with the aid of physical instruments. For 
( ) The reader is invited to carefully distinguish between the symbol » 
(which characterizes an hypothetical construct) and ? (which is the 
traditional symbol for the order relation defined on a sot of 
numbers). Later in the text, the same will apply to the distinction 
between the symbols •» and > . 
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example, whenever two objects are judged equal in weight by means of a 
balance, it is practically certain that a more refined balance will 
reveal a difference. This poses a statistical problem too: how can one 
ever, in the presence of systematic errors due to imperfections in the 
observational situation, decide upon "equality"? It is probably not 
possible at present to formulate an adequate solution to this question. 
It is quite easy to provide instances that violate the transitivity of 
indifference (i.e., II-transitivity). There is the classic example of 
LUCE (1956, p. 179) in which a subject is asked to choose between 
successive cups of coffee which differ only by one hundreth of a cube 
of sugar. It may not be difficult to find subjects that are indifferent 
to two successive cups, yet these same subjects will nearly all prefer 
a cup of coffee with one cube of sugar to one with five cubes, thus 
contradicting II-transitivity. Likewise, in a psychophysical context, a 
subject may be quite unable to detect a difference in loudness between 
two successive pure tones which differ slightly (physically), yet feel 
certain, on compainng a tone with the nth following one, that the one 
is louder than the other. Transitivity of indifference supposes 
infinite sensitivity, whereas intransitivity of indifference admits 
imperfect discrimination, entailing the problem of the existence of a 
"minimum sensible" as BERKELEY (1734) called it, hereby introducing a 
forerunner of the "just noticeable difference" concept of psychophysics. 
Of course, whenever we need a simple idealized preference theory, even 
at the price of ignoring objections to the transitivity of indifference, 
a weak preference relation might do. Indeed, many theories of 
preference claim both PP-transitivity and II-transitivity as fundamental 
axioms of preference. ARROW (1951, 1959), HALLDÊN (1957), HANSSON 
(1968b, 1969a), HOUTHAKKER (1965), and many others have adopted this 
point of view. But as soon as the transitivity of indifference is seen 
as an hindrance, one has to dismiss weak orders. A itK-tct р-^ е^ елепс e 
líiaiíon is then ideal because it allows intransitivity of indifference 
without discarding the validity of PP-transitivity. A strict preference 
relation, symbolized >, has generally been defined in the literature as 
a strict partial order; the alleged interpretation of к > у is "χ is 
preferred to y". When the basic preference relation is a weak order, 
indifference is defined as actual or "positive" equivalence; but in the 
context of a strict partial order, indifference (now symbolized ~) is 
defined "negatively' as the absence of strict preference: 
x. ~ y o [not(x>í/) and notti/> χ)] 
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The relation ~ is of course called an ¿nd-t^S-lince le-Ìat-con and χ ~ y is 
interpreted as "x is to be considered equivalent with y". We have 
already seen that this indifference relation is not necessarily 
transitive. Theories that permit intransitive indifference should be 
based on a strict preference notion, because this notion disentangles 
the PP-transitivity and II-transitivity issues. Throughout the present 
study we shall take strict preference as the basic binary relation. The 
advantage of taking a strict preference relation as a basic construct 
relies on the possible intransitivity of indifference, besides the fact 
that, in many situations, it may be more "natural" to think in terms of 
(strict) preference rather than preference-or-indifference. From now on 
we shall refer to the relation > as a pie \ etence Ktlaticn (without the 
qualification "strict"!), and to 5r as a wcafe ρΊε;5 eie ne e ieíaí"<cn. 
This is how the matter stands: practically all studies of preference 
are based either on a preference relation > that is assumed to be a 
weak order, or a preference relation »^ that is supposed to be a strict 
partial order. Both axiomatizations convey common intuitions about the 
concept of (either weak or strict) preference. And indeed, in the 
psychological literature, and especially in the economic literature, an 
astounding amount of energy has been expended in "justifying" either of 
these two axiomatizations, the alleged justification being based upon 
various notions of rationality, a topic to be discussed in Section 1.7. 
Logicians have been disturbed by the elementary character of these 
axiomatizations. HANSSON (1968a) gives an account of various attempts 
to carry the theory of preference beyond this "trivial" level. In this 
context, the studies of H A L L D É N (1957) and VON WRIGHT (1963) arouse 
much hope. These investigations are usually based on the introduction 
of opuH-atoKb in the field of the preference relation. When a preference 
relation holds between alternatives which may be considered as 
propositions, the paraphernalia of propositional calculus permit the 
introduction of operators, that is, of composition rules whose formal 
properties are similar to corresponding rules in the propositional 
calculus. Let -> represent a one-place composition rule assigning to 
every alternative χ a certain alternative -ix so that χ -» ц and -'У>^х 
both have a definite interpretation. If χ stands for "to win the first 
prize" and t/ stands for "to win any prize", and if χ > y -=· ^у >-ιΧ holds 
for a given person, this could be interpreted to mean that he prefers 
any prize to not winning the first prize. Similarly, two-place 
composition rules (operators) may be postulated. Clearly, what matters 
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are the formal properties of these operators in relation to preference. 
As HANSSON (1968a, p. 441) says himself, the. ie.ia¿t6 aie much -tu the. 
nzgat-Lve. — many piopoied ax-comi imply too òtiangz theonemò to be 
acceptable ai ax-torru -tn a geneial th&oiy of, piedeiznce. 
Besides the logicians, social scientists and economists have been 
active too. As transitive indifference lost its halo, studies in 
preference became based more and more upon strict preference relations 
and, occasionally, the strict preference relation was not supposed to 
be a strict partial order but some stronger structure, such as a 
semiorder or an interval order (which are both really special cases of 
a strict partial order). In the psychological literature these and 
related structures were studied by FISHBURN (1970a,b) and by ROBERTS 
(1970, 1971) for instance, while on the economic side CHIPMAN (1971) 
introduced similar ideas in the theory of consumption. 
As in the case of the transitivity of indifference, transitivity of 
preference (i.e., of strict preference) may be doubted. When a 
preference relation > is not transitive, there is room for P-cycles; 
reciprocally, P-cycles call for preferences that are not transitive. A 
few recent studies are indeed based on such unusual relations. When a 
preference relation is not supposed to be necessarily transitive, it is 
assumed to satisfy some very weak properties such as completeness in 
the case of weak preference, or irreflexivity and asymmetry in the case 
of strict preference. In this study we strongly advocate that 
preference is not necessarily transitive and that the transitivity 
axiom is an unnecessary and limiting assumption in certain theories of 
behaviour. This will be made more precise in the following sections and, 
especially, in Chapter II where we claim the eventuality of behaviour 
based on intransitive preferences and, by the same token, of "truly" 
intransitive choices. This brings us to the observation of choice 
behaviour, the subject of the next Section. 
1,4. BINARY CHOICE STRUCTURES. 
This Section is concerned with theories of choice behaviour. It is of 
paramount importance for anybody interested in the possible 
intransitivity of choice behaviour to permit the occurence of 
intransitivity. By this we mean that transitivity of choice should not 
be imposed by the method of data collection. For this reason our sole 
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interest will be in pairwise choices: indeed, when comparisons are 
made in pairs much of the evidence obtainable when they are made in 
sets of more than two is also secured, in addition to further evidence 
only obtainable with pairs. Paired comparison choices within 
independent triples (none of which share a pair of alternatives with 
another triple) are extremely appropriate for assessing the validity of 
the transitivity assumption, because this method imposes no 
transitivity. The exact properties of pairwise choices are largely 
dependent on the experimental design: in a binary forced choice 
experiment the binary choices satisfy both irreflexivity and asymmetry 
while, in another context, pairwise choices need not necessarily 
satisfy these properties. In general, it is a good idea to remember 
that the design of any choice experiment to some degree reflects the 
experimenter's preconceptions about the choice behaviour in question. 
It is well known that agents (persons or animals) are not very 
consistent in their choices in that they do not always make the same 
choice under seemingly identical conditions. There is indeed 
conbiderable evidence in the psychological literature indicating that 
the most rustic agent may be "versatile": in a binary choice situation 
he may prefer alternative x. to alternative y on one trial, and y to χ 
on another. In order to account for this observed inconsistency, choice 
behaviour has been viewed as a probabilistic process. Probabilistic 
theories of choice attribute to every ordered pair (x,tj) ^А a 
probability p(x.,y) that χ is chosen over y. These probabilities are 
usually estimated by the relative frequencies observed in binary choice 
experiments. Abstractly, the data consists then of a pair (A,p) where A 
is the set of alternatives and where ρ is a function p: AxA->|0,lJ 
assumed to satisfy p(x,tj) +p(ylx) =1 for all χ, y in A. By definition, 
p(x,x) =0.50 for every χ m A. When p(x,y) =0.50 for some x,y in A, 
choices from the pair (x
r
y) approximate to what we shall call complete 
landomne a . 
In borne cases, simplicity warrants an algebraic idealization. Choice 
theories in which 0, 0.50 and 1 are the only possible values of the 
pairwise choice pionabilities have been called a£geЬяа-сс or, also, 
diite.Hrru.n-i it* с choice models. Theories of choice that allow the pairwise 
choice probabilities to take on any value between zero and one, are 
called — not surprisingly — picbabiZ(iitc theories. Two famous 
probabilistic choice theories are those of THURSTONE (1927a) and LUCE 
(1959a) ; examples of algebraic choice models will be given in 
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Section 1.6. Note that the distinction between algebraic and 
probabilistic theories of choice, clear-cut as it is, does not resolve 
all the problems. The distinction between algebraic data and 
probabilistic data is indeed a more subtle one since deterministic 
(algebraic) models of choice are not incompatible with methods of data 
collection based upon replications, which produce data which have a 
probabilistic flavour although collected under a deterministic choice 
model. Confusion may however be avoided by remembering that a 
probabilistic theory of choice can be empirically tested only by data 
that are truly probabilistic, while deterministic data are enough for a 
deterministic theory. 
When choice behaviour is viewed as a probabilistic phenomenon, there 
are always some choices to be expected that are, pl-Lma. (¡асА.г, 
intransitive. Indeed, given any three alternatives x,y,z in A and given 
their pairwise probabilities p(x,y), p(y,z) and p(x,z), then, the 
probability of circular choices in one direction will be equal to the 
product ρ(χ,у)ρ{у,ζ)ρ(ζ,χ), provided the pairwise choices are 
independent of course; similarly, the probability of circular choices 
in the opposite direction is then ρ(χ,ζ)ρ(ζ,у)ρ(у,χ). Let us assume a 
choice situation such that an agent has just chosen χ over у and у 
over χ (symbolically, χ >, у and y>^z) on two particular trials. Given 
p(x,z), we can predict the frequency with which χ will be chosen over z, 
however, we cannot predict on which trials the agent will do so because 
there is, in a sense, some random element in the choices. The agent's 
choices may be thought to have both a systematic and a random component. 
Thus, no single probabilistic theory of choice is capable of predicting 
with certainty the transitive choice ΧϊςΖ. In probabilistic theories of 
choice, circularity of the choices is a probabilistic phenomenon, just 
like the choices themselves. Hence, probabilistic theories of choice 
authorize agents to act in a way which is apparently intransitive, as a 
result of inconsistencies in the pairwise choices. These 
"intransitivities" are really a by-product of inconsistency and they 
should not be confounded with -t-tue intransitivity. By truly 
intransitive choices we mean choices that are subjectively intransitive; 
this form of intransitivity may be called gewotyp-LC. Taking, 
provisionally, the existence of genotypic intransitivity for granted, 
we decide not to confuse it with appa.fLe.nt intransitivity. To avoid 
compromising, we reserve the expression A.nt>ia.ni4,£4.ve. cfio-tce. for choices 
that are genotypically intransitive. Whenever we are in doubt about the 
character of some observed intransitivity, the word "intransitive" will 
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be enclosed in quotation marks in order to avoid the appearance of 
approbation, unless our distrust is clear from the context. In the case 
of triples, c^fLCaZan. will have the meaning of "intransitive" (with 
quotation marks!). 
When replicated pairwise choices are not perfectly consistent, the 
choices cannot satisfy an absolute or dete inn»tii-cc consistency rule. 
This should not prevent the binary choices from satisfying other 
regularity conditions, viz., pfiobabiiiittc consistency rules. Although 
they allow the occurence of some inconsistency, these rules clearly 
show that the pairwise choices are not completely random. There are 
various mathematical models for lending precision to the notion of 
probabilistic consistency. The most popular probabilistic consistency 
conditions are the three traditional forms of itochai tLC trani-cί< \ι Ltij. 
They are, from least restrictive to most restrictive, lueafc òtocnaific 
fianbitLbity (WST) , modélate s tediai t< с tianbLtiv-Lty (MSI) and iftuiig 
ituc hai tía tlanòJ-tivitii (SST). These three probabilistic versions of 
transitivity are defined as follows: for all χ,у,ζ in A, 
WST: |p(x,(/) 5*0.50 and p(y,z) *0.501 ^ pU,z) >0.50 
MS'I : [ ρ ( χ, t/ ) 5-0.50 and p(i/,z)-»0.50] -> ρ ( χ , ζ ) > m m [ ρ ( χ , ι/ ) , ρ ( ι/, ζ ) 1 
SST: lp(x,//)>0.50 and ρ (у, ζ) ,¿0.501 -> ρ (χ,ζ) > max [ρ (χ,ί/) , ρ (у, ζ) ] 
Weak stochastic transitivity is the most general probabilistic version 
of transitivity: violations of WST cannot be attributed to the 
inconsistency of the choices alone. Another veteran probabilistic 
consistency condition is due to MARSCHAK (1960) who defined a 
tl^Languian cendttton (TRI) as follows: for all x,y,z in A, 
TRI: 1 < p(x,y) + ρ(ι/,ζ) + p(z,x) < 2 
When this condition is satisfied for any triple of alternatives, the 
alternatives can be represented by discriminai dispersions on a single 
dimension. 
In the r>с e it past, a multitude of new stochastic transitivity 
conditions have been introduced, several of which have been stated in 
terms of four alternatives (rather than three as in the traditional 
forms). First, TVERSKY & RUSSO (1969) proposed a strict version of SST, 
called i t l i c t ifriong !>tocha>,tic fituii-t f < ν-ί ty (SSST) : for all χ , у, ζ in A, 
SSST: ISST and ρ (χ, у) ^ 0.50 and ρ (ι/, ζ ) >0 . 5 0 ] ^ ρ ( χ , ζ ) -maxi ρ ( χ , у) , ρ (у, ζ) ] 
Clearly, SSST implies SST, but the converse is not true. Indeed, SSST 
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is a restriction of SST: it prohibits p(x,y) =1 whenever there exists 
an alternative ζ in A such that piy,z) >0.50. In their paper, TVERSKY 
and RUSSO show that SSST is equivalent to three other probabilistic 
consistency conditions, which are known as -twdependence, i-cmp¿& 
icaZab-Ll-tty and iabit-Ltutab-iZ-tty. 
Following this, ROBERTS (1971) and FISHBURN (1973) introduced a 
hierarchy of stochastic transitivity conditions with the result that, 
by now, a set of pairwise choice probabilities may or may not satisfy 
an almost overwhelming variety of probabilistic consistency conditions. 
Here are a few typical examples: pa/it^ai itoduuttc t>ia.nt>-i.t4.vA-ty (PST) , 
ne.QCit-Lve. itochait-Lc tn.ann.t-L\j-cty (NST) , -tníe-tuaí ¿iocfia^i^c txanb-LÍ-LV-cty 
(IST) and a condition dubbed JST. These probabilistic versions of 
transitivity are defined as follows: for all ui,x,y,z in A, 
PST: [p(x,í/) > 0. 50 and ρ (y, ζ) >0.50] =>ρ(χ,ζ) > min[p (χ, y) ,ρ(ί/,ζ) ] 
NST: pU,z)>0.50 =» max[ ρ (χ, y) , ρ ((/, ζ) ] > ρ (χ, ζ) 
1ST: max[p(x,í/) ,ρ(ζ,ω) ] > min[p (x,w) , ρ (ζ , y) ] 
JST: max[p(x,í/) ,p(y,z) ] > min[p ( χ ,MJ) , ρ (w, ζ) ] 
These (and other) probabilistic consistency conditions, academic as 
they may seem, arouse interest because of the relations existing 
between some of them and certain axiomatizations of the preference 
notion; this will be made more precise in the next Section. 
In general, we shall be concerned with a set of alternatives A such 
that an agent is able to make a choice from any pair (x,y) с A. We shall 
call a b-LnoLHy pin ¿e^ ienee btiuctanz the ordered pair (A,p) where ρ is a 
function defined on the whole of AxA. This function may take on any 
value between zero and one when the binary choice structure is 
generated by a probabilistic theory of choice, and the values 0, 0.50, 1 
only, in the case of a deterministic choice theory. Of course, up to 
now, the ordered pair (A,p) is hardly a "structure" since we have as 
yet placed no restrictions on the function p. We cannot expect to find 
any interesting results when the ordered pair (A,p) remains entirely 
unrestricted. But the ordered pair will become a fully fledged binary 
choice structure <A,p> as soon as the binary choices are supposed to 
satisfy certain regularity conditions, viz., any deterministic or 
probabilistic consistency condition. We have presented here a few 
probabilistic conditions (which happened to be conditions of stochastic 
transitivity) but other conditions might be thought of. Incidentally, 
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some very interesting conditions on the ordered pair (A,p) arise from 
replacing the probabilities by relations, and statinq requireirents on 
these relations. A well known case is provided by the notion of a 
semiorder. All the known binary choice theories do in fact generate 
particular binary choice structures. Elaborate choice models like those 
of THURSTONE (1927a, case V) and LUCE (1959a) require SST, while others, 
such as COOMBS' (1950) unfolding model or THURSTONb's (1927a, case Ш ) 
model imply only MST. 
The literature provides several instances of experiments designed to 
test conditions of stochastic transitivity inherent to a particular 
probabilistic choice theory. In this context CHIPMAN (1960) , COOMBS 
(1958), GRISWOLD & LUCE (1962) and MORRISON (1962) are worthy of 
mention. Both COOMBS and CHIPMAN have predicted and observed consistent 
violations of SST, while MORRISON produced experimental evidence m 
favour of systematic violations of MST; in his experiments, COOMBS 
observed some violations of MST, but apparently not to a statistically 
significant degree. The experimental verification of WS1 appears to be 
quite another matter. Experiments set up to test WST, usually failed to 
detect significant violations of WST. But BEZEMBINDER (1976) showed 
recently that computer simulated THURSTONE case V data provide a 
surprising number of violations of WST. To understand the difficulties 
that crop up with the experimental verification of a condition like WST, 
we have to dwell on the problems arising in this context. 
Remember that one always has to expect circular choice triples when the 
pairwise choice probabilities are neither zero nor one. Under the null 
hypothesis of complete random choice I i.e., p(x,t/) =0.50 for all к, ij 
in A J, the expected proportion of circular triples equals one-fourth. 
The hypothesis p(x,i/) =p(y,z) =p(x,z) =0.50 is a special case of MST 
and SST, which shows that up to one-fourth of the choice triples may be 
circular without violating MST, or even SST. And if WST is to be 
violated, at least one-fourth of the choice triples must be circular, 
while as many as half of the triples can be circular without violating 
WST le.g., p(x,i/)=l, ρ (ι/, ζ ) = 1 and p(x,z) =0.50]. The above represents 
the amount of "intransitivity" that can be accounted for by the three 
traditional forms of stochastic transitivity. 
If replicated choices by a single agent are independent and if the 
choice probabilities remain constant over replications, then definitions 
of stochastic transitivity can be tested using estimated choice 
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probabilities. For instance, an empirical test of WST might be based 
upon observed frequencies from a randomly replicated binary forced 
choice experiment. For each distinct pair of alternatives x and y, the 
null hypothesis that p(x,i/) =0.50 can be tested with specific 
confidence limits. The pairs for which the null hypothesis is rejected 
can then be applied to the condition 
IpU.ij) > 0.50 and ρ ( y, ζ ) > 0 . 50 ] => ρ (χ, ζ ) > 0 . 50 
This paradigm, simple as it is, would suggest that stochastic 
transitivity is an easily testable assumption. However, there are a few 
pitfalls worth indicating. 
There is, first of all, the problem of the constancy of the pairwise 
choice probabilities: these probabilities may, for all we know, change 
between replications. But then, even if the pairwise choice 
probabilities were constant over replications, it may be difficult to 
obtain enough A.ndzpzndtnt observations to estimate them. This may be 
the case when the alternatives are identifiable. To assume that an 
agent can make repeated independent choices of unidentified and 
qualitatively similar alternatives may be reasonable, but to assume 
that he can make independent choices of well-identifled, qualitatively 
distinct, alternatives, may be simply foolish. This difficulty has led 
many experimenters to estimate the amount of "intransitivity" by the 
relative frequency of observed circular triples. Many tests of weak 
stochastic transitivity (WST) have indeed been based on the comparison 
between the observed proportion of circular triples and the expected 
proportion under WST. As MORRISON (1962) has pointed out, this common 
procedure has a serious drawback arising from the fact that in a 
complete paired comparisons design only a limited proportion of triples 
can be circular. KENDALL (1948) has given a formula for the number of 
circular triples; this number will be called d. With m alternatives, 
assessed by the presentation of all possible pair comparisons, the 
results will contain t= (,) triples. Among these, the number of 
circular triples (d) can range from zero to a maximum (d ) of either 
m(m2-l)/24 (when m is odd) or m(m2-4)/24 (when m is even). Hence, the 
maximum number of circular triples divided by the total number of 
triples (d /Í) can take on one of the following values, 
m+1 , _ ,,. m+2 , , . 
4(m_2) (lf m 1 3 o d d ' o r 4(m-1) (if m 1 S e v e n ) 
But as the number of alternatives m increases, both expressions 
approach a limiting value of one-fourth, which, as we have mentioned 
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earlier, is precisely the expected proportion of circular triples under 
the null hypothesis of complete random choice! Hence, with a fairly 
large number of alternatives, it is impossible to use the relative 
frequency of circular triples in order to distinguish between the 
behaviour of an agent making all his choices at random, and a "diabolic" 
agent whose choices would be maximally circular... 
To conclude this Section on problems entailed by acts of choice, we 
emphasize the point that the experimental verification of any condition 
of stochastic choice does not at all answer the question about the 
existence of genotypic intransitivity, i.e., of the existence of 
choices that are truly intransitive rather than being an epiphenomenon 
of inconsistency. Experiments designed in the past to verify stochastic 
transitivity conditions can hardly be regarded as providing any clue 
either in favour of genotypically intransitive behaviour, or contrary 
to it, although, here, the exception proves the rule (see Section 1.6). 
But it cannot be claimed that these experiments were really intended to 
detect genotypic intransitivity: they were supposed to provide an 
experimental verification of stochastic transitivity and they did not 
take seriously into consideration the possibility of true intransitivity 
entering the picture. They were indeed designed in the light of theories 
of choice that provide no room for genotypic intransitivity, although 
they allow apparent intransitivity as a result of stochastic variations 
in the parameters of the theory. In fact, there exists but very few 
theories of choice that proclaim genotypic intransitivity as a 
theoretical possibility. To formulate these theories we have to proceed 
with the relationship between binary preference structures and binary 
choice structures. This is the topic of the next Section. 
1.5. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREFERENCE AND CHOICE. 
Traditionally, the concept of a sensory continuum refers to a suoject's 
experience of a continuously variable physical event which is called 
the stimulus. The sub3ect,s response in comparing two such stimuli is 
then a ju.dgme.nt rather than a choice. This implies that the sub3cct has 
no personal preference toward the outcome of the trial, but is merely 
an "objective" observer. When the subject is required to choose among 
alternatives on the basis of personal preferences, his response is 
ordinarily called a c/io-ice. According to this respectable tradition, 
responses that do not result from underlying preferences should not be 
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called choices. But, although neither THURSTONE (1927a,b) nor LUCE 
(1959a) postulate explicit preferences, both theories are nowadays 
called cho-tce theories. According to THURSTONE (1927b, p. 371) ¿t-cmal-c 
аіг d-L(¡(¡í>iínt.La.tQ.d by ркосгаел о^ the. oiganíim об unknown natale.. 
Elsewhere in the same paper (p. 368), he says that the exact nature of 
these processes is immaterial to his argument. One might infer from 
these and other remarks that THURSTONE did not de.l-Lbe.iia.te.ly hint at the 
preference notion, but we shall return to this point later (see p. 32). 
In any case, this brings us to the question of the existence of 
preferences in choice situations, which is a thorny subject. 
Individuals may be observed to have preference orderings on certain 
alternatives, and these orderings are generally not the same between 
individuals. In some instances, a person may categorically prefer one 
alternative to another, while on other occasions, with different 
alternatives, he may experience great difficulty in making up his mind. 
The problem may be more basic than being in possession of a preference 
or not: it may be doubtful whether an individual may be able to ondzn 
his preferences. On the other hand, one may as well verify that 
individuals often are ignorant of the exact state of their preferences. 
Of course, if an individual is in a state of total ignorance and if he 
is forced to choose as he is likely to be because circumstances of life 
call for choices even when there is no preference, we may think of his 
choices as the result of a random process, like tossing a coin, so that 
the probability of choosing one alternative to another equals one-half. 
But what about other degrees of ignorance of preferences? Current 
theories of choice or decision making do not yield very definite 
conclusions on problems of this kind. 
An agent may be ignorant of his preferences and yet he continues to 
make choices. To act is to choose and so theories of behaviour also 
have to be theories of choice, at least in some very broad sense. And 
theories of choice can be related to the idea of latent preferences. 
The observable part of such theories would be the choices themselves; 
the unobservable aspects would concern underlying preference relations. 
It is with the relationship between these observable and unobservable 
constituents that we will now be concerned. To commit ourselves we 
confess to be interested in a theory of measurement for preferences 
because of the information they provide about choice behaviour. If an 
agent chooses χ rather than у it is presumably, as we have said before, 
because he prefers x. Although actual choices are more accessible than 
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latent preferences, and despite the fact that preferences are not 
immediately observable, we postulate the existence of preferences and 
we assume them to satisfy a certain set of axioms. We thus introduce 
preference as a primitive (undefined) notion that satisfies a 
particular axiom system. 
Let < A,p> be any binary choice structure. For x. ¿ y , p(x,y) is 
interpreted as the probability that χ will be chosen instead of y when 
there is a unique choice to be made (either verbally or by some overt 
act) between χ and y. If р(к,у) =0.50, choices from the pair (χ,ι/) will 
be random. But when 0.50 < ρ (к,y) <1 , there exists a propensity to 
choose χ rather than y, although the choice of χ is not guaranteed on 
every presentation of the pair (к,у) because there is some random 
factor (of undefined nature) in the choices, so that there may be 
inconsistencies when the binary choices are repeated. As to the origin 
of these inconsistencies, one might assume systematic changes m the 
"internal state" of the agent (e.g., as a result of learning) or 
momentary variations in his preferences, but, in the absence of any 
momentary or systematic change, they might as well be interpreted as a 
result of some inherent variability in the evaluation process of the 
alternatives. These interpretations would be in harmony with the common 
experience that preferences are not always clear-cut: it may sometimes 
be quite difficult to decide whether an alternative χ is preferred to 
an alternative y, or vice versa. Preference judgments, like indifference 
judgments, are not always very "precise" judgments. 
In the absence of fluctuations in the evaluation process, there remains 
the old idea that "intensity" of preference has some relevance to the 
pairwise choices. When an agent has a categorical preference for χ over 
y he will presumably choose χ all the time (except for possible "errors" 
to be specified later) so that the probability that he will choose x 
can be equated to one. Similarly, when an agent is tlaiy indifferent 
towards two alternatives χ and y, but is forced to choose many times, 
the probability that he will choose χ over y may be assumed to equal 
one-half. And when he has a "slight" preference for χ over y, the 
probability that he chooses χ over y may be thought to be a "little 
higher" than 0.50. Remember that these intuitions have led several 
authors to dti-cne. preference in terms of the pairwise choice 
probabilities, or of their estimates. In the most popular definition, 
preference is simply identified with a greater frequency of choice. 
Following LUCE (1958, 1959a), ROBERTS (1971) and FISHBURN (1973), we 
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use binary choice probabilities to generate binary relations > on A by 
letting , 
x. > y » p{x,y) > \ 
for 0.50 <λ<1. The parameter λ is interpreted as an index of 
"decisiveness": when p(x,y) =1 lp(x.,y) =0.50, respectively] for an 
agent, this agent is completely decisive [indecisive, respectively] 
between χ and y, while > (λ ^ 0.50, 1) contains all ordered pairs {x.,y) 
for which the agent's propensity to choose χ instead of y exceeds λ. 
Taking λ =0.50, > contains all ordered pairs (x,i/) for which the 
agent's propensity to choose χ over y is strictly greater than one-half, 
i.e., according to the traditional identification of preference with 
greater frequency of choice, all ordered pairs (χ,ί/) for which χ > y 
holds; by putting λ equal to one-half, we recover the traditional 
preference concept in connection with pairwise choice probabilities. 
We now come to a few basic assumptions. We shall assume that all the 
alternatives of a given binary choice structure <A,p> are compaiabti. 
By this we mean that we postulate the existence of a non-void but 
finite set of criteria or pitm-ci^ ve chaicLcti>n.it-LCi by which the 
alternatives in question can be pairwise compared by a particular agent. 
Each alternative will be regarded as completely described and defined 
by the "values" it takes on these different primitive characteristics. 
Formally, each alternative thus takes on the form x= (χ^.,.,χ ) where 
χ i-c = 1, . . . ,n) is the value of alternative χ on the -tth primitive 
characteristic; we refer to these values as the componznti of the 
alternative. Note that the components of the alternatives may be 
nominal scale values; they need not be real numbers. The literature 
sometimes refers to these components as phyoicai .tnpat, but the term 
"physical" carries undesirable connotations. Indeed, although primitive 
characteristics may be physically specifiable in some applications, 
this is not so in many others. Furthermore, it is well known that 
several physical characteristics may combine into a single psychological 
characteristic. For instance, it appears that people can order pure 
tones according to their loudness, and there is considerable evidence 
that the psychological characteristic of loudness depends upon two 
physical characteristics, viz., intensity and frequency. This simple 
example shows that the criteria by which alternatives are perceived are 
not always self-evident: they may not at all be the psychological 
counterpart of any known physical variable. In many instances it is not 
even sure that the experimenter knows in advance all the primitive 
characteristics used by an agent, let alone that the experimenter is 
30 
able to manipulate them experimentally. But, provisionally, we 
assume that alternatives can be characterized by some iubj exi-tue 
primitive characteristics, or latini a.ttrn.bute.&. The problem of 
recovering the attributes when they are completely unknown, will be 
further discussed in Chapter II. 
Although alternatives may be "complex" in that they vary along several 
latent attributes that are relevant to a choice situation, we shall 
confine ourselves for the time being with choices that are generated 
by one single underlying attribute. The null hypothesis is then that 
all choices are subjectively transitive. In fact, our conjecture will 
be that, as long as preferences are generated along one single 
attribute, behaviour will be intrinsically transitive. When the choices 
of an agent are subjectively transitive, it may be assumed that there 
exists in his mind a rank order of values, each alternative being 
ordered by its òubj ecí-tue а.£иг. In psychological applications, the 
alternatives being given qualitatively (viz., on nominal scales), the 
subjective values are not known in advance, but we postulate their 
existence and we assume that an agent will base his choices on these 
values. But when the subjective values are translated into overt 
behaviour, "errors" may occur, and these may vary from time to time and 
from choice to choice. This suggests a distinction between subjective 
values and tlue iuo j ec-i-ti/e valuei, and therefore between observable 
choices and tluz cho-ccçi. The latter is precisely what we mean by the 
concept of preference; according to this tentative definition, the 
preferences of an agent are nothing but his true choices. This is not 
just a nominalistic -touA de о^Д-се but a way of stating the relationship 
between preference (true choice) and choice (observable choice). 
Although this relationship is not our prime concern, we shall not leave 
it completely undefined. The problem is of course that true choices are 
no more open to direct observation than latent preferences. This 
difficulty demands indirect lines of argument, such as those of 
inferential statistics. If, for every χ,y in А, т(х,у) is the 
probability that the observed choices coincide with the true choices, 
we may think of simple models relating π(χ,ζ/) to p(x,y), such as to 
obtain "good" estimators of π(χ,ί/). Of course, it would be fair to 
require ті(х,у) >0.50 as part of the idea of true choice. And, when the 
observed choices are completely "indecisive" [i.e., when p(K,y) =0.50] 
we assume that the true choice between x and у is not defined; this 
situation is highly ambiguous as it may apply to an agent truly 
(genotypically) indifferent between two alternatives as well as to a 
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person who is totally ignorant of the alternatives and simply cannot 
make up his mind. More generally, we incline to say that no true 
choice between χ and y is defined unless plx,y)>\ (0.50<λ<1) holds, 
so that the parameter of decisiveness λ becomes an indicator of true 
choice. Whatever way we might choose to estimate an agent's true 
choices, their mere existence has some bearing on the transitivity 
issue. We shall dwell on this subject before proceeding to the general 
case of preferences being generated by two or more latent attributes. 
We may of course choose to believe that intransitive choices occur only 
as a consequence of "error". This would suit our conjecture about the 
subjective transitivity of choices generated by one single latent 
attribute. Then, if the same alternatives appear to the agent to be 
somewhat different at different trials, collecting data by the method 
of paired comparisons will yield "intransitive" choices not by virtue 
of any inherent intransitivity, but by virtue of a random component, so 
that what is subjectively transitive may objectively appear to be 
intransitive. Hence, in the presence of some observed "intransitivity", 
our null hypothesis states that the underlying true choices are "really" 
transitive, but that some random component blurs this basic picture. 
Our task, of course, is to determine whether the observed intransitivity 
is reducible to a random component or whether we have to incline to the 
alternative hypothesis of subjective intransitivity. 
When true choices are affected by a random component, we have to decide 
whether any observed intransitivity can be explained by variations of 
the error component, or whether we are forced to conclude that the true 
choices themselves are intransitive. This would entail the existence of 
an intransitive preference relation. To settle this problem, we assume 
that there are only three admissible hypotheses about observed 
intransitivity. These are as follows: 
(1) As a first plausible explanation there is a patent lack of 
correspondence between an agent's true subjective value and the 
subjective value he actually employs in his choices. Assuming a true 
choice and an agent not always acting in conformity with it, we must 
expect that he will eventually make "mistakes" in his choices; his 
successive evaluations of an alternative may change without an 
alteration of his preferences, so that he may act in an apparently 
inconsistent manner. The causes of such "inconsistencies" are 
numerous. An agent may simply not take pains to harmonize his 
behaviour and preferences, for reasons of indolence or inertia, for 
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instance. Other sources of "carelesness" may also figure in the case, 
even when factors such as habit or superstition do not enter the 
picture. In general, we may invoke any phenomenon that causes a 
discrepancy between the true sub]ective value of an alternative and its 
actual value. Since THURSTONE (1927a,b), the processes by which an 
agent identifies and discriminates alternatives have been known as 
discriminai processes. For this reason, we collectively christen 
рлосетпд гыіоіі all those "errors" that can be explained by the 
former discrepancies. This definition would mean that the traditional 
"response error" generated by discriminai processes comes under the 
same heading. We might incline, indeed, to interpret the subjective 
values of a Thurstoman response function as true subjective values, 
and hence, as indicative of true choices, in spite of THURSTONE's 
uncommitted position (see earlier in this Section). Since the discriminai 
processes reported in the literature require at least WST, we shall not 
mention these processes as possible sources of genotypic intransitivity. 
(2) Another source of "inconsistent" behaviour is related to the 
threshold of sensation. EDWARDS (1954) suggested that intransitivity 
might be due to a lack of "decisiveness". When an agent is completely 
indecisive [so that p(x,i/) =0.50], "intransitivity" of behaviour may 
arise as a consequence of a phenomenon called random error of response, 
or in short, landom ilion.. We have said earlier that it may be argued 
that no true choice between χ and y has been defined if 1-λ< ρ (*,(/) <λ 
and indeed, theoretically, to obtain random error (of response) there 
need not be complete indifference between χ and y: all that is required 
is that the error variations be larger than the difference between their 
true sub]ective values. 
(3) Last but not least, observed intransitivity may be simply due to 
genotypic intransitivity. This form of intransitivity is based on true 
intransitivity of the subjective values, i.e., on intransitivity of the 
true subjective values. Genotypically intransitive choices may be 
assumed to be consistent in time, at least in so far as preferences 
(true choices) themselves may be expected to be temporally constant. 
This analysis calls for experimental tests to choose between the three 
proposed hypotheses. Such tests may be based on any information 
available about the true subjective value of the alternatives. It is 
here that the parameter of decisiveness λ comes into the picture again. 
It may be thought that "random error" is most frequent when the true 
subjective values lie close together, so that λ may be expected to be 
close to 0.50 — indeed, it is not unreasonable to postulate that 
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random error of response decreases as decisiveness increases. The 
"processing error", however, should remain rather independent of the 
true subjective values (hence, of the value of λ) and display little 
consistency. Only genotypic intransitivity may be expected to be 
consistent, i.e., persistent during time. When there is no observed 
tendency for agents to persist in making intransitive choices, there is 
really nothing to support the hypothesis of genotypic intransitivity. 
We now come to the general case. When alternatives are "complex" in 
that they vary along two or more latent attributes that are relevant to 
the choices of an agent, we assume that he bases his choices on the 
subjective values taken by the alternatives on the attributes in 
question. We suppose that the agent is capable of combining the 
subjective values of two alternatives so as to make pairwise choices. 
But we should like to mention explicitly that we do not adhere to any 
crude utilitarian view that would attribute to every alternative one 
single subjective value, either ordinal or cardinal. This implies that 
there is, generally, no complete ordering to be expected among the 
alternatives, which of course opens the door to genotypic 
intransitivity. If there is any complete ordering at all, it is, at 
best, among the subjective values w-t-tfi-cn a. n.ng¿e. a.ttl4.bu£e.. This view, 
which is in agreement with the general heuristic principle that 
properties of aggregates should be derived rather than assumed the same 
as those of their components, says nothing about the process by which 
an agent combines the subjective values of two alternatives. This 
problem may require an analysis of the process of choosing between 
complex alternatives, an analysis which has not yet proceeded very far 
[see MONTGOMERY & SVENSON (1976)]. We believe that the nature of such a 
process has to be specified by an appropriate theory of choice, a 
viewpoint that will be stressed more fully in Chapter II. But whatever 
the process may be, we are confident that nothing will have to be 
changed in our analysis of possible hypotheses for intransitive 
behaviour. We have only to add that the process by itself may be a 
source of processing errors: these may be generated when, by "error", 
some sitZzvant attributes are ignored or discarded on particular choices 
or as a result of incomplete scanning of the alternatives or even by 
reliance upon -сіігіг ant attributes. But there remains the important 
possibility of genotypic intransitivity entering the choices in a 
quite natural way, as a result of the mechanism by which the subjective 
values of the alternatives are processed, before being combined m some 
appropriate way. 
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The last mentioned argument calls for appropriate theories of choice. 
Theories of preference are required connecting latent true choices and 
observable actual choices. Formally, such theories can be seen as those 
relating a binary preference structure to a binary choice structure. 
The literature provides some promising examples. As already mentioned 
in Section 1.4, there exist interesting relationships between certain 
probabilistic consistency conditions and certain specific 
axiomatizations of the preference notion. It is really not very 
difficult to show that when χ > y is identified with p(x,i/) >0.50, a 
binary choice structure <A,p> satisfies weak stochastic transitivity 
(WST) if and only if the ordered pair (A,p) is a strict weak order. 
FISHBURN (1973) has shown that similar results hold for families of 
"decisiveness" relations > , when x> ц is identified with ρ(χ,ι/) >λ. 
λ λ 
Families in which all the relations > are of the same type (e.g., are 
λ 
all strict partial orders or all strict weak orders) may be 
characterized by specific consistency conditions. Indeed, FISHBURN 
shows that every > of a family is a strict partial order [strict weak 
order, respectively] if and only if partial stochastic transitivity 
(PST) [negative stochastic transitivity (NST), respectively] is 
satisfied by the corresponding choice structure. Similarly, every > of 
a family is an interval order if and only if interval stochastic 
transitivity (1ST) is satisfied, while every > is a semiorder if and 
л 
only if both 1ST and JST are satisfied. These examples demonstrate the 
importance of the relationship between certain forms of stochastic 
transitivity and types of families of > -orders (0.50<λ<]). This 
λ 
contribution to the interpretation of pairwise choices m terms of 
underlying true choices (preferences), substantial as it is, has one 
notable drawback: it provides no room for genotypically intransitive 
choices because all of the above-mentioned (preference) relations are 
quasi-transitive, i.e., satisfy PP-transitivity. Also, and what is 
worse, it is intended to be a contribution to the analysis of 
preferences generated along one single attribute only. 
Generally speaking, the problem is to discover some restrictions on the 
pairwise choices to guarantee that they can be derived from some 
specific binary preference relation. Conversely, there is the study of 
restrictions on a preference relation that guarantee a binary choice 
structure of a certain type. When the ordered pair (A,>) is restricted 
by formal properties having intuitive appeal in the context of 
preference, the pair will be called a b-cnaiy p/ieje-tence itiuctatLe., to 
be denoted <A,^> . The basic notion connecting a binary preference 
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structure and a binary choice structure is — not surprisingly — the 
notion of logical equivalence. When <Af>> «• <A,p> holds between a 
binary preference structure and a binary choice structure, we say that 
the choice function ρ is de/i-tued from the preference relation >; we may 
also say, then, that the preference relation > ge.n.i/ia.te.i the choice 
function p. The interesting types of choice functions include those 
that satisfy various sorts of consistency conditions ( ). These types 
of preference relations may satisfy various formal properties such as 
completeness, asymmetry, transitivity, etc. Should a preference 
relation violate completeness, a choice function will clearly not exist 
because there exists some pair (x,i/) for which neither x>y nor y > χ 
nor χ~ y so that the choice function p(x,y) will be undefined. 
Similarly, if a strict preference relation violates asymmetry, a choice 
function will be made impossible, at least in our formalization. 
Clearly then, for a choice function to exist, certain properties are 
indispensable. What about transitivity? In this study the argument is 
precisely that transitivity is not really necessary, that is, we 
seriously consider the possibility of obtaining a choice function in 
spite of violating the transitivity of the preference relation. 
Although recognizing that there may be several rational and systematic 
ways of thinking about preference, we advance here a formalization of 
the preference notion based on one single indispensable property, 
namely, asymmetry. In the present work a preference relation > will 
always be an asymmetric (not necessarily transitive) binary relation; 
it will be shown in Chapter II that this definition carries the 
important practical implication that, provided indifference is defined 
properly, the relation ^ is complete. 
Once the theoretical possibility of genotypic intransitivity is 
admitted, we have to provide suitable choice models, i.e., those 
capable of predicting truly intransitive choices. Such models would put 
a different face upon the experimental identification of intransitivity. 
We have related earlier (Section 1.4) why it may be so difficult to 
distinguish between inherent (genotypic) intransitivity and apparent 
(phenotypic) intransitivity. It has been shown that it might even be 
impossible to distinguish maximally "intransitive" choices from 
completely random choices by observing the relative frequency of 
"intransitivity" within arbitrarily selected triples. MORRISON (1962) 
( ) In the economic literature, some interesting types of choice 
functions are those which satisfy various so-called "revealed 
preference" axioms; see Section 1.7. 
36 
argues that better tests of (in)transitivity could be obtained by using 
many replications of a few well-chosen alternatives rather than by 
using a few replications of many alternatives — the latter approach 
has, however, been adopted in many experimental verifications of 
"intransitivity". More powerful tests would certainly be achieved by 
selecting in advance а (¡гш triples on the basis of their expected 
intransitivities of choice. And this is feasible typically when a proper 
choice model is available. To subject (in)transitivity to rigorous 
experimental testing, we need a plausible theory of choice, i.e., a 
theory that allows the prediction of genotypic intransitivity and that 
describes the alternatives in terms which can guide their selection. In 
the absence of a selection of triples, i.e., in the absence of a model 
that yields the prediction of genotypic intransitivities, the 
experimental verification of intransitivity may be a real burden indeed. 
The point of view adopted here is that transitivity of choice is an 
empirical question. It is however, by the same token, a theoretical 
matter. The alleged transitivity of the preference relation underlying 
a binary choice structure is surely an assumption that has to be 
verified by data. When an experimenter assumes the existence of a 
transitive preference relation, for instance by virtue of some 
psychological theory, he requires the data to be such that an agent 
chooses χ to г after having chosen x to у and у to ζ. But what if ζ is 
observed to be chosen rather than x' The experimenter may then adopt 
either of two courses of action. He may of course decide to refute the 
transitivity assumption although, in principle, he may as well suspect 
the data and interpret the observed behaviour (i.e., the choice of ζ 
over x) as an "error". The latter decision may not be unreasonable in 
certain cases: a complete paired comparisons design may contain quite 
a few circular triples which can all be obliterated by reversing one 
single binary choice ( ). To be sure, the interpretation of observed 
"intransitivities" as distortions (by error) of some underlying 
transitive behaviour is a decision not to be taken without some 
further consideration. An experimenter who becomes involved in such a 
course should in fact restore the latent reality, that is, he should 
identify the correct underlying transitivity, and this may turn out 
not to be trivial at all I see BEZEMBINDER (1976)]! Of course, in 
principle, circular triples may occur with such a frequency as to 
( ) Incidentally, SLATER (1961) proposed measuring the "intransitivity" 
of a complete system of paired comparisons by counting the minimum 
number of reversals required in order to obtain a complete order. 
37 
render doubtful any interpretation in terms of error. There may even be 
a certain number of Ρ-cycles, which would render the hypothesis of 
transitivity still more dubious. But, in the end, there is no escape 
from the fact that it is always the experimenter himself who must 
ultimately decide whether to attribute a discrepancy between theory and 
observation to error, rather than to inadequacies in the theory. 
Hence, in being confronted with observed "intransitivity" while working 
with a transitive theory of behaviour, an experimenter may either stick 
to his theory or, alternatively, seek modifications in order to bring 
it into conformity with the observed phenomena. Suppose he decides to 
interpret an observed circular triple as the result of truly 
intransitive choices, what kind of explanation could then be furnished 
for the behaviour? In the next Section we shall indeed review models of 
choice that have been proposed to account for intransitivity. 
1.6. A SURVEY OF MODELS FOR INTRANSITIVE CHOICE. 
In the literature, current results indicate that violations of 
stochastic transitivity conditions on choices may occur. What 
implications might such violations incur for experiments employing 
triples selected without regard to potential intransitivity7 We have 
argued that they are likely to have little effect in so far as it is 
difficult to distinguish genotypic intransitivity from intransitivity 
as an epiphenomenon of inconsistency. Yet, the literature provides 
several "models" alleged to yield genotypic intransitivities. In 
commencing a review of these we should like to briefly mention (in 
chronological order) a series of papers that do not really present 
fully-fledged models, but that provide theoretical considerations in 
favour of "intransitivity". Quotation marks are used because it is, 
once again, not at all sure whether the authors intended to distinguish 
true intransitivity from inconsistency. Remember, by the way, that we 
have already mentioned (in Section 1.4) a few studies in which this 
lack of concern was rather obvious. 
Theoretically, intransitive choices might be related to any arbitrary 
preference relation that is not fully transitive. McCULLOCH (1945) , for 
instance, showed how intransitivities could arise from a neural 
switching circuit model. A rather simple nervous network with the 
appropriate topology is easily seen to determine an intransitive binary 
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preference structure. Although transitive choices require a nervous 
network that maps on a plane, one diallel (or "cross-over") would be 
sufficient to obtain intransitivities so that the network can no longer 
be mapped on a plane. McCULLOCH asserts that a suitable nervous system 
composed of only six neurons is sufficiently endowed to be 
unpredictable from any transitive theory. And he concludes: 
cL±>icata.>L±t-Le.i λ,η ркг^гАипсг -tnitíCLd od -tnd-tca-t-tng ^nconi-Litenc-сго, 
actually dzmonòtiatz conA-catenui/ od a hj-ghzi оіагл (p. 93), namely, о^ 
an oKde.1 too lu.gh to pílmít the. conbtlact-LOn oí a ісаіг 0$ ьаІие.& (p. 89). 
McCULLOCH's study seems to indicate that an increase in the complexity 
of a choice mechanism is favourable to intransitive behaviour. This 
belief lingers everywhere in the literature. It is also true of 
RAPOPORT (1949) who, in his theoretical study of "peck right" among 
fowl, presents a very peculiar way of coping with the intransitivity 
issue. According to his view, peck right is completely determined by 
relations existing between certain inherent or acquired characteristics 
of the birds. So far so good. But RAPOPORT then formulates the 
determination of peck right by 
χ > у о 4 lx-,у) > Цу, Χ.) 
where x and у are members of the bird society, and where ^ is a 
certain function uilw&e. an.giime.yiti aie the tie.ipe.ctA.ve. "chanacteiA-it-LCi" 
0(5 the individuali involved in the peck lijht itlatton (p. 186). If i 
were a function of a single variable, transitivity would of course be 
warranted; but if ¿ is a function of more than one variable, functions 
d might be found that would allow both transitive and intransitive 
relations, depending on the values of the arguments. This is the basis 
of RAPOPORT's exhortation to begin the loqical development of, the peck 
/light pioblem by examining iome iuch function ¿ [...1. The itluctaie 0$ 
a ioaety unii then be detiimined by the ^олт o¡$ ¡j and by the 
datltbution oí the "chaxacteintiCi" among iti mtmbeli (p. 186). 
SAVAGE (1951) proposes reasonable courses of action when incomplete 
information gives rise to uncertainty. SAVAGE'S conception of decision 
under uncertainty is based on a states-of-nature approach. In this 
approach, the uncertainty concerns the existing "true state". An agent 
faced with a choice between courses of action x ,.,.,χ is assumed to 
know that the possible states of nature are i ,...,i , but not to know 
which -4 is the actual state. He is assumed to assign, for each 
appropriate i and j , a value (utility) u to the result of performing 
action x in the state i . Let и =max [a ] be the highest value i j j i ij 
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attainable under state i . We can then construct a "regret matrix" with 
entries 1 =α -u : each entry of the regret matrix is interpreted 
as a measure of the difference between the "payoff that is actually 
obtained and the "payoff" that could have been obtained if the true 
state of nature had been known in advance. SAVAGE's minimax principle 
goes then as follows: to each action assign its maximum regret value 
and select that course of action whose maximum regret is minimum. In 
lapidary style: minimize the maximum loss. This is SAVAGE'S advice. 
Although, plA-tna {¡CLCLÍ, it looks quite innocent, it leads to serious 
difficulties on closer investigation. But this is not our concern here; 
suffice it to say that SAVAGE's strategy may produce intransitive 
decisions (choices). 
In the fifties there was much ado about the empirical observation of 
"intransitivities" ( ). We are not going to go into these investigations 
since they furnish no explanation of observed "intransitivity" 
whatsoever. But we should like to mention FLOOD (1951-52) because his 
study appears to be quite unique in that it provides cycles of order 
greater than three. FLOOD asked his subjects for their binary 
preferences between physical objects of household utility and quantities 
of money. In his experiments, some subjects showed a cycle of order four 
over a set of ten alternatives, while other subjects showed cycles up to 
the sixth order. This is absolutely exceptional in the literature; to 
the best of our knowledge, intransitivity has been almost exclusively 
questioned in the light of triples only. 
QUANDT (1956) presents a quite different set of arguments. He claims 
that transitivity simply canno-t be generally true. This, according to 
the author, necessitates a revision of the traditional concepts of 
preference and indifference. QUANDT proposes to define preference and 
indifference in a probabilistic sense: he argues that the number of 
primitive characteristics (attributes) by which alternatives can be 
compared is so large as to necessitate a selection. The utilities of 
the various characteristics of the alternatives, together with the 
probability that certain attributes will be taken into consideration by 
an agent will then permit the calculation of the probability that 
alternative χ will be preferred to alternative y, i.e., the relative 
frequency with which χ will be chosen over y in the long run. QUANDT 
( ) See, for instance: DAVIS (1958), EDWARDS (1953a, 1953b, 1954a, 
1954b, 1954c, 1954d, 1955), HILL (1953), and PAPANDREOU (1953, 1957). 
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identifies preference with a greater frequency of choice. However, 
since agents must sample the attributes by which they are to compare 
two alternatives and, because this sampling itself may be dependent on 
the alternatives that are to be compared, QUANDT's definition of 
preference allows the possibility of circular behaviour. 
In a more or less similar vein, FLAMENT (1958) predicts circularities 
by assuming that some attributes are ignored in the pairwise choices. 
His analysis relies heavily on the concept of -t-type graphs described 
in HARARY & NORMAN (1953, Ch. 6). In such a graph there may exist, by 
superposition, t different relations between any two points. In 
FLAMENT's interpretation, the different relations correspond to 
different attributes. Since every pair of alternatives does net have to 
be compared on aZZ the attributes, any two given alternatives are 
related by a specific number of attributes. FLAMENT shows that even 
quite simple combinations of the contributions of the alternatives may 
lead to intransitivities. 
SHEPARD (1964) introduces striking circularities in judgments about the 
relative pitch of complex tones. His results Auggiit that pe-lceíved 
pj-tch cannot be adzquately ii¡>pKeoínte.d by a pufiety lect^í-tmai beati 
(p. 2346). SHEPARD's study provides grist to the mill of those who, 
over the years, claimed that pitch should be analyzed into two 
distinguishable attributes, viz., "height" and "tonality". According to 
old intuitions, the perception of pitch can be best described by a 
helical model in which "height" is represented by the vertical axis of 
the helix, while "tonality" is represented by the circular scale at the 
base of the helix. What SHLPARD tried to do was to suppress the 
dimension of height, so that all tones an octave apart could be mapped 
into the same tone, as if the tonal helix collapsed into a tonal circle. 
This brings to an end the first part of this Section in which we have 
presented various theoretical considerations in relation to 
intransitivity. We are sorry to have to dismiss them as modzli. Their 
status is essentially academic in that either they have been proposed 
as poit hoc explanations of observed circularities or, as α pX-LOlA. 
created abstract systems lacking any clear empirical content. In 
general, they fail to specify the triples for which intransitive 
pairwise choices will be predicted. We do not wish to be unfair to any 
of the afore-mentioned analyses, but we believe that they have been 
superseded by alternative models, which are now presented. 
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In order to introduce the first model, it is instructive to go back to 
the eighteenth century, when scholars first became interested in 
problems of collective choices by voting procedures. CONDORCET (1785) 
has proved that intransitivities may arise when collective choices are 
made by majority decision. Suppose that three individuals exhibit the 
following preference orderings on three alternatives x,y,z: xyz, yzx 
and zxi/. If the majority voting system is being employed the result may 
puzzle the participants: it is easily checked that χ can defeat y by 
two votes, y can defeat ζ by the same margin, yet ζ defeats χ by two 
votes to one. Thus, the method of majority decision may lead to 
paradoxical results. This phenomenon, which has been referred to as the 
Condonczt гЦгсі by GUILBAUD (1952, pp. 513-515), has for years been 
known as the paradox 0(5 voting, probably ever since NANSON's (1882) 
study of election methods. 
Although the method of majority decision is a highly appealing principle 
for collective choice, it is but one among many possible collective 
choice rules. We shall refer to methods of going from individual 
orderings to social preference соІ£е.сі-с г cho-tce ічіго. Formally, a 
collective choice rule is a functional relation ¡$ such that for any set 
of и individual orderings Κ.,.,.,Κ one, and only one, collective choice 
relation R is determined: R=¿(R.,...,R ). The relation R is then 
usually referred to as a iociat рігі&ігпсг Ke.lat4.on. Note that, in 
general, we do not demand that R must be an ordering. Following 
ARROW (1951), a collective choice rule that specifies oldzimgi for the 
society is called a ioc^at uie-lf^atie. (¡unction; a function that is 
essentially the same has been called a g/ioap dzcci-ton ¿unci-ton by 
MAY (1952) and by HANSSON (1969a,b). An obvious question arises as to 
whether general conditions should be imposed on the relation between 
the set of individual preferences and the social ordering. It may be 
quite sensible to avoid the preferences of a single individual 
dictating the social ordering by, for instance, the desires of a 
reckless condottiere, or the proclivities of a bloody despote. It is 
thus quite natural to require that a social welfare function must 
satisfy certain appropriate conditions. In his celebrated study, ARROW 
showed that a set of four apparently innocuous restrictions eliminate 
the possibility of having any social welfare function whatsoever! We 
shall not pursue his "impossibility theorem" further, but its scope 
should be stressed. The rather stunning theorem that ARROW proved 
demonstrates that no social welfare function exists that can satisfy 
the four conditions in question. The importance of the theorem lies in 
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the fact that it reveals not only that the method of majority decision 
leads to inconsistencies, but that the same problem will arise for any 
conceivable method, however ingenious. 
Attempts to avoid the impasse have been based on modifications of one 
or more of ARROW'S conditions. Indeed, ARROW'S impossibility theorem is 
very "economic": by Kiiax-ing any of his four conditions, the whole 
result collapses. If it had not, we would have been able to strenghten 
ARROW'S theorem immediately. In fact, ARROW (1951, Ch. VII) himself 
izitl-LCtid one of the conditions related to the number of admissible 
individual preference ordenngs: in extending a result of BLACK (1948a,b) 
he was able to show that if preferences are generated by so-called 
"single-peaked preference functions", then majority decision must be 
transitive irrespective ol the number of individuals holding any of 
the admissible ordenngs, provided the total number of persons is odd. 
In fact, several papers have been devoted to compilation of necessary 
and/or sufficient restrictions insuring a transitive group preference, 
when the method of majority decision is the collective choice rule. In 
this context, FISHBURN (1970c) and BOWMAN & COLANTONI (1972) may be 
cited. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that several investigators have 
questioned ARROW'S requirement that the social welfare function be a 
comptzte. ordering of all the alternatives. Among these, we should like 
to mention BUCHANAN (1954), GUILBAUD (1952), HANSSON (1969a), and 
KEMP (1953-54). HANSSON has shown though, that the relaxation of this 
requirement does not alter the result of ARROW'S impossibility theorem. 
MAY (1954) showed that ARROW'S impossibility theorem has much bearing 
on individual choice making. There is, indeed, a formal equivalence 
between ARROW'S choice model for η individuals each having an ordering 
of m alternatives and the corresponding model for one individual who 
orders m alternatives according to η different aspects or criteria. In 
this context, the aggregation procedure has been called а ркеieizntí 
aggtega-t-tng ¿unct-con. MAY's paper came as a blow to those convinced 
that intransitivity m behaviour could only be an illusion. In his 
study, MAY presents a theoretical framework that predicts genotypic 
intransitivities in individual preferences. The basic idea is that 
intransitive individual preferences may arise when the alternatives can 
be ordered in conflicting ways according to different criteria or 
attributes. This suggested a new explanation of the intransitivity 
phenomenon in human and animal behaviour, an explanation in terms of 
different ordenngs along distinct attributes. 
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This general idea was sharpened by MORRISON (1962). Suppose that the 
alternatives vary along и different attributes and that each alternative 
χ can be specified by its component values, x= (x..,...,x ), where χ 
stands for some physical magnitude of x on the -tth attribute. MORRISON 
then assumes that an agent, about to choose between two alternatives χ 
and y, is capable of three quite different things. He is supposed to be 
capable (1) of estimating the difference between χ and у for each of 
the attributes, then, (2) of weighting each difference estimate 
according to the perceived importance of each attribute, and finally, 
(3) of aggregating the weighted differences. This aggregation of 
weighted differences will then characterize the agent's over-all 
preference between χ and y, that is, will determine his choice. 
Formally, the estimated difference between the -tth component of two 
alternatives χ and у is represented by the value of a d-Ldiii&ncz 
ianct-Lon φ (χ ,y ) ( ). For the aggregation of the (weighted) difference 
estimates, MORRISON proposes a simple additive rule, viz., summing the 
weighted difference funtion values over all attributes. His model may 
therefore be represented as follows, 
η 
φ(χ,ί/) =1 ω Φ^(^»^) 
where и) characterizes the weight for the -tth attribute, and φ(χ,ι/) is 
the value of a dec-ti-ton function that determines the choice between χ 
and y: χ is chosen over у if and only if ф{х.,у) >0. MORRISON then shows 
that his model cannot predict intransitive choices ante.ii the difference 
functions are a particular type of non-linear function of physical 
differences. 
In order to test his theory, MORRISON particularized his model by 
specifying a decision function for artificially constructed stimuli. A 
display consisting of a temporal sequence of dots formed the stimulus 
and subjects were instructed to make judgments of relative number, i.e. 
an estimation of which of two stimuli contained more dots. In his 
experiments, MORRISON produced evidence for predictable intransitivities 
in judgments of this kind. Although no statistically significant 
violations of WST occurred, he did find consistent violations of MST. 
Unfortunately, these results do not admit of definite interpretations 
because a simplifying theoretical assumption of MORRISON'S theory was 
( ) An interesting case is that in which -1,0,1 are the only possible 
values of the difference function. This case is formally equivalent 
to MAY's (1954) hypothesis of weak ordering on the attributes. 
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violated in his experiments, hampering the prediction of genotypically 
intransitive choices. 
As has been said MORRISON suggested an explanation of the intransitivity 
phenomenon in terms of the form of the difference functions. According 
to his model, intransitive choices may occur when the difference 
functions are non-linear. The same sort of idea was used by 
TVERSKY (1969) who developed a similar model known as the addit-Lve. 
d-t^ e-tewce mode.¿. This model hinges on two basic assumptions, almost 
identical to assumptions in MORRISON'S model. According to the first 
basic assumption, the estimated difference between the -tth component of 
two alternatives increases monotonically with the algebraic difference 
between the corresponding subjective values. This assumption is based 
on the existence of real-valued functions ^.,..., (J , defined on the set 
of alternatives, such that j (x ) is interpreted аь the subjective value 
of alternative χ on the -ith attribute. Each difference function is thus 
assumed to be expressible as an increasing continuous function of the 
difference of two subjective values: 
According to TVERSKY, quantities of the form & = & (x )-<i {y ) can be 
viewed as the "advantage" or the "disadvantage" (depending on whether δ 
is positive or negative) of x over у with respect to the -ith attribute. 
TVERSKY's second basic assumption states that the values of φ (δ ) 
obtained are to be summed over all attributes. Alternative x is then 
preferred over alternative y whenever the resulting sum is positive. 
Formally, a binary preference structure satisfies the additive 
difference model (ADM) if there exist real-valued functions ί,,..., 4 
and increasing continuous functions Φ,,...,Φ such that 
η 
У->У ο Ι Φ U (*.)-<!. (!/.) 1 > 0 
where the difference functions must also satisfy the requirement that 
φ (-6) =-φ (δ) holds for all i . 
In his paper, TVERSKY proves that, when n>3, the additive difference 
model imposes transitivity л.^ and onZy -cij all the difference functions 
are linear; he also proves that for и = 2 transitivity holds -t ¡J and onty 
*-h φ, (δ) =Φ2(ίδ) for some positive t, while, for η = 1, TVERSKY's 
theorem reduces to a piece of rustic wisdom: transitivity is always 
satisfied. This theorem shows that the transitivity condition imposes 
extremely severe constraints on the difference functions. Furthermore, 
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if the additive difference model is satisfied and if even one difference 
function is non-linear, as is quite likely to be the case in some 
situations, then transitivity may be expected to be violated. 
In the spirit of the additive difference model, TVERSKY designed two 
experiments to investigate the possibility of producing reliable 
intransitivities. To do so, he radicalized the additive difference 
model by letting, for n=2, one of the difference functions exhibit an 
extreme form of non-linearity, viz. a step function where φ(δ) =0 
whenever i<r. In fact, he constructed alternatives under a 
two-dimensional "lexicographic semiorder". The alternatives consisted 
of two attributes which differed in importance to the subjects. 
Normally, subjects made their choices on the basis of the more important 
attribute although, occasionally, when having difficulty in 
discriminating between two alternatives, they switched to the less 
important attribute. Formally, this system where a semiorder is 
imposed on a lexicographic ordering (whence its name) may be seen as a 
limiting case of the additive difference model in which one of the 
difference functions is, orean be approximated by, a step function. 
Violation of the transitivity assumption is then possible when the 
alternatives can be ranked in conflicting ways according to their 
subjective values on the two attributes. Indeed, in concentrating on 
one attribute, a subject may choose χ over i/ and y over ζ (ignoring 
small differences between these alternatives on the second attribute), 
but the difference between x and ζ may be more salient on the second 
attribute than on the first, leading to a choice of ζ over x, in 
contradiction with transitivity. Hence, when the alternatives are 
complex, it may be possible to create cyclic choices by coupling 
"small" differences on some attribute with "large" differences on 
others. TVERSKY used this idea to construct alternatives which yielded 
stochastically intransitive data, viz. data which violate weak 
stochastic transitivity. But it is not the violation of WST that counts: 
what is exceptional is that most violations were in the expected 
direction, and almost all of them were in the predicted locations. 
Incidentally, TVERSKY's experiment is the exception already announced 
on page 26. Empirical evidence supporting the idea that agents (persons 
and animals) may employ the lexicographic semiorder has also been 
presented by NAVARICK & FANTINO (1974) as well as MONTGOMERY (1975c). 
TVERSKY's results show that, under specific experimental conditions, 
consistent and predictable intransitivities can be demonstrated. 
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Evidence about the stability of circular choices is of course essential. 
Henceforth, it is no longer unreasonable to consider the possibility 
that, in some behavioural situations, failure of transitivity occurs 
systematically, and might even be predicted. However, statements about 
behaviour arising from intransitive preferences have been commonly 
interpreted as making no sense, that is, as "irrational". The 
transitivity assumption has indeed often been regarded as particularly 
indicative of rationality — when the word "rationality" was not used 
as a synonym for "transitivity". In this study, we do not want to 
consider transitivity as part of the definition of rational behaviour. 
This will be made more precise in the next Section. 
1.7, THE RATIONALITY ISSUE. 
The problem of rationality of behaviour has been of interest to social 
scientists (viz., psychologists and sociologists), to economists and to 
logicians. We shall say a few words about rationality in each of these 
contexts, and that in a reverse order. 
(1) Logicians have developed extremely sophisticated theories of 
rationality, most of which appear to be based on a "Bayesian" model for 
rational decision making. In this model an agent faced with a choice 
between courses of action χ ,...,* is assumed to know that the possible 
"states of nature" are J.,...,! , but not to know which 6 is the actual 
1 m j 
state. He is assumed to be able to assign, for each appropriate -t and j , 
a utility α to the result of performing action χ in the state J . 
Faced with the choice between λ ,...,x the agent should determine, on 
the basis of his total evidence, a probability index p(i ) for each 
possible state of nature J . Then, (.n оісігі to be lat tonai, he should 
choose an action χ for which the expected utility 
m 
is maximal. This definition of rationality has been agreed upon by 
eminent logicians such as CARNAP (1962,1963) and REICHENBACH (1938,1949), 
although these gentlemen are known to champion very different theories 
of rationality. CREARY (1971) shows that the deep disparity between the 
Carnapian and Reichenbachian theory stems from the manner in which the 
probability indices p(i ) are to be determined from the total evidence, 
and this appears to be related to important controversies in the 
philosophy of induction. Progress is, however, being made toward 
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axiomatic theories of rationality, i.e. toward precisely stated and 
deductively developed theories of rationality. 
The Bayesian approach to rationality implies transitivity. The usual 
Bayesian argument for transitivity can be exemplified by the prosaic 
action of a "money-pump". Suppose an individual prefers χ to y and y 
to z, yet ζ to x. Suppose also that this individual possesses, at a 
given moment, the alternative x. It may then be reasonable to assume 
that he is willing to pay a certain amount of money to replace χ by ζ. 
Likewise, he may be willing to pay some amount of money to replace ζ 
by y and still another to replace y by x. He then ends up with the 
alternative he started with, yet robbed to the point that he may, 
henceforth, look twice at every penny! This illustrates the Bayesian 
(money-pump) argument for transitivity: according to Bayesian decision 
theory, violation of transitivity is "incoherent" since it requires an 
appreciable payment of money without any benefit in return. In a recent 
paper, BURROS (1974) presents an axiomatic analysis of the transitivity 
requirement in the general context of a so-called "money-pump game", 
i.e., a simulated game between two persons, the "decision maker" and 
another party called "the dealer". This study shows that it is quite 
possible for a coherent decision maker to violate transitivity of 
preference or indifference. In view of his model, BURROS argues that 
the axiom of transitivity is not a necessary truth for a general 
normative decision theory. 
(2) One of the common assumptions of economic theories is that consumer 
behaviour is "rational". In the field of economics, the concept of 
rationality consists traditionally of two parts: the first is that man 
is capable of a weak ordering of his preferences (choices), while the 
second is that man chooses so as to maximize something. The first part 
of this notion of rationality implies, of course, transitivity; the 
assumption of transitivity is a necessity for conventional economic 
theory indeed. The second part admits various criteria of 
optimalization: assumptions about maximization only become specific 
when they state what is being maximized. VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN (1944) 
have demonstrated that where behaviour satisfies a set of clearly 
defined axioms (which, incidentally, implies transitivity), the 
alternatives may be mapped into utility numbers, such that the behaviour 
may be interpreted as an attempt to maximize their mathematical 
expectation. Since then, the VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN axioms have often 
been recommended in economic theory, either as descriptive or normative 
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principles. This brings us very close to the above-mentioned notion of 
rationality as diffused by modern logic. 
In the economic literature, the notion of rationality has a long and 
honourable history, but this is not our concern here. It will be 
sufficient for our purposes to present the modern approach to the 
rationality issue, and in order to describe recent developments, we 
will have to further formalize the intuitive concept of choice. 
Let A be a non-empty set of alternatives. We assume that there exists 
a particular non-empty class V of non-empty subsets of A, i.e., we 
assume that A contains non-void subset A ,A ,... which may or may not 
overlap. Choice is then defined as a function i (A ) which allocates 
to each subset A a particular subset of A , namely, a set which 
contains the "chosen" alternatives. Functions of this type will be 
called cfio-cce ¿unc-t-ioni. Thus, choice functions are functions having a 
certain class of sets as their domain of definition; clearly, this 
notion generalizes the notion of a b-cnaiy cho-Lce. (¡anctton introduced 
earlier (Section 1.4). In analogy to a binary choice structure, we may 
define a cho-Lce itluctule. as the ordered triple (A,l/,^ > provided, of 
course, that we impose proper restrictions on the triple. A famous 
restriction is based on SAMUELSON's (1938a,b, 1947) notion of "revealed 
preference". Suppose a class V of subsets of A is given together with a 
<M ncjie -\ialae.d choice function ^ defined on V. Consider two different 
but overlapping subsets A. and A in V. Suppose that the chosen 
alternative (J (A ) also belongs to A , without being identical with 
(5 (A ). The alternative í (A9) is then "revealed" (by )^ to be preferred 
to the alternative (5 (A ), because ¿(A.) could have been chosen instead 
of (J (A ) — in the subset A — but was not. Thus, for any choice 
structure (Α,ν,^) , we say that an alternative xcA is liViatiLd 
plifaelied to an alternative у с A if, for some A cU, χ is chosen when у 
could have been chosen. A triple (A,l/,¿) that satisfies this assumption 
of revealed preference exemplifies a particular type of choice 
structure, but other types exist just as there are other forms of 
revealed preference; for a discussion of various choice structures we 
refer to HANSSON (1968b). 
It is nowadays fairly generally agreed that the rationality of 
(economic) behaviour may be described by postulating that an agent has 
a definite preference structure and that he chooses according to it. To 
capture this notion of preferences explaining choice behaviour, we 
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follow RICHTER (1971) and claim that a preference structure (A,>> 
/ia.t-cona.t^zii a choice function ¡5 on <A>l/,j> if, for every A e I/, 
(5(A) is defined by 
Í (AJ = { x|xcA^ and x>i/ ( ¡/ e AJ } (1) 
According to this view, if an agent has a preference relation > on a 
set of alternatives and if his choices are made in accordance with 
these preferences, then the preferences can be said to rationalize the 
choices. Conversely, to the extent that choice behaviour is of primary 
concern, it may be said that choices are rational if there exists лоте. 
preference relation that rationalizes them. Then, whenever a choice 
function ^ admits a rationalization, i.e., a preference relation > , 
the choice may be called rational and > can be called an underlying 
preference relation for the choice structure <A, I/,¿ ) . 
Hence, the mere existence of a choice function is in some sense a 
condition of rational choice; in the context of the majority decision 
rule, this was noted by CONDORCET as early as 1785. Indeed, RICHTER 
(pp. 32-33) shows that not all choices can be rationalized, and that 
the class of choices which can be rationalized is characterized by 
SAMUELSON's notion of revealed preference: this axiom of revealed 
preference must hold for att rationalizations. This shows that we can 
specify the notion of rationality by defining conditions (viz. 
rationality conditions) in terms of the properties of the choice 
function, a result known at least since ARROW (1959). Furthermore, 
the equivalence between certain choice structures and certain 
preference structures suggests that there is a close relationship 
between a choice function fulfilling some given property and the 
underlying preference relation satisfying particular conditions. Until 
now, little has been said about specific properties of the preference 
relation > in the context of rationality. In fact, RICHTER has taken 
the trouble to characterize choices which can be rationalized by 
particular preference relations, a subject that will not be pursued 
here. Suffice it so say that RICHTER calls a choice function {¡ 
tlaniA.t-Lve.-lat-conat when ¿ is rationalized by a transitive preference 
relation. 
( ) Actually, RICHTER's definition made use of a weak preference 
relation (> ), which leads to a slightly different concept of 
rationality. 
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Although the economic literature may be thought to be indoctrinated 
with the concept of transitive behaviour to the point that statements 
about behaviour arising from intransitive choices are interpreted as 
making no sense and should be referred to as "irrational" 
[see TULLOCK (1964)], there has been increasing recognition in recent 
years that the hypothesis of so-called "rational" behaviour is by no 
means coercive. Occasionally, a polemical paper contests the setting 
of traditional rationality, bringing discredit both on its normative 
importance and its descriptive validity. MICHALOS (1967), for instance, 
defies the VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN axiomatization arguing that their 
postulates are both inaccurate empirical generalizations and 
unacceptable normative principles. Other papers have a different scope: 
they tend to dispense with one of the constituents of the traditional 
notion of rationality in the economic literature, without refuting all 
points. CHIPMAN (1971) proposes a consumption theory without transitive 
indifference, whereas SONNENSCHEIN (1971) was able to shun transitivity 
altogether. Daring as these (and some other) studies may be, they 
remain exceptional and they do not alter the fact that the transitivity 
condition remains essential to current economic theories. 
(3) In the psychological literature, the picture is in some sense 
similar to that in economics. Almost every theory of behaviour 
assumes weak ordering of the alternatives, and hence transitivity. Far 
worse, measurement theories are based on empirical systems in which, 
invariably and quite explicitly, some entity is assumed to be 
transitive so that, for anyone interested in genotypic intransitivity, 
existing measurement theories can hardly be considered propitious. 
When sub]ects violate the transitivity assumption, they have usually 
been regarded as behaving in a manner customarily termed "inconsistent" 
or "irrational". In innumerable studies the word "consistent" has 
simply been used as a substitute, or even as a synonym for "transitive". 
A typical example is furnished by ROBINSON S DADSON (1956) who devised 
consistency tests for equal-loudness relations, and referred to a test 
based on the transitivity of indifference as a ciac-<.ai te.it o^ 
COnH-itzncy (p. 173). MARKS (1974) provides a quite recent instance 
when he calls on transitivity to assess the internal consistency of 
psychophysical scales. According to GRIDGEMAN (1963, p. 214) some 
authors even suspect that intransitive behaviour must have something to 
do with "perversity". Terminology is in fact responsible for some of 
the confusion. While "inconsistency" was often confounded with 
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"intransitivity" in popular language, GERARD & SHAPIRO (1958) prescribed 
the disentanglement of both terms in paired comparisons data. For a 
complete paired comparisons design, KENDALL & BABINGTON SMITH (1940) 
suggested measuring the "inconsistency" by a coefficient ς = 1 - ¿/^max» 
where d and d respectively denote the actual and the maximum number 
max r -" 
of circular triples; this index is seen as indicative for the 
compatibility of a complete set of paired comparisons data with a 
complete order. BEZEMBINDER (1976) stresses the fact that it is 
generally left unspecified wiu.ch complete order is meant, and he 
proposes to independently measure "circularity" and "Inconsistency" of 
paired comparisons, consistency being defined in terms of a g-tv/en 
complete order. Finally, in this study, we use the term "consistent" 
with a still different meaning: by consistency we mean a tendency to 
make the same choices over and over again when the same conditions 
present themselves. 
It has already been mentioned that transitivity is crucial for 
measurement theories. Transitivity is indeed basic to measurement 
models of sensation or value. The key role of transitivity in 
measurement theories stems from the fact that it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of a unidimensional measurement 
scale, at least when the number of alternatives is finite, or countable. 
Clearly, transitivity is a necessary condition for the existence of a 
cardinal or ordinal (utility) scale u, such that u(x) >a{y) if and only 
if x>y, for all x,y in A. But, for all practical purposes, transitivity 
may also be considered sufficient for the existence of a utility scale. 
The sufficiency holds not only for finite or countable sets, but also 
for a large class of sets that includes those ordinarily used to 
idealize sets of alternatives: this class includes all those sets of 
indifference classes that can be partitioned into a countable number of 
sets each of which is either (1) finite, or (2) denumerable and dense, 
or (3) denumerable and discrete, or even (4) continuous and separable. 
Transitivity thus underlies any utilitarian theory of behaviour: 
transitivity holds precisely when a money price (a utility expressed in 
terms of money) can represent the preference pattern, at least 
ordinally. If it were true that "everything has a price" reflecting its 
preference status, intransitivity of value j^udgments could hardly 
arise. Whether there can be a common scale for value, i.e. whether 
values are numbers of any one kind, is largely open to doubt. The 
assumption that values can be treated like numbers, at least ordinally, 
is certainly consistent with expressions of the form "I like χ mo-te 
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than (/", but this interesting linguistic coincidence may be related to 
what MAY (1954, p. 3) calls the pl-tc-tng рлорепи.£-сгі о^ а ргсип-салу 
¿0C4.e.ty. This is not to say that there exists a compelling linear 
hierarchy of values, or even that it would be fair to identify 
transitivity with rationality. 
In psychological studies, much as in economic investigations, there has 
been increasing recognition in recent years that the hypothesis of 
so-called rational behaviour is by no means coterminous with the 
existence of a utility function and, hence, with the assumption of 
transitivity. This trend is implicit in some of the papers we have 
cited in connection with models for intransitive choice (Section 1.6); 
in other papers, it is quite explicit. As a final comment we really 
must mention a provoking study entitled "The Irrationality of 
Transitivity in Social Choice" by FISHBURN (1970d), in which he claims 
that the transitivity condition is untenable as a general desideratum 
for social choice functions. 
• α π 
To conclude both this Section and the first Chapter of this study, we 
may say that there appears to linger in the psychological literature a 
widespread belief in the transitivity assumption. If transitivity is to 
be based on experimental evidence rather than on belief or assumption, 
data must be collected in order to investigate the precise nature of 
transitivity in human and animal behaviour. Years ago, EDWARDS (1961) 
recommended giving up the question of whether transitivity is a general 
principle of behaviour, and instead, investigating audit ibhat ce nd-ctioni 
[...J να-ΊΛ oui aiiampt-Loni about tiannt-Lv-Lty koLd, and und&l what 
cond-ct-Loni do thzy not (p. 483) . From this empirical point of view, 
there is no reason to suppose that all choices will be transitive, and 
none to suppose that transitive choices never occur. It is the task of 
the empirically-minded scientist to discover conditions that may be 
favourable or unfavourable to transitivity in behaviour, and therefore 
EDWARDS strongly advocated the creation of experimental conditions 
de.l'Lbzn.ate.ltj den.gmd to be ип^а оіаЫг to frianiit-Lv-Lty (p. 483). 
Though many people must have been aware of EDWARDS' exhortations, few 
were in a hurry to draw any radical policy from them. For almost two 
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decades investigators carried on performing experiments which ignored 
the essential distinction between true and apparent intransitivity, so 
that they were, in a sense, simply seeking a sort of Holy Grail. Yet, 
substantial progress has been made in лоте, papers, such as those of 
MORRISON (1962) and TVERSKY (1969). Despite the almost universal 
acceptance of the transitivity assumption in psychology, there exist 
experimental studies which show that, under appropriate experimental 
conditions, some behaviour may be genotypically intransitive. A few 
papers even show considerable advances in the theoretical approach to 
genotypic intransitivity. 
Until now, most experimenters have tended to believe that genotypic 
intransitivity is a very rare phenomenon, even if it exists at all! 
If further investigations were to support this conclusion, psychologists 
would really have nothing to worry about: they could continue along 
current lines of theoretical work in choice behaviour. Psychologists 
should indeed not be disturbed by either "processing error" or "random 
error", because both types enter into behaviour in a random fashion and 
so do not disturb any predictions that may be made under the assumption 
of transitivity, except to the extent that errors may be expected to 
crop up by chance. The fact remains that the presence of any genotypic 
intransitivity is consistent with only the lowest level of present-day 
psychological measurement. If there are behaviours which do not satisfy 
the assumption of genotypic transitivity, choices concerned with these 
behaviours should take account of this failure. The purpose of the next 
Chapter is to provide a modest contribution to this topic. 
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CHAPTER Π 
ON VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF THE ADDITIVE DIFFERENCE MODEL 
II.1. INTRODUCTION, 
This Chapter develops the themes first sketched in Sections 1.3-7. The 
setting will be multidimensional since our approach is based on the 
belief that the problem of genotypic intransitivity cannot 
satisfactorily be discussed within the confines of unidimensional 
theories of choice. Each alternative will thus be viewed as 
multidimensional in the sense of being a multiple-factor entity. 
Throughout this study an individual's preference relation on a set of 
alternatives will appear as a basic or primitive notion. This means 
that we shall not attempt to define preference in terms of any other, 
more primitive, notion. The idea of preference will be enmeshed m an 
asymmetric binary relation that does not necessarily have to be 
transitive. In respect of a connection between choice and preference 
we shall assume that preference governs the choices. The ultimate aim 
of this Chapter will be the presentation of a particular class of models 
for intransitive choice. These models are the result of a rather simple 
theory about individual decision making. In order to formulate this 
theory we shall require more than a single primitive or undefined 
notion: some preliminary definitions will be necessary. 
In Section II.2 we will be concerned with giving rigorous definitions of 
various derived notions. The notions of indifference and strong 
indifference will be defined in a straightforward manner. When the 
alternatives are multidimensional it seems natural to think of the 
preferences as being in fact compound, i.e., as aggregates of component 
preferences on different factors. This approach presupposes some kind of 
independence among the factors, namely that the order for a given 
factor is independent of the particular level of the other factors. The 
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assumption of independence will authorize the definition of the 
derived notions of unidimensional preference, unidimensional 
indifference and unidimensional strong indifference. We shall show how 
these notions quite naturally lead to the idea of unidimensional 
preference "intervals", and to the representation of the latter by 
so-called unidimensional oreference functions. 
Section II.3 will be concerned with different interpretations of the 
unidimensional preference relations. These interpretations arc related 
to different unidimensional preference conditions (axioms). We shall 
identify three types of unidimensional preference conditions which, m 
fact, are really conditions on the primitive (over-all) preference 
relation, bach of these types leads to a particular asymmetric binary 
relation, viz., to either a strict weak order, a semiorder, or an 
inteival order. These three specializations of an asymmetric binary 
relation admit utility representations that are already fairly well 
known; these theorems hinge on the (assumed) transitivity of the 
unidimensional preference relations. We do indeed require the 
unidimensional preference relations to be transitive, but wo do not 
require that the holistic (over-all) preferences be transitive. It is 
arguable that over-all preferences should depend not merely on 
unidimensional preference ordenngs, but also on the idea of "strength 
of preference", and therefore wc shall be not so much interested in 
utility representations, but rather in the representation of 
preference "intervals". While the precise strength-of-preference concept 
will be examined in some detail, we shall, in fact, only require a 
weaker version based on either of two notions which we shall call 
"intradimensional simple scalability" and "intradimensional strict 
dual-monotonicity". 
Where the alternatives are multidimensional, the over-all preferences 
can be thought to result from the aggregation of unidimensional 
preference functions. Section 11.4 deals with preference aggregating 
rules, i.e., with rules that relate holistic preferences to the 
underlying unidimensional preferences. This idea will be made more 
precise by a notion known as decomposability. This allows us to 
establish a functional relationship between unidimensional preference 
functions and what will be referred to as an aggregated preference 
function; we shall then speak of a preference aggregating function. A 
well known choice model, called the additive difference model, makes 
good use of an additive preference aggregating function, that is, of 
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interdimensional additivity; this model is also based on a particular 
assumption of pairwise intradimensional comparisons between the 
alternatives. We shall indicate that both the interdimensional and the 
intradimensional assumption of the additive difference model can be 
replaced by a series of other assumptions. 
Section II.5 attempts to construct a rational basis for individual 
choice making. We shall identify various conditions that should be 
considered in the context of selecting satisfactory, i.e. rational, 
mechanisms of individual choice. These conditions of rational choice 
will be formulated as properties of the preference aggregating 
functions. We shall examine rationality conditions found within the 
field of collective choice making and see how well (or how badly) they 
fit in with problems of individual choice making. It will be shown 
that Arrow's celebrated "impossibility theorem" may be interpreted as 
supporting the intransitivity of individual choices. The opportunity 
will be taken to point out the moral aspects of individual decision 
making. Finally, we shall dwell on the problem of choice in those cases 
where there is a patent conflict between the dimensions: it will be 
argued that, although the conflict may sometimes prove to be resolvable 
by reliance upon certain particular aspects or dimensions (i.e., by 
deliberately avoiding others), there is no general method for resolving 
"difficult choices". 
Section II.6 provides a connection between several intradimensional and 
interdimensional properties (assumptions) introduced in earlier 
sections. We shall show that they can be combined quite independently 
to generate a variety of choice models of which the additive difference 
model is only one particular instance. 
The actual models are presented in Section II.7. We shall not go into 
all the details of every model, but rather take one of them (model Ml) 
as being archetypal of a class of dimensional models for the 
representation of multidimensional preference data. Although we deal 
with only one out of a class of models, certain (often minor) revisions 
render our analysis applicable to the other cases. In accordance with 
the theoretical orientation of the Chapter, numerical examples are only 
intended to illustrate the theory. They show that even quite simple 
models, operating under very mild assumptions, are capable of 
producing impressive fe-cycles (fe>3), a possibility that, within the 
literature, is very rare indeed. 
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II.2. GENERAL CONCEPTS. 
In the following theory it will be assumed that there exists more than 
one single attribute underlying the choice behaviour. Let (A,>> be a 
binary preference structure, that is, let A be a non-empty set to be 
interpreted as a set of alternatives available to an organism 
(individual, animal or group) at a given time, while > is a binary 
relation to be interpreted as a strict preference relation. We assume 
that the preference between any two alternatives is to be understood 
in the light of certain η attributes (n> 1). To be more precise, let 
A={A ,.,.,Α } be a family of и disjoint sets and let these sets be 
regarded as referring to η factors (latent attributes) along which the 
alternatives are perceived and structured. For reasons to be specified 
later, such factors are called d-tmeni-wpi and their number η is named 
the d.<.rmni-tona.t^ty of the alternatives. Each of the sets Α^,.,,Α is 
presupposed to be non-empty; they are actually assumed to be finite or 
denumerably infinite and the number of their elements will be indicated 
by n.,...,n respectively. The elements of factor A are labelled a., 
b ,c ,...; the elements of factor A are labelled a ,b ,c ,. .; etc. 
Any element of factor A1 will be represented by x.; any element of 
factor A by x.; etc. Where necessary we shall also use other letters 
(e.g.: ί/.,ι/„,...; ζ.,ζ , . . . ) . We further assume that the elements of 
each factor can be chosen without regard to the elements of the other 
factors. Formally, this assumption means that each alternative χ in A 
is an n- tuple х=(х1#Х-#...,х) of the product set Α = ΑχΑχ...χΑ , 
where χ.,*.,...,* arc called the compomnto of the alternative in 
question. For convenience we assume that each χ e A is the <th 
component of some χ с A. An alternative may thus be characterized in two 
equivalent ways: by a single symbol (letter) or by the n-tuple of its 
components. The components may or may not have actual numerical 
measures. We thus assume that the alternatives can be represented as 
point vectors in an n-dimensional subjective (psychological) space. 
In psychological applications, an alternative may be characterized by 
its components (x.,x„,...,χ ) though the numerical value of the 
corresponding coordinates in the psychological space are not known in 
advance. 
In our axiomatic study of preference A and > are considered primitive 
notions. For interpretative purposes one may think of x>y as 
"alternative x=(x1,...,x) is preferred to alternative ij = {y.,..., у ) " . 
This empirical interpretation of > is supposed to be such that it is 
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possible to decide, for a given к and y, whether χ> у , or not. We will 
now introduce two defined notions: 
DEFINITION 1 χ ~ у «• [not-(x>i/) and not- (y > X) ] 
DEFINITION 2 X ^y «. [x~2 o !/~.z;VzeA] 
The binary relation ~ is of course the relation of .¿па-с^глеисе; the 
binary relation « is called the relation of itlont} ¿nd.Í¿¿e.>Ltnce.. The 
precise properties of both ~ and « depend upon the properties of > . It 
is well known that many studies in preference theory are based on the 
assumption that > is an asymmetric окагк (usually a strict partial order 
or a strict weak order, although semiorders are encountered as well). 
For reasons already explained in Chapter I, we do not follow this 
procedure but rather impose a much weaker condition on the preference 
relation, assuming > to be simply an asymmetric binary relation. To be 
more formal about this, we state the following axiom: 
AXIOM 1 The relation > on A is asymmetric, i.e., if x.>y, 
then not- (ι/ > x) . 
Asymmetry has indeed been widely considered as a "natural" condition 
for preference. It can be viewed as a criterion of consistency: when an 
organism prefers an alternative x to y, it should not simultaneously 
prefer у to x. Axiom 1 has the following immediate consequences: 
( i) For all x,yeA, exactly one of x>y or y>x or x.~y holds (TRICHOTOMY); 
(ii) The relation > on A is irreflexive; 
(üi) The relation ~ on A is reflexive and symmetric; 
(iv) The relation » on A is an equivalence relation. 
These consequences are elementary and proofs are omitted here. For 
convenience, we define > as the union of > and ~ . In the present 
context, the binary relation > is not very elegant as it combines an 
undefined relation with a defined one, but it is well suited to our 
purpose in that, by trichotomy, ^  is complete on A. Indeed, since » has 
A as its field, it is a binary relation on the set of all the 
alternatives, a fact that will prove to come in handy in many situations. 
When the alternatives are multidimensional in that they vary along 
different factors A. (¿ = Ι,.,.,η), > can be interpreted as a binary 
relation on Α.χΑ χ.,.χΑ . A relation > then induces binary relations on 
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products of any n' factors (n'< n). Indeed, choosing fixed components 
in any subset of factors induces a binary relation over the complement 
of the subset, i.e., over the product of the remaining factors. Let В 
be any subset of A ={A ,...,A } and let B' be its complement in A, to 
wit: Be A and B' = A - B . For every fixed level χ in any А с В the 
relation > then induces a binary relation > D. on 
D 
A .cB' J 
J 
When for any subset of factors В the relation > , is independent of the 
choice of the levels χ in each А с Β, we say that the ordered pair 
<A,>> is independent. This is made more precise in the following 
definition: 
и 
DEFINITION 3 Let > be a binary relation on a product set A = I' A . 
(.= 1 ^ 
The relation > is independent if and only if for every 
В с A, the relation > , induced by > on Π A for В'= A-B 
A-cB'-' 
and for fixed levels X m each А с В, is-'unaffected by 
the choice of those levels. 
This definition leads quite naturally to the following definition: 
DEFINITION 4 A binary preference structure <A,>> is called -Lndipzndent 
if and only if > is an independent relation on A. 
Interpreted empirically, independence is a qualitative (i.e. ordinal) 
version of non-interaction between two or more factors. Perhaps the most 
salient property of an independent relation is that it induces a binary 
relation on each factor. Indeed, with respect to a single factor A^, 
independence justifies the following two definitions: 
DEFINITION 5 Suppose that > is an independent relation on A. Then, 
for any ч', a binary relation > on A is defined as 
follows: for χ ,ij г A , χ > ij if and only if there 
exists a set of components (α.,...,α _,,a ,,...,a ) 
such that 
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DEFINITION 6 Suppose that > is an independent relation on A. Then, 
for any -L, a binary relation ~ on A is defined as 
follows: for χ ,y e A , χ ~ y if and only if, 
according to Definition 5, not-(x > y ) and not-(i/ > x ) 
JC* Ж* л. ^ 4*. ^ 
Again for convenience, we define ^ as the union of > and ~ 
Independence is an important notion as it allows the trading of 
properties between the relation > and the relations > (4 = 1,...,n). 
When > is assumed to be an order, independence induces a natural order 
on each factor. But we are not assuming that > is an order: Axiom 1 
simply assumes > to be an asymmetric binary relation. It is quite easy 
to see that the relations > (¿=l,...,n) are all restrictions of the 
relation >, so that every relation > is both asymmetric (AS) and 
irreflexive (IR), while every relation ~ is both symmetric and 
reflexive. At the moment we cannot assert that any of the relations > 
is transitive. Note that they may ait be transitive, without > itself 
having to be transitivei The following theory is in fact based on the 
assumption that the relations > (ч.= 1,...,п) ал.е transitive, an 
assumption that will be made explicit in due course by appropriate 
axioms. For obvious reasons we shall refer to the ordered pairs <A ,> > 
(4 = 1 , . . . , n) as u.n4d4me.ni40na¿ рле^елепсе àt>Lu.ct\x>ie.i> ; the subscript 
refers of course to и different dimensions. 
Remember that, at the moment, we cannot assert the validity of 
independence. It may happen that for some (a.,...,a ,a .,...,a ) we 
h a v e (α
ι
 а
*-1' хЛ
+
1 %> > (αι "t-i'V^+i'···'%> 
while, for some other set (b
 λ
,...,b _.,b .,...,b) we have 
(Ь1 Ь,С-1' Ь,Ч-1 V > (Ь1 Ь4-\іХ4'Ь4^'---'ЬП)· H ° W e V e r ' 
in the following discussion, we shall suppose that independence holds. 
This, by the way, is why the factors A (4 = 1, ,n) have been called 
dimensions. The term "dimension" has been used in the psychological 
literature in quite different senses. For a brief discussion of this 
topic, see TVERSKY & KRANTZ (1970, pp. 594-595). Suffice it to say here 
that, in the present study, a psychological dimension is a factor along 
which the alternatives are perceived. According to this view, the 
existence of a psychological dimension requires the possibility of 
defining equivalence classes with respect to the alleged dimension, 
equivalence classes that must be 4nde.pznd&nt of those defined with 
respect to the other dimensions. Thus, to quote TVERSKY & KRANTZ, 4fa 
atea, ¿ол. example, 4i one o¿ the. p6ychotog4ca.l d4imn¿40ni ofi geome-t-tx-C 
¿-tgu/tei, tke.n one woatd expeci _ƒudgmen-tA сопселич.пд ал.еа to be. 
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-cndependení o¡$ th& ¿hape. oí, the i-tqufiQi. Th-a may not be tiae when alia 
-ci di^-cnzd phyi-ccalZy, but it-Ll¿ be. tfiat when alea -ci de{lA.ne.d by a 
p6yc.hotogA.ca.l lathei than a phyncaZ opeiat-ccn (p. 595) . This example 
shows that psychological dimensions need not be specifiable in the same 
sense as physical dimensions. The fact of the matter is that 
psychological dimensions are not necessarily accessible to direct 
observation. It is at present impossible to formulate a precise 
solution to the problem of recovering psychological dimensions that are 
completely unknown. The answer to this problem may require insight into 
the process of choosing between complex (multidimensional) alternatives, 
a subject-matter which has not yet proceeded very far; MONTGOMERY & 
SVENSON (1976) provide a tentative survey of what is known today. When 
a psychological dimension is defined in terms of a formal property such 
as independence, one can investigate which of several variables, if any, 
can be regarded as a psychological dimension — at least in the sense of 
satisfying the formal property in question. Hence, one should construct 
models for preferences between multidimensional alternatives and these 
should describe the alternatives in terms which allow testing of 
whether any variable (physically specifiable, or not) can be regarded as 
a psychological dimension. Of course, there remains the possibility 
that psychological dimensions may be further defined by formal 
properties other than independence. As models are developed for 
preferences between multidimensional alternatives, it should become 
easier to detect the relevant dimensions in specific choice situations. 
Today, however, nothing very definite can be said about this, unless the 
alternatives are generated artificially so that they vary along a few 
well-chosen dimensions that can be manipulated experimentally (the 
implicit assumption being that those dimensions are indeed the relevant 
psychological dimensions). Future developments will hopefully teach us 
how to elicit the latent dimensional structure of a choice situation, 
e.g., from the pattern of its intransitivities. 
Until now we have been concerned with the notion of preference when it 
is assumed that the choice alternatives may be subjectively described on 
a number of dimensions. In what follows it will be recognized that the 
preference concept is not so much concerned with individual alternatives 
but is essentially a property of paili of alternatives. Whenever 
independence is satisfied, the preference relation > induces a 
relation > on every dimension -t. By virtue of the latter relation 
we can refer to "intervals" within one dimension. For the sake of 
concreteness, we assume that the elements of every dimension A appear 
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in a natural order on their dimension. This is depicted for two 
arbitrary dimensions A and A in Figure II.1; the use of two dimensions 
is for illustrative purposes only. Whenever two elements are capable of 
being ordered by preference judgments, this assumption of natural 
ordering is trivial since it can always be met by relabelling the 
elements of the individual dimensions. By an iníe-Ίϋαί m A we simply 
mean the formal entity denoted (x ,y ) , where χ and y are called 
- 1 ι 1 ι 1 I 1 
1 
• 1 I 1 1 1 I · | 
s 
j- 1 I 1 ι 1 ι 1 I 
d с b a. 
Figure II.1. 
the zndpo-Lnti of the interval. When possible, i.e., whenever the 
elements χ and у can be ordered by preference judgments, a distinction 
is drawn between (x ,y ) and (y ,x ). We shall adhere to the convention 
of writing the interval as (x ,у ) [rather than (y ,x )] when χ > у . 
Л. Л, Л. Л. Л, Л- л. 
We assume therefore that, for every -L, the non-diagonal elements of 
Α χΑ can be divided into two sets of pairs, (x ,y ) and {y ,x ), each 
of which behave in a manner that makes sense in the context of a choice 
situation. In addition, we shall assume that a comparison is possible 
between both types of interval, an assumption which will prove to have 
an "ethical" flavour about it. To lend precision to this idea it will be 
useful to make our interpretative intentions explicit. It is assumed 
that the distinction between (x ,y ) and (y ,x ) reflects the asymmetry 
of the preference relation > . This is to say that if the preference 
x >- У is to be represented in some way or another by a number 
φ (χ ,y ), we shall have to decide on the value of φ (у ,χ ). In general 
we shall certainly be interested in axioms that permit the construction 
of particular real-valued functions φ (x ,y ) on A xA {i. = 1,...,n). 
Such a function φ (χ , t/ ) will be called a и.п*.ал.тгпі4.опа.І ρ·* e ¿ел e ne e. 
iunct-Lon, or in short, a api; similar functions were called d-LÜzie.ncí 
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iu.nctA.oni by MORRISON (1962) and by TVERSKY (1969) I sec Chapter I]. In 
the intended interpretation φ (χ ,y ) characterizes the preference of 
χ over y . In its crudest form, a upf will take on only the values 
-1,0,1 ; under these circumstances it is clear that a upf merely 
quantifies the d-ttiecln on of the corresponding unidimensional binary 
preference relation. But in the following theory, upf's will be allowed 
to take on any real value, thus granting a degree of latitude that will 
prove to bring us close to the realm of the notion of ¿ntenò-ity ο^ 
pie (¡zienct (also called itizngth o i рпе^сьспс e or degtee с^  ріс^гіеисе). 
Just how close will be seen in the following Section, where we analyse 
conditions on upf's as a result of plausible assumptions about the 
unidimensional preference relations, i.e., as a result of plausible 
assumptions on the (primitive) relation -> . 
II.3. CONDITIONS ON UNIDIMENSIONAL PREFERENCE RELATIONS. 
This Section is concerned with different interpretations of the 
unidimensional preference relations > and with conforming scaling 
assumptions. In the present study it is assumed that the unidimensional 
preferences are increasing or, at least, nondecreasing along the 
underlying dimension. While keeping an eye on this assumption one may 
look for other more or less restrictive asymmetric binary relations as 
possible interpretations of the unidimensional preference relations > . 
A strict partial order is one of the weakest asymmetric binary relations 
known to the author. But to interpret a unidimensional preference 
relation > as a strict partial order has one serious drawback, viz., 
it would permit x. > у , и -» ν , к - υ and у ~ и , a situation 
incompatible with a unidimensional continuum along which preferences 
increases monotonically. bor these preferences, therefore, some 
further assumption must be added to the defining assumption of a strict 
partial order. The interval order property fulfils this role well, 
leading, as it does, to an ordering that is slightly more restrictive 
than a strict partial order. Simultaneously, it fits in well with the 
idea of a single attribute generating the preferences. When a 
unidimensional preference relation > is interpreted as an interval 
order, the indifference relation ~ may be intransitive. An interesting 
assumption that can be added to the interval order property, without 
jeopardizing the possibility of intransitive indifference, is 
semitransitivity. Indeed, a semiorder is obtained by requiring an 
interval order to satisfy semitransitivity and it is well known that 
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intransitive indifference typically occurs in a semiorder. If we are 
willing to place still stronger restrictions on the indifference 
relation ~ , such that it becomes transitive, then > can be 
interpreted as a strict weak order. It will be remembered, by the way, 
that there has been defined another form of indifference, strong 
indifference (denoted « ), which turns out to be always transitive 
when > is an asymmetric binary relation (see Section II.2). Last but 
not least we stress the point that assumptions about > are really 
assumptions about >, which is our primitive notion. Statements about 
unidimensional preferences take on a rather complicated form if they 
are formulated in terms of the primitive relation >; it is, therefore, 
intuitively desirable to use a defined notion whose interpretation 
follows directly from that of the primitive anyway. 
As mentioned earlier, the asymmetry of the relations > {•c = λ , .. . ,n) 
leads to the problem of the relationship between φ (χ ,y ) and 
φ (y ,x ). Remember that our conventions imply that φ (χ ,y ) is 
A~ 'T*, 't 't 't ^-
associated with χ > y . Asymmetry requires that χ > y implies 
•t. t ^- ^ 't 't 
not-(y > χ ) which, in principle, leaves φ {y ,χ ) effectively 
Λ. t 't t- ^. -^
undefined! One way to make the idea of a relationship between φ (χ ,y ) 
and φ (y ,χ ) more precise is to postulate the so-called H-tjn->ie.ve?Lòa.l 
(SR) property which goes as follows: 
SR: W O J > W V 0 WV > MVJ 
This is a standard assumption whenever one wants to bring out a 
"directed difference" notion. A restriction of this assumption will be 
called the лілопд іА.дп-іе. гл.іа.І (SSR) assumption: 
SSP: W^J =- W V 
This stronger assumption could be interpreted to mean that the estimated 
"difference" between χ and y is to be considered the same as the 
estimated "difference" between y and χ , except for a change in sign. 
But this interpretation appears to be unnecessarily severe, as both SR 
and SSR can be seen to be assumptions that only allow a simple trading 
between the properties of "opposite" intervals (x ,y ) and {y ,x ). As 
long as the representation of the intervals is ordinal, there should be 
no objection to the adoption of SSR which, of course, greatly reduces 
the number of parameters in the scaling model. 
In order to see that either assumption (i.e., SR or the stronger SSR) 
may lead to "ethical" involvements, we interpret the quantity φ (χ ,y ) 
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as the "advantage" of χ over ij and, similarly, the quantity φ ( ι/ , χ ) 
as the "disadvantage" of y over χ [for a congruent interpretation, 
mentioned in Chapter I, see TVERSKY (1969, p. 41)]. Such an 
interpretation would imply that the advantage of any choice situation 
can be equated with the disadvantage of some "opposite" choice, at least 
ordinally in the sense of SR. This entails ethical problems since it 
implies some compensation principle between the "good" and the "bad". 
Such a principle is not at all self-evident in every choice situation: 
it may indeed be argued that, for instance, the ли^елчпд-о о^ -Cíie man 
undet an -t.nqu.<.H-t-Lon wiZZ неиел. be waihid out by the ga-tn, кои-с еі 
ía>ig(l, oí the. inqu^iito/i [SEN (1970, p. 140)]. This and similar examples 
show that SR and SSR may lead to counter-intuitive preferences so that 
they may not be acceptable for iome preference situations. Although it 
cannot be stated that the advantage of every choice situation can be 
related in any simple way to the disadvantage of some opposite 
situation, we do adhere to such simplifying assumptions not merely 
because they provide convenient shortcuts, but, in particular, because 
they constitute in fact extremely weak scaling restrictions. 
Our fundamental unidimensional scaling assumption will be as follows: 
Trichotomy and SSR together then require that one, and only one, of 
three situations holds: 
either x, ^, У, " I ί>, (*,»'/,)> r, a n d Φ,(!/,'Χ,)< "' . 1 
у<>±\ - ^ J v V >F¿ and V W < -rJ 
o r x<.~<.y< - r-r^ « W V ' W X J < + FJ 
For convenience, we also create the following scaling convention: 
Obviously, χ = χ for every χ in A , whence φ (χ ,χ ) =0. When 
χ ~ и holds, we say that the upf's φ (χ ,y ) and φ (y ,χ ) take on 
"small" values, i.e., values between the quantities -c and г . The 
numbers f U = 1 , . . . ,n) can be interpreted as sensory thresholds. They 
convey the idea of a limitation of the discriminatory power of an agent 
(individual or animal) by making possible intransitive indifference. In 
the present study, sensory thresholds need not necessarily be constant 
because > may be assumed to be an interval order. If we are willing 
to put stronger restrictions on indifference and accept the idea of a 
semiorder, we may keep to the same representation augmented by the 
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constancy of the sensory thresholds; formally, this idea is introduced 
by the assumption that the e 's (ч. = 1,.. . ,n) are constants. Finally, if 
a simple idealized theory is required, even at the price of ignoring 
objections to the transitivity of indifference (see Chapter I), all we 
need is to equate the ε 's to zero. 
Each of the above-mentioned specializations of an asymmetric binary 
relation (i.e., an interval order, a semiorder and a strict weak order) 
admits a typical representation theorem. These theormes are fairly well 
known so that we shall content ourselves by simply mentioning the 
results. Let A / « be the set of equivalence classes of A under » . 
It has been proved by FISHBURN (1970a) that, if > is an interval order 
on A , and if A / » is countable, then there exist real-valued 
functions u and ρ on A , with ρ (χ ) >0, such that for all χ ,У e A , 
χ > и » u (χ ) > Ц (и ) + ρ (и ) 
According to this representation, utility numbers u (x ) can be assigned 
to the elements in A . The representation suggests characterization of 
"indifference intervals" as follows: I (x ) =[u (x ), u (x ) +ρ (χ )] 
for each χ e A . It is then readily seen that FISHBURN's results 
simply boils down to the following "interval representation": χ > Ц 
if and only if I (x)>I (¿/ ) . The interval I (x ) may be thought of as 
a range of "fuzziness" or indiscnminability for χ . If these ranges 
overlap for χ and и then χ ~ и , otherwise either χ > Ц or 
у > χ ; by the above interval representation I (x ) is wholly to the 
right of I ((/ ) if and only if χ > tj . The representation allows 
different degrees of fuzziness for different stimuli, depending on the 
value of the "vagueness function" ρ (χ ). In psychological applications, 
the indifference intervals may be interpreted as sensory thresholds; in 
the case of an interval order, the sensory thresholds have different 
values for different elements m A [see FISHBURN (1970a, p. 146)]. The 
main feature of a similar concept in the context of a semiorder is that 
the thresholds all have (or can be made to have) a constant value. 
Indeed, it was first shown by SCOTT & SUPPES (1958) that, if > is a 
semiorder on A , and if A /« is finite, then there is a real-valued 
(utility) function u on A such that, for all * »!/. m A , 
In this interval representation, with I (x ) =[a (x ) , u (x ) +1] , all 
intervals have the same length (unity is merely selected as a matter of 
convenience). This, quite naturally, suggests the idea of a constant 
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"just noticeable difference". Therefore, both the interval order and 
semiorder notions apply when the elements of A can be visualized as 
represented by indifference intervals on the underlyinc continuum. 
Note, by the way, that m both cases the representation s such that 
x. =5 y iff u (x ) =u (u ) . When > is assumed to be a strict weak 
order, ~ is transitive and it is impossible to detect the presence of 
any sensory threshold. It is indeed well known [see, for instance, 
BIRKHOFF (1948, p. 31)] that if > is a strict weak order on A and if 
A / ~ is countable, then there exists a real-valued (utility) function 
α on A such that, for all χ ,и in A , 
χ > Μ о u (x ) > u (u ) 
This representation can be viewed as an interval representation in which 
all intervals have zero length; thus, strict weak orders eliminate all 
"fuzziness" from the interval representation. 
Utility representations are known to capture the principle of a single 
underlying scale or dimension. They state that the effect of each 
element χ с A can be summarized by a single (constant) scale value 
u ( >t ). One way to make this idea of unidimensionality precise is to 
assume that the elements of A can be scaled so that the upf's are 
expressible as a monotonie function of the scale values of the 
respective elements. This condition will be called A.Y\.tna.át.miniiAona.t 
¿•empie 4сa.ía.b¿Z-tty (ISS). Technically, this property can be stated as 
follows: 
DEFINITION 7 A unidimensional binary preference structure ( A , > > 
satisfies -tn-flad-tmenj-tonii-i iimple. icaÍab<.ÍA.ty (ISS) 
if and only if there exist real-valued functions u and 
φ such that for all х.іУ, m A , 
x > у о t [α (x ) ,u (i/)]>F 
where ώ is strictly increasing in its first argument 
and strictly decreasing in the second. 
A similar assumption is prevalent in another scaling model, introduced 
by KRANTZ (1964), called "simple scalability". But KRANTZ's simple 
scalability is more restrictive than ISS in that it does not only 
allow the prediction of the difiect-Lon of choice (x > у , у > к or 
x ~ у ) but also the prediction of the exact choice probabilities. 
Hence, in KRANTZ's theory these choice probabilities are predictable 
from the scale values of the alternatives. When there is no need to 
predict exact quantities, the use of scale values may be thought to be 
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cumbersome. For this reason we introduce another property, christened 
j-ntKixdA-mtnb-Lon<Ll iti^ct dual-monoton-ccity (ISDM) . Formally, this is 
stated as follows: 
DEFINITION 8 A unidimensional binary preference structure < A , >^  > 
satisfies 4.пІіа.(1-сте.пі-соnat Atlict duat-monotonA-c-tty 
(ISDM) if and only if there exists a real-valued 
function φ (χ ,y ) such that, for all χ ,y in A , 
\><.У*. * фЛ'!>,с ) > е.с 
where φ is strictly increasing in its first argument 
and strictly decreasing in its second. 
This definition perhaps supplies the most general formulation of the 
idea that upf's are monotonically increasing (or else monotomcally 
decreasing) along their respective dimensions. 
A stronger form of ISS is well known under the name of •cntladA.tmni-Lona.t 
&ubt*.a.ct-tVA.ty. To give this property a formal expression we state the 
following definition: 
DEFINITION 9 A unidimensional binary preference structure ( A , > ) 
satisfies .^ní/íad^ menA^ onai &u.bt>iae.£j-\}-Lty (IS) if and 
and only if there exists a real-valued function u 
(defined on A ) together with a monotonically increasing 
function φ such that, for all x ,y in A , 
The difference between ISS and IS is, of course, that in the former, 
φ is a function of two variables, u (χ ) and uA y ), whereas in the 
latter it is a function of their difference. Obviously, ISS (or ISDM) 
is a generalization of the assumption of intradimensional 
subtractivity. Note, that the assumption that any of the just mentioned 
definitions holds for a specific unidimensional preference structure, 
leads quite naturally to the sign-reversal assumption (SR), but not to 
the stronger SSR. Note also (perhaos reluctantly) that any one of them 
points at some strength-of-preference notion, as mentioned earlier in 
this Chapter. As long as upf's can take on only the values -1,0,1, such 
as in MAY's work (see Chapter I), there is of course little to worry 
about. But when a continuous gradation of the values of upf's occurs 
there is room for the idea of preference intervals or "differences". 
Every model that assumes veridical perception of unidimensional 
preferences indicates the problem of the existence of upf's, and of 
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their form. In the literature, there is indeed some evidence in favour 
of the existence of unidimensional preference functions. There is 
PEAK'S (195Б) hypothesis that motivational arousal is a function of the 
"discrepancy" between two events. The old hypothesis of perceptual 
assimilation and/or contrast on a single dimension also hints at the 
existence of a upf. But above all, besides these theoretical 
considerations, modern psychophysics has provided a few suggestive 
results supporting the reality of upf's; these will be presented in 
Chapter III when we shall deal with the simulation of our models based 
on analogy to the construction of sensory scales (Section III.4). 
In a unidimensional preference structure satisfying IS, the upf's are 
expressible as an increasing continuous function of the differences of 
two scale values. In many instances, it may indeed be reasonable to 
expect that estimated "differences" increase monotomcally, with either 
the sensed difference or the sensed ratio between certain 
characteristics of the alternatives. However, when a subject is asked 
to estimate sensation "differences" (or, for that matter, sensation 
"ratios"), he does not necessarily act as though he were judging 
numzl-ccat differences (or ratios) of sensations. Yet, under certain 
circumstances, subjects may act as though they were judging 
unidimensional numerical differences (or numerical ratios) so that the 
corresponding upf satisfies the assumption of intradimensional 
subtractivity. In general, however, the requirement of IS seems 
unnecessarily restrictive and a more general class of upf's may be 
thought to satisfy ISDM. But even then, a upf may be thought to index 
the d-LWct-LOn of a unidimensional preference, as well as, in a vague 
sense, its magnitude as "measured" by some perceived "difference". 
This question is of much importance to all those people who believe 
in the old view that intensity of preference must have some relevance 
to the theory of (simple) preference — this view was indeed developed 
in the second half of the eighteenth century by BORDA (1781) . 
There are two conditions that invariably crop up in the context of a 
strength-of-preference notion. In the literature, this notion is in 
fact based on the idea of comparable preference differences, viz., on a 
primitive binary relation on pairs of ordered pairs. The two 
above-mentioned conditions are then expressed in terms of this binary 
relation. Since we have not foimally introduced the notion of comparing 
unidimensional preference differences and, worse still, are not willing 
to introduce such a notion, we are unable to state the two conditions, 
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although we do resurrect their spirit in terms of upf's: 
CONDITION 1 '('.¿(''.¿г!^ ) > ^¿^¿^ ¿^ =» ^¿ ( υ^ ' u¿> > Φ4. (!/^ ' "ч.' 
CONDITION 2 ф^ (х^, ^ ) > ф^ (сі^ . ^) « ф^ (x¿, u¿) > ф^ (^,υ^) 
Note that Condition 1 is implied by the sign-reversal assumption. For 
the statement of both conditions in terms of an abstract relation on 
ordered pairs, see FISHBURN (1970e, p. 210). We could of course have 
introduced the concept of comparable preference differences, and we 
may then have discovered stronger results since, following a rustic 
maxim, the more assumptions made, the more knowledge gained. But we 
feel that, within the context of an everyday notion such as preference, 
there may be good reason for assuming as little as possible. Hence, we 
do not introduce an explicit relation on ordered pairs so that, at 
present, we have no basis for comparing degrees or intensities of 
preference, since the mere choice (a1,...,a •_.,x • ,a . ,...,a ) > 
(a.,...,a ._ ,у . ,α.. .,...,α ) yields no evidence whatsoever as to the 
strength of the preference x.. •>. у . . But this problem will reappear as 
soon as we try to aggregate unidimensional preference functions. 
МЛ, PREFERENCE AGGREGATING FUNCTIONS. 
The literature provides two fundamentally different models for choice 
making between multidimensional alternatives. According to the first 
model, each alternative χ is evaluated independently and then assigned 
a (utility) number u(x) reflecting its subjective value. The traditional 
approach to problems of choice is indeed based on the existence of a 
utility function (either cardinal or ordinal) that in some fashion 
represents the "desirability" of the alternatives. The assumption 
follows quite naturally that an alternative χ is preferred to an 
alternative y, when χ contains more of something (namely, utility) than 
1/ or, formally, χ > у if and only if u.(x) > u.(y) . The possibility that 
this argument is tautological is a problem that will not be discussed 
here. Suffice it to say that the explanation of preference and/or choice 
in terms of utility is much older than the explanation in terms of 
preference relations; it was not until the advent of modern logic that 
the properties of binary relations began to be taken seriously, viz., 
as bases of the modern approach to problems of preference and choice. 
When the alternatives are multidimensional there arises the question of 
the process by which a single value u(x) is assigned to a complex 
entity (alternative) x. According to the most widely used model, the 
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subjective value of an alternative is expressible as the sum of the 
subjective values of the components. This model, which is essentially 
an additive conjoint measurement model, is known as the add-Lt-Lve. modet. 
It depends heavily on the existence of sinqle-valued functions u, 
u.,...,u such that 
I n и η 
χ > у о u(x) = J, u (χ ) > l и (y ) = a(ij) 
Axiomatic analyses of this model, based on ordinal assumptions, have 
been presented by DEBREU (I960), KRANT7 (1964), LUCE & TVERSKY (1964) 
and LUCE (1966) . 
This additive model can be extended in a natural way by assuming a 
strictly increasing function \ that represents the exact choice 
probabilities (assumed to be neither ?ero nor one) 
η r 
pCc.yi = i { Ζ %(*,) - J а,(У,) } 
{. = 1 ( = 1 
such that x > у if and only if ρ(x,y) > 0 . 50 . This extension is clearly 
a special case of the itxong (Fcckneiian] utility model according to 
which the pairwise choice probabilities can be expressed as a monotonie 
function of some underlying scale values, viz., as the difference of 
two scale values. 
Utility models assume that choices are made on the basis of the 
subjective value of the alternatives and, in the case of 
multidimensional alternatives, this simply boils down to the additive 
model. In contrast to this, another choice model has been prooosed 
based on component-wise differences between the alternatives. According 
to this second model, choices are determined by quantities of the form 
'S =u (x ) -u (Í/ ) . These were introduced earlier (Chapter I) when we 
presented the additive difference model. The second model is thus 
based on mtradimensional evaluations, viz., on the assumption of 
intradimensional subtractivity (IS). Accordingly, each component 
contribution is characterized by a upf that is a function of a numerical 
difference: φ (x ,</ ) =i (5 ) =i [u (x ) - α (f/ )1. This second model 
implies that two alternatives arc evaluated on the same dimension 
before another dimension is considered. In comparing two alternatives 
x and y, their "difference" on each dimension is evaluated by a number 
φ (i ), reflecting the contribution of the -tth dimension to the 
over-all preference between x and y. This latter preference is then 
obtained as a result of another assumption called "interdimensional 
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additivity" (see later, p. 91), which states that the contributions 
of the several dimensions should be summed over all the relevant 
dimensions. Both assumptions (intradimensional subtractivity and 
interdimensional additivity) together yield the additive difference 
model (ADM) presented earlier (in Chapter I), according to which 
и 
х.>У « l Ф^[%(*^) - "-¿ІУ^ I > 0 
ADM is a choice model where perceived "differences" along the various 
dimensions contribute additively to the over-all preference. According 
to this model, preference judgments are described in terms of two sets 
of scales: the first set of scales (u..,...,u. ) refers to the dimensional 
structure of the alternatives, whereas the second set (φ ,.,.,φ ) 
applies to the perceived differences along the dimensions, and describes 
their contributions to the over-all preference between the alternatives. 
The additive difference model can be further extended by assuming the 
existence of a strictly increasing function {¡ that accounts for the 
exact choice probabilities (assumed to be neither zero nor one) 
η 
P(x,y) =&{ I W V - и^У^]} 
such that χ > у if and only if ρ(χ,у) >0.50. This extended version can be 
regarded as the additive version of a multidimensional generalization of 
the strong utility model. 
From a psychological point of view, a comparison of the additive model 
with the additive difference model shows that they are based on 
different processing mechanisms. In the additive model, alternatives are 
evaluated individually and the preference judgments are immediately 
available as a result of these interdimensional evaluations. In the 
additive difference model, preference judgments are decomposed into two 
independent processes: a "perceptual" process satisfying 
intradimensional subtractivity and an "evaluative" process satisfying 
interdimensional additivity. Although the two models assume different 
mechanisms, TVERSKY (1969) has shown that the additive model is formally 
a &pe.c-La¿ cam of the additive difference model in which all upf ' s are 
linear. But this algebraic equivalence does of course not at all imply 
that the underlying psychological processes are identical! 
To the best of the author's knowledge, there is as yet little 
experimental evidence in support of either of the above-mentioned 
information processing strategies. At present it is probably difficult 
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to indicate at an experimental level those cases in which either 
strategy is involved in a particular choice situation, as for instance, 
in choices between real-world alternatives. Both strategies may be 
thought to be appealing, at least under certain circumstances, so that 
one may look for conditions that would favour one model instead of the 
other. So it can be argued that the additive model is more likely to be 
used when the alternatives are displayed sequentially (i.e. one at a 
time), while ADM is more likely to apply when the dimensions are 
displayed sequentially, although the distinction between simultaneous 
and successive presentation cannot be a very sharp one: even if two 
alternatives are presented simultaneously, a subject may attend to them 
successively. It may be that human subjects are capable of adopting 
either processing strategy in a single situation, depending upon 
the particular external factors Гог this reason, it may indeed be wise 
to follow MORRISON'S (1962) advice to encourage subjects to select a 
specific strategy by controlling any factor that may be thought to 
influence the selection. At present, nothing very definite can be said 
about these matters: ^aithci leiicDich -ci needed t η c"¡dct te -í^cnt-t^y 
^actoli which a^ie-C-t the dec<6-Lon mafce-t' i m^ulmat-t on р>іосе.ы^пд 
itnateg^&i [MONTGOMERY & SVENbON (1976, p. 8)]. As noted by 
TVERSKY (1969, pp. 42-43) there are several general considerations 
which would favour the additive difference model: 
(1) In the first place, ADM is more general than the additive model in 
that the former can accomodate many more binary preference structures 
than the latter. This is not only because the additive model requires 
transitivity whereas ADM allows mtransitivities to occur (see Chapter I) 
but, more fundamentally, because the precise form of the upf's 
φ (χ ,y ) =φ |u (x ) -u (y ) Ì is left open, depending upon the 
perception of unidimensional "differences". MORRISON (1962) indeed 
suggested different kinds of upf, while TVERSKY's (1969) lexicographic 
semiorder provides in fact another version of ADM (see Chapter I). Years 
before, MAY (1952) had already presented an embryonic form of ADM (see, 
again, Chapter I). The additive difference model can also be 
extrapolated by letting 
и 
Φ(Χ,!/) = ) Ф^ { I 11^ (1/ l-u^ojl - I u^UJ-u^ (ajl } 
¿=1 
represent the preferential choice between two alternatives x and y as 
given by an organism whose "ideal point" is determined by the 
coordinates u (a ) (¿ =1,...,n) in the psychological space. This 
transforms ADM into an ideal-point model that belongs to the sphere 
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of multidimensional unfolding, although it is not formally equivalent 
to COOMBS' (1964) multidimensional unfolding theory, where preferences 
are determined by Eucd-tdean distances. But there is still more to be 
said about the way in which ADM may be either generalized or 
specialized. As will be shown in this study, ADM can be consistently 
extended to upf's that satisfy ISDM and, hence, that are independent of 
the existence of scale values. This model can then, in turn, be 
generalized by allowing the aggregation rule to be different from the 
additive, providing room for a general theory that may apply to any 
pairwise choices based on intradimensional comparisons. Incidentally, 
MONTGOMERY (1975c) found in a protocol analysis of choices between 
simple gambles that his subjects were almost exclusively making 
intradimensional comparisons. 
(2) Secondly, it may be argued that ADM applies to allegedly "difficult" 
choices because intradimensional comparisons may be easier to perform 
than interdimensional evaluations, simply because the compared 
quantities are expressed in terms of the same units or, at least, 
because the compared entities are evaluated along a common basic 
reference frame. If an alternative just slightly dominates another 
alternative on all the relevant dimensions, this will be revealed 
immediately by intradimensional comparisons, and the choice may be 
quite easy indeed. 
(3) Thirdly, intradimensional comparisons may simplify the evaluation 
process. In the literature it has been argued that ADM may be more 
economic than the additive model in that the former requires less 
evaluations than the latter. For instance, ADM can accomodate various 
approximation methods in which "small" values of the upf's are 
ignored in the choice process, thus reducing the number of dimensions 
that have to be considered. 
(4) Last but not least, there is the transitivity issue. It is well 
known that the additive model cannot lead to violations of the 
transitivity principle. This does not depend on the additivity 
assumption: transitivity must be satisfied by any model where scale 
values (supposed to represent the preferences) are assigned to the 
individual alternatives. The relationship between ADM and 
(in)transitivity is quite different. TVERSKY (1969) has shown that 
ADM may yield intransitivities (at least, for n>l). He has proved, 
in fact, that ADM does not allow the prediction of intransitivity unless 
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at least one of the upf's is non-linear. TVERSKY's theorem (see 
Chapter I) suggests a specific explanation of the intransitivity 
phenomenon, viz., in terms of the form of the upf's. 
In this study we take advantage of TVERSKV's cyclic-choice paradigm to 
explore a general approach to individual decision making. In order to 
allow intransitive choices to occur our approach л s based on the 
assumption that the alternatives are pairwise compared with respect to 
each relevant dimension, and that the results of these comparisons are 
pooled to reach an over-all (holistic) preference and, possibly, a 
choice. This entails the question of moving from unidimensional 
preference relations > (-( = Ι,.,.,π) to the preference relation > . We 
shall call methods of going from a set of it unidimensional preference 
relations > to a holistic preference relation > pie ^¡еіепсч 
aggnegatíng luíeó. This idea is made more precise in the following 
definition. 
DLTINITIQN 10 A pie /¡e ie nee. aggregating late is a functional relation F 
such that for any set of и unidimensional preference 
relations -> (-t = !,...,«) one, and only one, over-all 
preference relation -- is determined; symbolically, 
In the present study the relations > are interpreted as the 
unidimensional preference relations of an agent (individual or animal) 
while > is supposed to represent his over-all, aggregate preference. 
It is well known that this interpretation, natural as it is in the 
context of individual choice making, is not at all necessary in other 
settings. So, for instance, in the area of collective choice, the 
relations > may stand for the preference relations of η distinct 
individuals while the relation > is interpreted as a collective 
preference relation. Our notion of "preference aggregating rule" is 
thus very similar to what is otherwise known as a "collective choice 
rule". In a certain sense there is a striking parallel between problems 
of collective preference (or choice) and problems of individual 
preference, at least at a formal level. But it will become clear later 
in this Section that this parallel collapses as soon as one starts 
interpreting the formalism in one way or another. Since a comparative 
study of individual and collective choice making is outside our purpose, 
we shall not systematically pursue their similarities here: rather, we 
shall restrict ourselves to the analysis of mechanisms of individual 
choice, reserving the right to allude incidentally to problems of 
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collective choice making. 
The idea of a preference aggregating rule will be remoulded by means 
of a notion called dzcompoiab^t-tty. This notion applies to real-valued 
functions rather than being tailored to abstract relations. It calls on 
a function whose domain is no longer a relational structure but, 
rather, a n-tuple of real numbers. But as the role of this function is 
essentially identical to that of the above-mentioned functional 
relation, we shall use the same symbol F for both notions. Technically, 
decomposability may be described as follows: 
DEFINITION 11 Suppose that < A, > ) is an independent binary preference 
structure. Let F be a real-valued function of η real 
variables that is one-to-one in each variable 
separately. The preference structure (A, > ) is called 
F-ctzcompoia.bit if and only if there exists a function φ 
(defined on AxA) together with strict dual-monotonic 
functions φ (defined on A xA ;.t = l,...,n) such that 
for all x,y in A , 
(i) ф(х,і/)>е if and only if x > y 
(11) φ (x, y) = Ρ[φ1 (х^у^ , .. .,фи(хи,і/п) ] 
According to the principle of decomposability, the holistic preference 
between two alternatives is a function of component-wise contributions. 
Following MAY (1954), the function F will be called a р>і&іе.кгпсг 
аддігдаІА.пд ¿u.nctj.on, although, as mentioned before, we shall not 
attempt to make a sharp distinction between preference aggregating rules 
and preference aggregating functions. The problem of individual choice 
making can thus be regarded as an aggregation exercise, viz., as the 
aggregation of и unidimensional preference functions φ (x ,y ) 
into a single preference function ф(х,у) to be called aggiogate. 
рі&ігігпсг ^unct-con (in short, api). Our ultimate goal is the 
axiomatization of the relational system <A, > > so as to formulate the 
conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient for the existence of 
representations of the type given by Definition 11. In the following 
models the binary relation will indeed be represented by an aggregate 
preference function φ such that 
x > у » Φ(χ,!/)>ε 
where ε is a positive number or zero. This is our basic scaling 
assumption for the preference relation > . By hypothesis, φ is defined 
on all of AxA. Trichotomy then requires that one, and only one, of 
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ф{х,у)>с or Ф(с/,х)>г or ' (χ, у) ,φ {у, х) < ε 
holds for every χ,ι/ in A . The aggregate preference function i is 
assumed to command the pairwise choices. Hence, if choices are made 
in accord with the underlying preferences, intransitive choices in one 
direction will occur if φ(χ,ί/), φ(ί/,ζ) and <-(z,x) are all greater than 
ε regardless of magnitude; intransitive choices in the opposite 
direction will follow if «Μι/,χ), φ (ζ, у) and φ (χ, ζ) are greater than с, 
equally, regardless of magnitude. 
In our presentation the pairwise choices are supposed to be controlled 
by the value of the aggregate preference function. For this reason we 
could have called the function ф(х,(/) a "decision function", which is 
indeed standard nomenclature for similar functions in the literature. 
But we feel that the intuitive sense of "aggregate preference function" 
has much appeal in the context of individual choice making, particularly 
when preferences are underlying the overt choices. This is not to say, 
of course, that the values of an apf φ should be equal to the values of 
a corresponding choice function ρ (see Section 1.4). Much would depend 
on the measurement level of both functions. In any case, we require at 
least the following weak condition 
Φ (Χ,ί/) > Φ (u,y) о P(x,t/) # p(u,v) 
for all u,u,x,i/ in A. When this condition is satisfied we say that the 
binary preference structure (A,>) is compatible with the binary choice 
structure <A,p) . We also say that the observed choices are compatible 
with any equation of the type φ ( χ, tj) = F (Φ , . . . , φ ) if the equation in 
question is satisfied when p(x,i/) plays the role of ф(х,у), that is, 
when р(х,і/) is substituted for o(x,i/). 
In the rest of this Section and in Section 11.5 we will try to establish 
a general framework for the aggregation of upf's into a single apf. The 
general setting is revealed by the relation 
Ф(х,і/) = F ΙΦ, U , ,(/,) , . . . ,φ
η
(χ(,,!/η) ] 
Clearly, this relation hints at a possible "comparability" of the 
dimensions. And to more than that! It hints also at the notion of 
unidimensional preference intensities. As COOMBS (1964, p. 287) has 
remarked, α dec4.640n function [our apf J ¿ò afitai/i a vatua iyitem about 
thz netcLttve mei-cti o^ attt-ibutei [dimensions] and ho^ to comb-oie them. 
True as it may be in general, this statement does not reckon with the 
many subtleties of interdimensional comparability, but in any case, this 
topic is beyond the scope of our study, as will be amplified in the 
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following Chapter. On the other hand, it should be clear that from 
now on we can no longer avoid the intensity-of-preference idea: the very 
notion of a preference aggregating function strongly suggests resort to 
measures of unidimensional preference intensities. Indeed, 
multidimensional preference theories seek to decompose the preference 
relation into a product of component preferences, the aggregating 
function representing a theory of the behaviour in question. Where the 
component preferences contribute in a one-to-one correspondence (by 
virtue of the alleged model), one upf φ may induce an ordering among 
other upf's φ (.//<-) and, hence, exploit the idea of interdimensional 
comparability. This would introduce a continuous gradation of the 
values of the upf's which, evidently, points to the idea of 
unidimensional preference intensities. We admit the fact and we accept 
the interpretation but, as noted earlier (in Section II.3), we do not 
formally introduce the notion of preference intensity, that is, we do 
not α pl-LOl-L assume the existence of a quaternary relation (on A) to 
be interpreted as a strength-of-preference relation. It has sometimes 
been argued [see, for instance, FISHBURN (1970b, p. 209)] that, like 
simple preference, intensity of preference is essentially unanalysable 
in terms of other constructs. In the present study we advance the idea 
that, for multidimensional alternatives and under appropriate 
conditions, a strength-of-preference notion can quite naturally be 
defined on the basis of simple preference comparisons. This will become 
more clear subsequently, as the specific models are developed. 
II.5. CONDITIONS ON PREFERENCE AGGREGATING FUNCTIONS, 
The question now is whether we can make general statements about the 
different kinds of preference aggregating rules (or functions) that one 
would be willing to endorse when thinking in a systematic way about 
individual choice making. What should F look like in order to represent 
an "acceptable" mechanism of individual choice making? We look for 
conditions to be imposed on a preference aggregating function in order 
to provide it with a "rational" basis. Can we image conditions that 
would have to be incorporated into any preference aggregating function 
in order to meet given standards of rationality? In the context of 
collective choice making it has often been required that the choice 
mechanism invariably produces complete orderings. This is done by 
restricting the range of the preference aggregating rule to the set of 
orderings over A, a restriction known as Condition О on Γ. But, for 
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individual choice making, transitivity has been dismissed as a 
criterion of rationality (see Chapter I). Therefore, if individual 
choice is to be our concern, we shall not be willing to restrict the 
range of F by requiring Condition O. In looking for rational 
aggregation rules, there will be several other conditions to be 
considered. Take the case of two alternatives к and у such that one is 
preferred to the other on all the relevant dimensions so that, for 
instance, χ > ¡J holds for every value of the subscript x.. The problem 
of comparing two alternatives in which one is superior to the other in 
every respect may be thought to be straightforward: by all standards of 
rationality, χ should be preferred to t/. This is the gist of a condition 
known as the (strict) Pareto rule: 
CONDITION Ρ (Pareto principle) For any χ,у in A , 
if χ > ij for every ч , then χ > у . 
Intuitively, this condition has a cormclling appeal. It is in fact 
almost trivial, just as the situation in which complete agreement exists 
between all the component preferences is also trivial. But this case can 
be generalized to cases of partial (rather than complete) agreement, a 
situation that would require a generilization of the strict Pareto rule, 
a problem that is not trivial at ill. There are indeed several possible 
generalizations: they may all make sense as conditions on a preference 
aggregating rule, but they would indicate different hypotheses about the 
preference behaviour in question. We shall not pursue this problem here, 
but it was worth -nentioning in order to illustrate the kind of 
conditions that may be imposed on a preference aggregating rule Г. Once 
a set of unidimensional preference relations > (-с = 1,...,и) is given, 
F specifies one, and only one, holistic preference relation > (see 
Definition 10). This allows us to employ the over-all relation •»· in the 
statement of a condition such as the Pareto principle, which is really 
a condition on Г' Certain conditions on preference aggregating rules or, 
for that matter, on preference aggregating functions, take on a rather 
complicated form if they are formulated in terms of F: simplicity then 
requires the use of either > or F, at the price of abandoning uniformity. 
Consequently, we will use either > or F, whichever is simplest. 
Of course, the kinship between a set of pairwise unidimensional 
preferences need not be one of agreement. In some cases, the 
disagreement may be removed at little cost, simply by ignoring 
troublesome dimensions. In the choice between two alternatives x and y 
with x. > y for every possible value of the subscript except one, 
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say J, for which у • >·χ • , an agent may very well decide to ignore the 
/th dimension. Occasionally, choice theories deliberately separate out 
the non-controversial part of a preference configuration and discard the 
discordant portion. But this procedure, expedient as it is, by no means 
solves all the problems of individual choice making. Incidentally, it 
entails the question of the relative importance of the dimensions. In 
many choice situations it may well be that the dimensions are of 
unequal importance. It may, however, be reasonable to postulate that 
each relevant dimension has at least ьотг importance. This can be 
achieved by creating an appropriate condition. There are in fact many 
conditions that, in one sense or another, oblige the dimensions to be 
aggregated in accordance with some egalitarian principle. A very strong 
requirement is known as the cond^iian. o (¡ íqaa¿¿ty or, in the context of 
collective choice, as the cond-ti-con o^ anon-cmÁty: 
CONDITION E (equality) If >°. , . . . ,>° is a permutation of >.,...,>, 
then F (>",... ,>°n) = F (>1 , .. . ,>n) . 
The condition of equality requires that each dimension be treated in 
the same way as far as its influence on the outcome is concerned. This 
really is a very strong requirement! It means that the value of the apf 
is determined only by the value of the upf's, regardless of how the 
latter are assigned to the dimensions. Is this restriction absurdly 
strong? We tend to doubt it. After all, in order to make a choice, an 
individual might very well rely on the "method of majority decision" by 
letting his preferences depend on the number of dimensions on which one 
alternative is preferred to another. In the sphere of collective choice 
the method of majority decision has been presented as a highly appealing 
preference aggregating rule. We advance the possibility that the 
majority rule may have some relevance to individual choice making. The 
condition of equality would then clearly be satisfied. 
Before stating other (weak) egalitarian conditions, new definitions 
will be introduced. 
DEFINITION 12 A preference aggregating rule (function, respectively) 
is deci-i-tve if and only if its range is restricted to 
complete preference relations. 
It would be sensible to require that a preference aggregating rule be 
pairwise decisive in the sense that it yields a compi ite preference 
relation, in keeping with the views developed in Chapter I. The notion 
of decisiveness is made still more precise in the following definition. 
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DEFINITION 13 Let В be a subset of A={A ,.,.,Α }. A set of 
dimensions В is dec-câ-n/e for χ against у if χ > у 
whenever χ > у for every ί such that А с В. 
The concept of a decisive set of dimensions is intuitively easy to 
understand: a set of dimensions is decisive if, whenever χ is preferred 
to у on those dimensions, χ is over-all preferred to y, regardless of 
the preferences on the other dimensions. Note that, whether a given set 
of dimensions is decisive or not with respect to a pair of alternatives 
will be determined by the preference aggregating function. The question 
is whether we want to admit the existence of decisive sets of dimensions 
in genital. It could indeed be argued that, ideally, no single dimension 
should predominate for this would mean that there is no real 
aggregation problem... Such a requirement is particularly appealing in 
problems of collective choice when one tries to rule out the existence 
of an individual whose preferences are always adopted by the society. 
This is done by invoking an appropriate condition known, for obvious 
reasons, as the condti-con с <¡ nou-d < ctato li h-cp. 
CONDITION D (non-dictatorship) There is no dimension -L such that, for 
every element in the domain of F and for every к,y in A, 
if χ > y , then χ > y . 
This condition is violated whenever, in actual practice, an agent 
determines his aggregate preferences by considering one dimension only. 
By imposing Condition D one is limited to the cases where the 
aggregation problem really exists. The condition of non-dictatorship is 
sometimes cast in a stricter mould, as follows: 
CONDITION D' For no dimension -( does a pair χ, y in A exist such 
that for all > (Ί = 1 , . ..,и) in the domain of F, 
if χ > у , then χ > у 
Evidently, Condition D outlaws the existence of a single decisive 
dimension whereas, according to Condition D , no dimension should be 
decisive over even a single pair. Both conditions are implied by the 
much stronger Condition A. But the three properties serve essentially 
the same purpose: they all prevent choice problems becoming trivialized 
by understatement of the role of one or more dimensions. 
Another interesting property is known as the condit<cn o£ niatA.a.lA,ty. 
This condition states that the alternatives have to be "neutral" in the 
sense that no alternative should be favoured for reasons other than 
those expressed by the unidimensional preferences. A complete set of 
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unidimensional preference relations, i.e. a set consisting of one 
preference relation > for each dimension -t, will be called a 
рле^елеисе ¿¿ίιιαί-ιοη. According to the condition of neutrality, the 
preference aggregating rule (or function) should not discriminate 
between the alternatives, that is, if for every л., χ is related to у 
in one preference situation as ω is to ζ in another, then the holistic 
preference between χ and i/ in the former should be the same as the 
over-all preference between и) and ζ in the latter. Technically, this 
condition can be expressed as follows: 
CONDITION N (neutrality) If σ maps A into itself and if, for each -L 
and all χ,ι/ιηΑ, σ ( χ ) > σ (у ) iff χ > у , then 
FU, », У, ,...,х
и
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и
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Another condition is called the cond-t-tícn oh nzutlcLl-Lty -tn the. &о.пбг o¿ 
May or, the aondit-tovi o i izii-daal-cty. This condition is expressed in 
terms of upf's. Let, for every -t and all x.,y in Α, σ (χ ) =y and 
σ (у ) =x . Then, the condition of self-duality is as follows: 
CONDITION SD (self-duality) A preference aggregating function F 
satisfies self-duality if and only if 
F [φ, (x, , ! / , ) , . . . , Ф
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Obviously, this condition is a restriction of Condition N: whatever the 
aggregation function that permits us to specify the relation between χ 
and y, then, if we have a true statement about this function, we must 
obtain another true statement from it by replacing each argument by its 
negative. 
The condition of neutrality leads quite naturally to the well known 
condA-tíon o¡5 thz independence o i •Liiete.va.n.t altzn.natA.ve.ii·. 
CONDITION I (independence of irrelevant alternatives) Let > and > be 
two preference relations corresponding respectively to 
two sets of unidimensional preference relations > 
and > U =1,...,n). If [χ > у iff χ > у ] for 
each -t and every x,y in A, then [ χ > у iff x^y] . 
That Condition I is a special case of neutrality can be seen by applying 
the (trivial) mappings χ •+ σ (χ ) =x and у •+о (у ) =у to the 
definition of neutrality. The condition of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives requires that the over-all preference between 
two alternatives depends only on the preferences between their 
components, and not on anything else. This is to say that if, on some 
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dimensions, the preference ordenngs are changed for some alternatives, 
the over-all preferences between the remaining alternatives should not 
be affected. Hence, according to the condition in question, an agent's 
preference between two alternatives is determined by all his various 
reactions to thai г two alternatives. This simply means that all aspects 
of the alternatives are included in the components — that is, that the 
preferences are truly binary 
It will be clear that a preference aggregating rule (or function) must 
be "well behaved" in order to meet certain rationality requirements for 
individual choice making. What other reasonable looking conditions 
could, in general, be incorporated into preference aggregating rules? 
One appealing condition requires that the aggregation is not negatively 
responsive to the unidimensional preferences in the sense that, if 
everything remains the same except that one dimension changes favourably 
toward an alternative, the holistic preference will not prove to be less 
favourable to that alternative. If, on any one dimension, an agent 
shifts his preferences in favour of χ relative to у the other 
unidimensional preferences remaining the same, then his over-all 
preference between χ and у should not shift "negatively", that is in the 
direction of у. This requirement is made more precise in the following 
condition, 
CONDITION M (monotonicity) Let > and > be two preference relations 
corresponding respectively to two sets of 
unidimensional preference relations > and Í 
(-t = 1 , . . . ,n) . If [x > il when χ > i/ and χ ^ i/ 
when χ ~ ч 1 for each с and for every χ, у (χ/ι/) in A 
then Ι χ > у when χ > у and χ ^  у when χ ~ у 1 . 
This property admits of many variations. They go by many names such as 
the "condition of positive responsiveness", the "condition of 
nonnegative responsiveness", "Arrow's condition of positive association", 
the "condition of (positive) monotonicity" and "the condition of strong 
monotonicity". These various properties are all cousins and some of them 
are even identical twins. Their common appeal seems almost as 
unobjectionable as the Pareto-pnnciple. According to the literature, 
the Conditions Ρ and M are indeed corner-stones of theories of rational 
decision making. 
It has been stated earlier that the relation between pairwise 
unidimensional preferences need not be one of agreement. This might be 
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a suitable opening for a discussion of " difficult " choices. It may not 
always be possible to avoid these choices by ignoring appropriate 
dimensions. A dimension can be called "basic" to an agent if he is not 
willing to abandon it lightly. This principle could entail a 
partitioning of the dimensions — e.g., by appropriate weighting — into 
two classes, a class of basic and nonbasic dimensions. In the course of 
his life, a man may very well have to face choice situations in which 
the alternatives are ordered in conflicting ways on two (or more) ba.6j.c 
dimensions. The literature of the world provides emphatic examples of 
this allegation. Presumably, Antigone would have been the last to 
disavow this, divided as she was between the two imperative principles 
of divine and civil law. According to tradition, Antigone's life turned 
upon the conflict of two respectable loyalties which, had they become 
enmeshed in the net of a scientific model, might well have proved to be 
interpretable as psychological dimensions. [Whether or not this be true 
is certainly an empirical question, especially in view of the very 
precise meaning we gave to the concept of "psychological dimension" 
(see Section II.2)]. In a more or less similar vein we could cite the 
French playwright Corneille whose tragedies are said to depict the 
conflict between the incompatibles of duty and passion. And the younger 
Goethe might well have passed quiet days long before his move to Weimar, 
if he had not had to reconcile his "Sturm und Drang" dimension with his 
craving for "rationality". These are but a few noble examples. To 
instance a popular one, consider a person addicted to cigarette smoking 
and who has to balance the many satisfactions he receives from his habit 
( ) with their alleged pathogenic consequences. Another simple case is 
provided by a man who is pursuing the satisfaction of material desires 
under budgetary constraints. The reader may think of many other 
compelling situations displaying similar features. 
Some of the above-mentioned examples turn upon ethical problems. These 
problems, incidentally, have some bearing on the traditional theory of 
rational decision making as presented by theorists in logic, statistics, 
economics, and related fields. In the literature there is some 
uneasiness about the intrinsic validity of theories of rational decision 
making. Typically, these theories contain the standard injunction to 
maximize something (usually, utility) so that an agent's action will be 
based on a pragmatically optimal relationship between means and ends. 
( ) To get an idea of the multidimensional character of these 
satisfactions witness the profusion of themes that are currently 
broached by the advertisers. 
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The trouble with this approach is that maximizing principles are 
supremely indifferent to the morality of the means-end relationship. The 
hard-headed social climber pursuing his self-interest to the exclusion 
of all other considerations may pervade many traditional optimalization 
criteria although, supposedly, he is not a paragon of virtue. What is in 
doubt is the attractiveness of the maximization precept. (Remember that 
another famous criterion of rationality, transitivity, has been earlier 
rejected). It would appear that what is needed is a normative framework 
other than that of pragmatic rationality. As CREARY (1971) has claimed, 
thz theony o¿ Kat^onal act-ion IS α th&oAij o^ obi^gation — RATIONAL 
oblLqa.tA.on„ Accotid-cngly, by -te^ íecí-uig an tke mítathzoiij o(¡ molai 
i-Lghtn&ii, we may expec-t to да-си юте -tno-cgft-t л-nto the. metatheofiy oi 
piagmat^c Kattonality (p. 253) . The author of the present study has to 
confess that his limited faculties are unequal to this task that must be 
reserved for the penetrating studies of scholarly scientists. But the 
problem is recognized m this study and the stand is taken that moral 
aspects of decision making be included in the choice process, for 
instance, by means of as many appropriate (i.e., ethical) dimensions as 
are necessary. 
In the antepenultimate paragraph it was concluded that, in many 
situations, there may be conflicts between the relevant dimensions. The 
question is how much conflict is to be expected in choice situations 
and, hence, how much conflict are we willing to endorse? Two 
dimensions are maximally conflicting if the alternatives exhibit 
opposite ordenngs on them. Incidentally, by admitting this possibility, 
one automatically refers to a new rationality condition for the 
aggregating rule. This condition, known as the cond-ct-ion G< ante i 11< cted 
doma-ui, asserts that the preference aggregating rule must work for all 
possible configurations of unidimensional preferences. 
CONDITION U (unrestricted domain) The domain of the preference 
aggregating function must include all possible 
combinations of unidimensional ordenngs (interval 
orders, semiorders or strict weak orders) . 
This condition specifies that the preference aggregating rule must 
yield an aggregate preference, regardless of the variety or divergence 
of the unidimensional preference ordenngs. To restrict the domain of 
the rule is to say that certain unidimensional preference patterns are 
put under a taboo. In the context of collective choice, this problem 
was first investigated by BLACK (1948a,b) and ARROW (1951). These 
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authors have noted that when the method of majority decision is the 
collective choice rule, the individual preferences must exhibit certain 
"similarities" in order to yield transitive results. Many attempts to 
avoid the impasse in ARROW'S (1951) impossibility theorem (see 
Section 1.6) have indeed centered upon modifying Condition U. Similarly, 
within individual decision making, for certain preference aggregating 
rules, the imposition of appropriate restrictions on the unidimensional 
preference ordenngs may very well be the condition i-Lnz qua non 
transitive aggregated preferences are not warranted. This assertion of 
ours is necessarily speculative as little is known about preference 
aggregating rules m individual choice procedures. But the point we want 
to make is that, precisely because we do not require the aggregate 
preferences to be transitive, we are unable to see the use of 
restricting the unidimensional preference ordenngs, that is to say, of 
dismissing Condition U. We should actually like to argue that Condition U 
is highly appealing in the context of individual choice making, much 
like the Conditions D, I and Ρ were found to be very attractive indeed. 
These four conditions together, incidentally, form the basis of ARROW'S 
impossibility theorem. We claim therefore that this impossibility 
theorem (and, possibly, other impossibility theorems to be found in 
the literature) supports the contention that individual preferences may 
turn out to be genotypically intransitive. 
But then, what choice will an agent make when his pairwise preferences 
are subjectively circular, for instance, when χ > y and y>z, yet z>x? 
Note that this problem may not exhibit the insolent character it does 
in collective choice making because agents frequently simply choose, 
without apparently being too much embarrassed by the circularity of 
their latent preferences. It may be that individuals are often simply 
unaware of the vicious circles secluded within their minds, whereas 
such circles are usually obvious in mechanisms of collective choice. 
According to MAY (1954) a preference cycle that has been observed 
during the war concerns the behaviour of pilots in burning airplanes: 
when confronted with pairwise choices from the set {^¿атгб, i&d hot 
mztal, iatt^ng], pilots most often choose "flames" over "red hot metal" 
and "red hot metal" over "falling" although they apparently preferred 
"falling" to "flames". In this and similar instances of dzipcLAati 
choices it could be that the intransitivity problem is eluded by the 
focusing of attention upon two alternatives out of a set of three or 
more. But then, this speculation may not be true in situations that lack 
the dramatic character of desparate choices. When a person is facing 
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three alternatives which may be pairwise compared under ideal 
circumstances, he may very well come to the conclusion that his 
preferences are circular. Indeed, it may not be unthinkable that, in 
some cases, individuals аге concious of the problem. What might their 
resolution then be' One possibility is to follow the advice of 
DODGSON (1874), better known as Lewis Carroll: DODGSON suggested 
(actually, in the context of collective choice) to consider the ύtatui 
quo, that is, the issue "that nothing be done", as a possible outcome 
of choice problems. By this provision one simply recognizes that 
bzhav-LOi -LÌ ^ntfL-cni-Lcatly pafit-talty on.de.n.e.d [COOMBS (1964, p. 285)]. 
But in human society there is usually a compulsion for decision and 
action. To quote COOMBS again, -iücte-tí/ >iequA.Kíi that diciiioni be made, 
and htnct [..„] pa/it-cal oide.ii muli be coinp-teiied -ui-to i-trnpie oKdiKi 
(p. 286). The point is that the necessity for mapping partial orders 
into simple orders may be less compelling in individual choice making 
than it is in problems concerning society. If a choice is not really 
indispensable, an individual may very well resolve to adjourn any 
decision bine. d-te. But in any such case it may be wise to bear in mind 
the misfortunes of Buridan's ass... Although Dante claims that this 
fatal issue might bo the lot (or the prerogative ? ) of a man in full 
possession of his free will: such a man should be prepared to die while 
exerting himself in resolving "impossible" choices ( ). 
Yet, life must move ever forward: there are situations m which choices 
constitute an indispensable condition for existence. The conflict then 
inherent m circular preferences cannot simply be forgotten but must be 
resolved in some way or another. In general, little is known about the 
mechanisms employed to resolve "difficult" choices when there is a real 
conflict involved. JhzKt doei net ieew tc have, been any deicuió-ton о^  
w/iaí a man iMLth ^ntxanH-t^vQ p4(i{c>iQnc.zi Mould do л.^ pfieidnte.d U/4-tfi a 
choice among all dementi o^ the. ^ntxannt^vi loop [xi/zx] i<.multaneouilL¡ 
[TULLOCK (1964, p. 403)J. This problem reminds one of the similar 
difficulties in the case of an agent about to choose between two 
genotypically indifferent alternatives. In this context, SLOVIC (1975) 
provided data in support of the hypothesis that the difficulty might be 
resolved in a systematic manner, but so far we have encountered no such 
evidence in respect of genotypic intransitivity. Clearly, under 
genotypic mtransitivity, choosing becomes a Sisyphean task. A dubious 
palliative might be sought in random choice. The random choice of one 
( ) See DANTE, Patad-tJO, Canto IV, verses 1-3. 
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alternative out of a cycle may bring some relief but the effect may 
very well prove to be of short duration. Another solution might consist 
in changing the decision rule, i.e., the preference aggregating 
function. An agent may indeed employ various preference aggregating 
functions in trying to resolve "impossible" choices, and two distinct 
aggregating functions may lead to very different choices. (Incidentally, 
it should be remembered that, in general, preference aggregating rules 
need not always lead to a choice: MONTGOMERY & SVENSON (1976) provide 
several instances in which preference aggregating rules fail to be 
decisive). Perhaps the most elegant escape from the dilemma would be to 
reconsider the preferences. Jocasta must have been wrong when she 
proclaimed that, since life is unpredictable, it is best to abandon 
principle and live from hand to mouth ( ). As SEN (1970, p. 165) has it, 
¿ndíVíduaZ ріе^елеисе^ abe. de-tei m-с и ed not by tu^n-eng a Koaiztte. uohizl 
o\iti alt poi&j-blz aitzinativti, bat by czitaín ¿pec-tá-tc [...] cultunal 
^оісгі. These forces, however conflicting, may interplay in a subtle 
fashion, and even a minor change in any one of them may work a miracle. 
The dimensions of a choice situation do not harden into a static 
framework. Their number is not immutable, so that it must be possible, 
in principle at least, to manipulate it, either by neglecting one or 
more "minor" (less weighted) dimensions, or by introducing new 
dimensions upon the scene although, in general, it may be a good idea 
to bear in mind La Fontaine's advice to keep the number of relevant 
2 dimensions as low as possible ( ). There is also the possibility of two 
alternatives interchanging their subjective values on one or two 
non-basic dimensions. Any of the above-mentioned palliatives may in 
fact be helpful in removing circular preferences. But, of course, they 
all constitute more or less ad hoc. remedies. In the case of persistent 
intransitive preferences, the author knows of no existing panacea. 
11,6, GENERAL OPTIONS UNDERLYING THE MODELS, 
This Section is devoted to a recapitulation of various assumptions that 
may be relevant for models of individual choice. These assumptions can 
(1) See SOPHOCLES, Oed.tpu.0 Rex, verses 977-979. 
2 ( ) Providing that the present author's interpretation of the following 
lines is correct: Too many іскгтгі bew-t£det but the. choj.ee.; Рол. 
while we chooie, the happy moment il-c&i: Have bat one plan, and 
let that plan be w-tie. [In La Fontaine'i Fablei, translated by 
R. Thomson (Pans, Chenu, 1806) , Book IX, Fable XIV, "The cat and 
the fox"] . 
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be partitioned into two classes depending upon how they formulate 
mtradimensional or interdimensional properties. The models we propound 
are all based on particular options among the assumptions available in 
either of both classes. Clearly, the additive difference model results 
from the combination of the assumption of mtradimensional 
subtractivity (Definition 9) and the assumption of interdimensional 
additivity. Either of the assumptions may be replaced by other 
assumptions. Interdimensional additivity may certainly be thought to be 
a "strong" assumption when the unidimensional preference functions fail 
to meet particular measurement requirements: when the unidimensional 
preference functions are neither ratio nor interval scales, the 
assumption of interdimensional additivity seems questionable since, in 
these cases, the n-ary operation of addition is not well defined. Under 
these circumstances, the exact form of the preference aggregating 
function might be left unspecified provided decomposability is 
assumed. This latter assumption is formulated m Definition 11 where it 
happens to go hand in hand with the assumption of strict 
dual-monotonicity, itself being an mtradimensional property. But, 
strict dual-monotonicity can of course be strenghtened by requiring 
mtradimensional subtractivity. On the other hand, as we have already 
mentioned, there may exist binary preference structures that can be 
decomposed into the effects of η independent factors (dimensions), but 
which cannot be scaled so as to combine additively. An alternative 
interdimensional assumption will then be in order. In looking for 
definite choices of the preference aggregating function F one may 
consider polynomials, or at least certain classes of polynomials, but 
the intractability of polynomial models cautions trepidation in an 
advance towards this area. 
These and similar considerations show that several mtradimensional and 
interdimensional assumptions can be combined quite independently so as 
to generate a variety of choice models of which the additive difference 
model is only one particular instance. All the choice models may be 
regarded as modifications — in one sense or another — of the 
additive difference model. We have mentioned before that the additive 
difference model admits of many variations; the models we present 
provide but a few instances of a theme capable of many variations. This 
is further stressed when one realizes that any modification of the 
additive difference model can be particularized by a specific choice of 
the unidimensional preference functions. Considering the wide appeal of 
the power function in the metric analysis of similarity data (we refer 
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of course to the role of the Minkowski .^-metric in the psychological 
literature), we may indeed be tempted by certain transpositions and 
require the unidimensional preference functions to be similar to any of 
the functions currently employed in models of multidimensional 
similarity. 
Having outlined the fundamental options underlying our models, we shall 
proceed, in the next Section, to the presentation of the models in 
question. 
II.7, THE MODELS. 
In the models we present it is always assumed that the preference 
between two alternatives χ and y is entirely determined by the 
aggregation of component contributions ф. (х.,и. ) (•¿=1,...,n). 
Independence (Definition 3) suggests decomposability models, i.e. models 
where η unidimensional preference functions contribute their effects 
¿nde.pznd2.ntZy, The simplest law governing the aggregation of component 
preferences is of course an additive one; additivity asserts a 
quantitative non-interaction between η factors that is much stronger 
than the qualitative non-interaction put forward by Definition 3. Our 
first two models will indeed be based on the additive aggregation rule. 
Our starting point will be the well known additive difference model, 
which we shall call model MO (to be read "M zero"). This model combines 
the assumption of и-factor additivity across dimensions (i.e., 
interdimensional additivity) and of two-factor subtractivity within each 
dimension (Definition 9). Model MO is made more precise by the following 
definition. 
(MODEL MO) 
DEFINITION 14 Suppose that (A,>) is an independent binary preference 
structure. This structure is a decomposable structure 
satisfying the additive. ¿-¿¿¡Ja-tence mode-d (ADM) if and 
only if there exist real-valued functions u . defined on 
A. (i =1,...,η), and strictly monotonically increasing 
functions φ. defined on A .xA . (.c = 1 , . . ., n) , such that 
for all x,y in A , 
( i ) φ (χ.,у) > e if and only if χ > у 
η 
(ii) tU,у) = Ι φ-[α.[χ. ) -ц. [у. ]] 
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Our second model is based upon the assumption of interdimensional 
additivity along with the assumption of intradimensional strict 
dual-monotonicity (Definition 8 ) . This model, which is called model Ml, 
is to be taken as archetypal of the class of models that are proposed 
in this work. Model Ml is defined as follows: 
Suppose that (A,>) is an independent binary preference 
structure. This structure is an additively-decomposable 
structure satisfying intradimensional strict 
dual-monotonicity if and only if there exist strict 
dual-monotonic functions φ defined on A xA (¿=1,...,η) 
such that, for all χ,y in A , 
(ι) φ (x , i/) > L if and only if χ > y 
d i ) φ (к, y) =*, (x1 ,y}) + ... + Ф и (*„»!/„) 
A following model, to be called model M2, is dependent upon the 
assumption that the preference structure (A,>> can be decomposed into 
the effects of n unidimensional contributions, while the contribution 
of any one dimension can be represented by the difference of two scale 
values. In this model use is made of the notion of F-decomposability 
introduced earlier (see Definition 11). Formally, model M2 can be 
defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 16 Suppose that <A,>) is an independent binary preference 
/..^гм-пт ..-.л structure and let F be a strictly monotomcally (MODEL M2) 
increasing function of η real variables that is 
one-to-one in each variable separately. This structure 
is a F-decomposable structure satisfying 
intradimensional subtractivity if and only if there 
exist real-valued functions u defined on A (i=\,...,n) 
such that, for all x,y in A , 
(i) 6 (χ, ι/) > ε if and only if х>(/ 
di) φ (x,!/) =F[u 1(x l) - u 1 (Í^) ,...,ии(хи) -ип(уп)] 
Still another model, model M3, expresses a very general form of 
decomposability: it is based on the assumption that the preference 
structure <A,>> can be decomposed into the effects of η independent 
contributions. This idea was already captured in Definition 11 when we 
formalized the notion of decomposability in order to account for the 
joint effects of several independent dimensions. For convenience, we 
simply repeat here Definition 11: 
DEFINITION 15 
(MODEL Ml) 
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DEFINITION 11 
(MODEL M3) 
Suppose that < A,> > is an independent binary preference 
structure and let F be a strictly monotomcally 
increasing function of η variables that is one-to-оче 
in each variable separately. The preference structure 
<A,>) is called F-decomposable if and only if there 
exist strict dual-monotonic functions φ defined on A *A 
(-L = l,...,n) such that, for all x,y in A , 
(1) φ(χ,y) > ε if and only if χ > y 
(il) Ф(х, ι/) = РЕФ, (х, , ϋ ^ ) .f Φ (x ι 4 ) ] 
Taking (for instance) the additive difference model as a starting 
point, we may try to specify the unidimensional preference functions. 
Consideration of the wide appeal of the power function in the metric 
analysis of similarity data, we may be tempted by a "wild" transposition 
and require the unidimensional preference functions to be power 
functions in the sense that 
W '^ NJ 
where & stands for u (x ) 
Ifi, 
u (y ) and where 
6* if 6 >0 
<L 4. 
If 6^<0 
ÍÍJ is defined as follows 
These ideas lead to the following defintion. 
DEFINITION 17 
(MODEL M4) 
Suppose that < A,> ) is an independent binary preference 
structure. This structure is a decomposable structure 
satisfying model M4 if and only if there exist 
real-valued functions u defined on A (-t = l,...,w) 
such that, for all x,y in A , 
(i) φ(χ,!/)>ε if and only if χ > у 
di) Φ 
n
 1 ι /л 
U.У) - Ι ϊ lí.l 1 ' 
¿=1 ^ 
(where Î I ' is defined in a similar fashion as 16 ]*). This 
specialization of the additive difference model is (as yet) rather 
arbitrary. It pays tribute to current usage m multidimensional scaling 
of the power function. Indeed, this function has much interest for 
psychologists, although there is no reason for ruling out other 
functions as formal models for multidimensional scaling! Where model M4 
94 
would be justifiable, following the example of CROSS (1965), it would 
be tempting to investigate whether the number 1 admits a psychological 
interpretation in the following sense: К =1 would indicate that all the 
dimensions are equally weighted, however, as 1 increases, the dimensions 
would become increasingly differentially weighted according to the 
values of S , until, in the limit 1 = °° , only the largest S would 
contribute to the over-all preference between two alternatives. The 
latter case would be similar to TVERSKY's (1969) lexicographic semiorder 
model. 
Model M4 is based on a very specific choice of the form of the 
unidimensional preference functions. Of course, α ρΐΑ.οΊΑ., other 
functions may be selected like, for instance, 
ξ 
φ U ,y ) =log(l +e •*-) or φ U . y ) = ( 1 + δ*) 1 A 
\. A~ А. Л,- л. л л* 
These and other unidimensional preference functions do indeed provide 
a variety of ipec-c^c models which we are not going to present in 
detail. We shall rather, as announced above, take one депечаі model 
(model Ml; as archetypal of the whole class. This model will now be 
discussed more fully and we merely state that certain revisions will 
render the present analysis applicable to the other models. 
In order to know the ins and outs of model Ml we shall, once again, 
take the additive difference model as a starting point. In the additive 
difference model the unidimensional preferences are functions of the 
numerical differences between two scale values. Unidimensional 
preference functions indicate perceived relations pertaining to pairs 
of (unidimensional) alternatives. According to the additive difference 
model, these relations are mediated by some property of the individual 
unidimensional alternatives, viz., by their subjective values. In a 
sense, unidimensional preferences are properties of a pair as such and, 
consequently, they may or nay not be predictable from some simple 
property of the individual alternatives. Model МЛ fully recognizes that 
the fundamental objects judged by an agent are not single alternatives, 
but paoii of unidimensional alternatives. It renders preferences 
between multidimensional alternatives in terms of judgments of 
unidimensional pairs. 
It may be worthwhile to compare model Ml with other known models of 
conjoint measurement, for instance, with additive conjoint measurement. 
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To make such a comparison tractable we shall consider only the 
two-dimensional case. Elements of A1 will be labelled afb,c,..., while 
p,q,1,... will represent typical elements of A« . To simplify the 
notation we write ap rather than (a.,p) for ordered pairs. Let A be the 
set A^A of all ordered pairs ap with aeA 1 and peA„ . The theory of 
additive conjoint measurement is based on a -t^ an4-cix.ue relation > 
defined over the product set A xA . In the case of additive conjoint 
measurement an oldcti-tng over A xA induces an ordering of intervals in 
each factor. The translation of an order relation on AjXA between ap 
and bq into one between ab and pq depends on an additive rule of 
combination for the contributions of A] and A„ . Under appropriate 
strong conditions for > on A = A..xA. , the theory of additive conjoint 
measurement establishes the existence of real-valued functions φ , Φ. 
and φ, defined on A , A. and A„ respectively, that satisfy 
( ι ) αρ ^ bq iff <t>(a.p)><t>(bq) 
di) φ(αρ) =φ 1 (a) + φ2(ρ) 
or simply, 
apsrbq iff φ, (α) +φ2(ρ) > φ1 (b) + φ2(ς) (II.1) 
It is well known that the structure <A.xA„,>> need not necessarily be 
interpreted in terms of the additivity of the two factors. Indeed, 
relation (II. 1) can be written 
apsrbq iff φ1 (α) -φ, (b) > φ2(ς) - φ2(ρ) (II.2) 
or, equivalently, as 
apzbq iff [φ, (α)-φ1 (b)] + [φ2(ρ)-φ2(ς)] >0 (II.3) 
This interpretation of <A.xA7,>> as a difference structure is very 
similar to the representation given by a specialization of the additive 
difference model, a specialization that requires the unidimensional 
preference functions to be equal to the numerical difference of two 
subjective scale values. Obviously, this specialization outlaws 
intransitivity and, indeed, conjoint measurement is concerned only with 
олаел.-спдА over the product Α.χΑ. . 
The representations (II. 1) and (II.2) are clearly equivalent, so that 
we are led to define dual relations > and >' as follows: 
ap > bq iff ab >' qp 
The most noteworthy implication of the additivity of two factors is the 
condition that αχ >¿q and ¿p >bx together imply ap>bq. This is the 
96 
crucial "cancellation axiom" of LUCE & TUKEY (1964) . Translated into 
terms of the dual relation >' , this axiom can be written as ajj >' qx 
and ^b >' xp imply abs-' qp . And when this condition holds, neither the 
additive difference model nor model Ml is able to predict intransitive 
choices. Actually, the latter models can be considered as 
generalizations of tne representation (II.3); the generalizations in 
question are of the form 
ap ζ bq iff i?1 (ab) + φ2(ρί}) > 0 (II.4) 
In these generalizations the unidimensional preference functions are no 
longer equal to the difference of two subjective scale values. This 
implies that the additivity of sensed "differences" (or unidimensional 
preferences) л s no longer guaranteed. But the additivity of the 
unidimensional preference functions may well prove to be an audacious 
assumption! In fact, the very idea that unidimensional preferences 
estimates are obtained as though agents were judging numerical 
differences may be thought to be unnecessarily restrictive, if not 
wholly artificial. 
The properties dealt with in psychology are almost always non-additive. 
But additivity is a necessary condition for traditional measurement and 
that is why the corresponding quantitative methods do not especially 
suit the needs of psychological measurement. When additivity is not 
apparent, we must look for measurement theories that avoid this 
controversial requirement. Such theories may well prove to be quite 
different from classic theories. For instance, an axionatization of 
(AjXA-,?-) that justifies tne representation (II.4) may be quite unlike 
the traditional axioms of additive conjoint measurement. The scaling 
assumptions of additive conjoint measurement have several well known 
consequences (transitivity, independence, double cancellation and 
triple cancellation). None of these properties are, α pliol-c, necessary 
consequences of any of the models we present. Hence, in the latter 
models, little remains of the precise results of additive conjoint 
measurement. In particular, the models in question can cope with 
structures ( A xA ,>> that need not be transitive. In order to discover 
necessary conditions on > for any of our models, we have to proceed 
analytically by taking each model in turn and attempting a derivation 
of consequences that may be used to establish the corresponding 
representation. We shall now proceed to do so for model Ml, beginning 
with the two-dimensional case (which we have, in fact, just been 
considering), on the general heuristic principle that, in 
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multidimensional theories of measurement, there always appears to be 
an essential difference between the case of two and the case of more 
than two component spaces. This difference consists in the fact that 
nothing ressembling a "cancellation axiom" is required m the general 
case where n>2 : conditions of this type follow then from independence, 
a property that is much stronger for three or more components than it 
is for two only. 
We now turn to some of the necessary consequences of model Ml. A very 
evident property is that which states that if two alternatives possess 
a common element on one component, then their preference relation 
remains unaffected if that element is changed to another. Indeed, 
ap > bp ο Φ1 (αί>)+Φ2 {рр)>0 « Φ1(α6)+Φ2(ςς)>0 ~ aq > bq 
simply because φ,(pp) =Φ_ (çç) =0. This demonstrates that mutual 
independence is a necessary condition for the additive model Ml (mutual, 
because ар>aq о bp>bq can similarly be proved). Note that independence 
need not be taken as an explicit axiom, because the model postulates the 
stronger assumption of intradimensional strict dual-monotonicity (ISDM). 
Independence can be seen as a consequence of ISDM, at least when one 
requires φ (χ ,χ ) =0 for every к e A (¿ = 1,2). In fact, this was our 
main reason for making this scaling assumption (see Section II.3). 
The model assumes strict dual-monotonicity of the unidimensional 
preference relations > (-c = l,2), and this leads to testable 
consequences. In order to formulate these consequences we shall 
distinguish between pairs of anta.goru.it4.c alternatives and pairs of 
conizn-iiiai alternatives. By a pair of consensual alternatives we mean 
a pair where one alternative weakly dominates the other on every 
dimension, i.e. all pairs χ =ар and у =bq such that the first and 
second component of one of the alternatives is weakly preferred to, 
respectively, the first and the second component of the other 
alternative (e.g., a >. b and ρ >„<}). Antagonistic alternatives refer to 
those whose components exhibit conflicting preferences on the 
dimensions, i.e., two alternatives a = a and υ =d i are antagonistic if 
с >. d and 1 >_ i . 
Let n. and n? be the number of elements in A. and A„ respectively. We 
call W(a) the number of pairs of antagonistic alternatives; obviously, 
this quantity is equal to the number of ways two elements of A„ can be 
associated with two elements of A1 , that is, N(a) = t"
1) f"2). When we 
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substract Μ(α) from the total number of ordered pairs of alternatives N 
[У= ( ', )] we obtain the nunber of pairs of consensual alternatives, 
which we shall call W(c). It is interesting to note that the ratio 
4(a)/N is a function of both η and η ; this ratio increases with n. 
or и , which means that the relative number of antagonistic 
alternatives also increases with η or η . Indeed, for n. =n = 6, 
M(a)/N=0.36, while V(a)/V=0.37 [0.3Θ, respectively] for и =8 and 
и = 6 In. =n = 7 , respectively!. More typically, N(a)/W = 0.43 for 
η =10 and η = 20, while N(a) /V «= 0.4 5 for η = η = 20, i.e., for 4 00 
alternatives. When either of n. or η increases to infinity while the 
other remains finite (yet, at least equal to 2) Ψ(α)/Ν will take on a 
value between 0.25 and 0.50, depending upon the precise value of the 
finite number. In the limit, where both η and n„ increase to infinity 
(that is, \-> ™ as a result of n. y™ and г -1· J°) , the ratio V(a)/W 
tends to 0.50. 
We shall now formulate an important property of the consensual 
alternatives, and one that is a necessary consequence of the model. 
Firstly, let us note that -tt, a,b,c are three components such that 
£ip>bp>CLp, then ф1(сі,с)> max [φ. (а,Ь),ф(Ь,с)] . This is obviously a 
result of strict dual-monotonicity. A similar result will be true of 
couise for components in A . For every fa >. с and q> 1, respectively, 
if bq^oi, then xq > yn. for every к such that χ > fa 
and every у such that с Зг у 
if bq>c'Ll then bu>cu for every α such that u. »„ q 
and every ν such that 1 s? υ 
This may be proved as follows: when b > с and 
faq > UK o i>(bq,cfL) =ф 1(Ь,с)+Ф 2(<},/1.)>0 
then ISDM on >. requires: 
( i) xq >e.>L ~ i>(xp,cl) =Ф 1(х,с) + φ (ς,Λ) > 0 
for every χ such that χ >. b 
(II.5) 
(II.6) 
and 
(n) bq > yi ~ <ilbq,yi) =Ф1(Ь,у) + φ2 (ς,Λ) > 
for every (/ such that с >. у 
Similarly, when q >. л. , it can be proved that bq>cA. induces bu > Ci. 
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( for every α such that u.^„q) and bq > cu (for every y such that 
Eqs. (II.5-6) place severe restrictions on the relations >· (-¿ = 1,2). 
Indeed, they imply transitivity of both >1 and >-. Transitivity within 
each factor is, therefore, a necessary condition for the additive 
model Ml. Note that the transitivity of >. does not have to be taken 
as an explicit axiom when we adopt stronger conditions and require >. 
to be either of three specializations of an asymmetric order: an 
interval order, a semiorder or a strict weak order (see Section II.3). 
The transitivity of > · (-¿ = 1,2) does not imply transitivity of > . But 
the restriction of > to pairs of consensual alternatives is a transitive 
relation. Let > be this restriction, and then it is readily seen that 
if ap>cbíí « φ1 (α,ί>) + φ2 (ρ,ς) > 0 
and if bq > ел » Φ, (b ,е.) + ή> (q ,π) > О 
then ар> с* о φ {а,с) +φ (ρ,ι) > О 
as a result of ISDM. But the restriction of > to pairs of antagonistic 
alternatives, a restriction that w: 
satisfy the transitivity property! 
ill be denoted > , does not have to 
This is not to say that > is an arbitray asymmetric relation. Indeed, 
the number W(a) leads a. pliolÁ. to an upper bound [viz., 2 ] for the 
number of possible cases based on pairs of antagonistic alternatives. 
But not all these cases are actually possible in model Ml, because ISDM 
has testable consequences in the case of > also: 
if cq > bu, then cu >6υ for every υ such that n » υ 
and every u such that u jr. q 
if Ьл. > cq, then in > ^ q for every e such that С ». Ь 
and every i such that с ».. Í 
The proof is straightforward and based simply upon the fact that 
|φ2 (α,υ) | >φ2(ή,Α) whenu> 2q or Κ ^2 υ 
and |φ1 (e, ¡ί) I >ф 1 (Ь,с) when е> Ь or с >. Í 
Eqs. (II.7-8) place severe restrictions on the possible relations 
(II.7) 
(II.8) 
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between conflicting alternatives. Indeed, for и1=и„=3, Ν(α) =9 but not 9 
all 2 =512 cases are compatible with the model! There are, in fact, 
only 50 cases that can be accounted for by model Ml. The computation of 
this reduction is straightforward but should be performed in each 
particular case (that is, for each particular value of n. and n?) since 
we have been unable to derive a general formula. 
This brings us to the general reduction problem. Let A be a set of W 
alternatives and let us assume that there exists a binary relation on A 
that, for simplicity, takes on only tuio values, 0 and 1. Therefore, 
there α pn-toi-L exist 2 possible choice patterns; even for the modest 
value of N = 9 this number is equal to 2 , which is a sizeable quantity, 
much higher indeed than that resulting from Brahman Sissa's challenge to 
King Shirham ( ). But preference relations are not arbitrary, being, in 
fact, commonly assumed to be asymmetric. When the binary relation is 
asymmetric and when identical pairs ^ are discarded, the number of 
{ \ τ л 
possible choice patterns reduces to 2 , i.e., to 2 for N=9. The 
assumption of independence brings about yet another reduction which, 
obviously, is given by (it!-!) ( „'') + (n,-l) ( ' ) . In our particular case 
study, with n. = n. = 3, this reduction equals a factor 12 , which leaves 
24 
us with 2 possible response patterns. ISDM fixes the value of the M(c) 
pairs of consensual alternatives, leaving 2 as an upper bound for 
the number of possible cases; for 4(a) =9, this upper bound equals 512. 
081 asymmetry ,36 independence -,24 ISDM (c) ') ISDM (a) ,-„ 
Figure II.2. 
But ISDM also places restrictions on certain pairs of conflicting 
alternatives As we have already mentioned, this last reduction must be 
computed in each particular case; for n, = и =3 , it leads to 50 cases 
(see Figure II.2). Our example clearly shows the relative importance of 
the reduction due to ISDM, and this may be interpreted as an argument 
in favour of the ISDM-assumption (but our main argument for ISDM is 
based on the interpretation of the preference functions Φ as 
unidimensional preference measures). 
A well known formula exists for finding the maximum number of 
intransitive triples in a complete paired comparisons design having no 
( ) One of the alleged inventors of chess. The number in question was 
of course 264 - 1 . 
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equivalence judgments. For W=n1n„ = 9 , this maximum number is 30. It 
would be interesting to know whether, given the model Ml for 
intransitive choices, this maximum number could be obtained. If not, 
it would be desirable to derive an alternative formula for the maximum 
number of intransitive triples compatible with the model in question. 
So far we have been unable to derive such a general formula so that, 
for want of something better, we are compelled to compute this maximum 
number in each particular case, i.e., for each particular set of values 
for и1 and n„. For n1 = n„ = 3 , the maximum number of intransitive 
triples is 2 (each intransitive triple can of course be written in 
three different ways!), these two triples being based on the 
alternatives ал, bq and ел (see Figure II.3). Later on, two other 
2 
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examples are presented, having more alternatives, where the maximum 
number of intransitive triples is higher; these examples, incidentally, 
also admit of intransitive cyles of order k larger than three (fe>3). 
Eqs. (II„7-8) also have other important consequences. Their essential 
consequence is that they result in a particular ordering of the 
unidimensional preference functions. Indeed, the model authorizes the 
following interpretations: 
cq >bfi * φ2(ί,Λ) > ф1 (Ь,с) 
ол >cc¡ о ф1 (6,с) > Ф2((г,л.) 
bu ~ cq «· ф1(Ь,с)=ф(ч,л) 
This shows that, in principle, every φ. can be compared to every φ. 
(or, vice versa) and weakly ordered accordingly. This does not 
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necessarily lead to a common weak order for both the <t>,'s and the Φ,'Ξ 
because it may be that there are unidimensional preference functions, 
either ф.'з or ф.'з, that are incapable of being ordered. This will be 
the case whenever there exists no φ. (no φ , respectively) which is 
available to order two φ,'ε (two ф.'з, respectively). For example, in 
Figure II.3, a possible occurence is that 
bp > ai о ф(Ьр,аі)=-ф.(а,Ь)+о(р,л.)> 0 
and 6<Ί>ορ о- ф(Ьі,ср)= Ф 1(Ь,с)-ф(р,/і)>0 
which would resolve into the order Ф 1(а.,Ь)<ф(р,л)<ф 1(Ь,с). But it 
might also occur that 
bp>afL and с ρ > Ьл 
or ai>bp and bà. > cp 
two instances that would leave ф.(а,Ь) and ф.(Ь,с) unordered. This 
example shows that the order induced on ( (A xA )u (A.xA ) 1 is not, in 
general, a total order. It should also be noted, incidentally, that 
model Ml authorizes two interpretations of the indifference notion. The 
model admits indifference as resulting from the aggregation of 
unidimensional indifference relations (~ ) but, on the other hand, it 
also admits indifference as a consequence of certain compensations 
between unidimensional preferences (> ) . The latter interpretation is 
in contradiction with such indifference measures as ROBERTS' (1970) 
"max metric" according to which two alternatives are indifferent if and 
only if there is an indifference relation between them on each of the 
dimensions. 
We shall now proceed to the presentation of two more complex, and, 
hence, more realistic examples. In the first examDle we assume the 
existence of two sets A1 = f а , Ь ,c ,d} and A = {ρ,ς,η} with η =4 and 
и =3 elements respectively (see Figure II.4). The number of pairs 
of antagonistic alternatives is then given by W(a) =18 , while 
W(c) =48 . In Table II.1 we present a fictitious data matrix of 
n.it. = 12 columns. The matrix is artificial and has been constructed 
only so as to insure that model Ml is satisfied by the N(c) =48 pairs 
of consensual alternatives. In an experimental context, one should of 
course start checking whether the Eqs. (II.5-6) hold for the Ы(й) 
pairs of consensual alternatives. If this is the case, we know that 
the transitivity of both > and ~ hold for thai e pairs. But it is easy 
to verify that the present data matrix does contain intransitive 
triples. Application of KENDALL'S (1948) well known formula results in 
юз 
a total of 4 intransitive triples. These triples belong to the set of 
pairs of antagonistic alternatives, a set containing 18 pairs in the 
2 
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present example. The intransitive triples are found to be as follows: 
an > bq > cp > an, ал > bq > dp >• at, an. > cq > dp > an and bn > cq > dp > bn. Note 
that the matrix of Table II.1 contains intransitive cycles that are 
ap 
aq 
an 
bp 
bq 
bn 
cp 
cq 
en 
dp 
dq 
dn 
ap 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
aq 
1 
-
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
an 
1 
1 
-
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
bp 
1 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
bq 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
bn 
-
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
cp 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
aq 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
en 
-
0 
0 
0 
dp 
0 
-
0 
0 
dq 
-
0 
dn 
-
Table II.1. 
not of order 3. Indeed, the matrix in question admits some 4-cycles, 
for instance an > bq > cp > dp>an or an > bn > cq > dp>an.. 
As would be expected, the number of fe-cycles (fe>3) increases 
drastically with increasing n. and/or п.. This is exemplified by a 
second (artificial) example here presented, an example that assumes 
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η. =η„=5 and, hence, is based on 25 alternatives. The corresponding 
matrix is given in Table II.2. The matrix has again been constructed 
so as to insure that model Ml is satisfied by the N(c) =200 pairs of 
consensual alternatives. The matrix contains 24 circular triples, 
which is modest in comparison with the maximum number of circular 
triples as computed by KENDALL'S formula; for N=25 this maximum 
number is 650. Yet, the matrix of Table II.2 contains an appreciable 
number of fe-cycles with fe>3. BEZEMBINDER (1976) proposed measuring 
the circularity of a system of paired comparisons (omitting diagonals) 
by the rank of what is called a "cycle matrix". In the present case, 
the rank of this matrix is 19 which indicates that the maximal fe-cycle 
is of order fe=19. In fact, there are 24 different 19-cycles in the 
matrix of Table 11.2; one of them can be seen to be at >zn. >d i > i t > b t > 
> cp > bq > ah > dp > cq > b-t > ep > ац > ел > aò > eq > d>i > a > hi > at. Of course, 
there are several fe-cycles with 3<b<19, the maximum being 313 for 
fe = 12. This second example (Table II.2) demonstrates some of the 
possibilities of model Ml. In particular, it shows that the model is 
not at all restricted to circular triples only but, rather, is capable 
of coping with fe-cycles (fe>3), a property that, within the literature, 
is very unusual indeed. 
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CHAPTER Ш 
TRANSITIVITY REVISITED 
III.l, INTRODUCTION. 
Having developed a class of simple models for genotypic intransitivity 
we should quite naturally like to give them a fair trial. Several 
factors combine to make this a very delicate task indeed. The precise 
nature of these factors, to which the present Chapter is devoted, 
hinges upon certain inadequacies in the psychological and economic 
literature. It will be argued that these inadequacies not only refer to 
the absence of appropriate data but, what is more, to the paucity of 
reliable empirical results that are capable of inspiring either critical 
experiments or compelling simulations. 
In Section III.2 the overwhelming prestige of transitivity in the 
psychological literature will be analyzed further. The transitivity 
assumption forms not only the corner-stone of measurement theories but 
it underlies a multitude of scaling methods for which no measurement 
theory has yet been offered. The transitivity assumption is also basic 
to many behaviourally oriented theories, where it appears to be related 
to the common assumption of unidimensionality of behaviour. The result 
of all this is that existing data are altogether irrelevant to the 
empirical verification of genotypic intransitivity. These data have 
invariably been collected under the shadow of a transitive theory of 
one kind or another, so that they are inherently inappropriate to the 
support of a phenomenon such as sub]ective intransitivity. We shall 
argue that there is little — if any — help to be expected from either 
the psychological or economic literature. 
In a theorem on the additive difference model, TVERSKY (1969) has 
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proved that, for multidimensional alternatives with n>3, transitivity 
holds if and only if the unidimensional preference functions are 
linear. We shall show in Section III.3 that the linearity requirement 
induces a property called additivity. Mathematically, additivity of the 
unidimensional preference functions leads to a celebrated functional 
equation which is known to admit only linear functions as continuous 
solutions. Thus, under the auspices of the additive difference model 
or, for that matter, of model Ml, the transitivity issue appears to be 
intimately related to the additivity of the unidimensional preference 
functions. Although the properties dealt with in the behavioural 
sciences hardly ever turn out to be additive, there exist almost no 
measurement theories that avoid this requirement. It is already well 
known that theories of unidimensional difference measurement are, in 
fact, based on an additivity assumption, but this assumption is also 
basic to such multidimensional theories as KRANTZ'ε (1972) theory of 
cross-modality, where it guarantees a certain "homogeneity" of 
concatenation across the dimensions. Hence, any known method for 
measuring subjective "differences" cannot be assumed to be valid if 
either the additive difference model or our model Ml is to yield 
intransitive data. For this reason we decided to sift the psychological 
literature in search of empirical evidence supporting the existence of 
non-additive "difference" functions that could be interpreted as 
(non-additive) unidimensional preference functions within a simulation 
exercise. 
Section III.4 is concerned with the possibility of simulation basod 
upon possible analogies to the construction of sensory magnitude scales, 
which is known to be one of the oldest problems in experimental 
psychology. The goal of this Section will be to scrutinize the relevance 
of this problem to the measurement of subjective intervals or 
"differences". Although the direct estimation of sensation intervals 
was established as an important procedure for the scaling of surface 
colours almost half a century ago, there is, in general, little to be 
found within the psychological literature. Few experiments have 
produced data about magnitude estimates of "differences" between 
alternatives, the data required to estimate the form of unidimensional 
preference functions. In the case of a few exceptional intensive 
continua some results have been obtained recently, but these are 
invariably still entangled in old psychophysical controversies. This is 
to be seen either in the conflict between the validity of direct 
scaling procedures versus indirect ones, or in the relationship between 
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magnitude and category scaling procedures, or even in the precise form 
of the psychophysical function. All these issues nourish a sciertific 
debate that has been raging ever since FECHNER founded the bases of 
psychophysics. The existing confusion is so great that we should like 
to argue that the choice of any specific unidimensional preference 
function would have to rest upon a truly fragile theoretical and 
empirical basis, thus hampering the possibility of meaningful 
simulation. 
In our search for a dependable basis for the rational selectio η of 
unidimensional preference functions, we have naturally been attracted 
by the popular assumption that there is a close kinship between 
estimates of (unidimensional) sensory "differences", and those of 
(unidimensional) dissimilarity. This will be the topic of discussion 
in Section III.5. In the psychological literature there are indeed 
several speculations to be found about the relationship between the 
judgment of sensory intervals and the judgment of dissimilarity. The 
most widely held position is that these two kinds of judgment correlate 
positively, and according to some authors, the correlation is even 
perfect in the sense that both judgments are identical. However, there 
appears to be really little empirical support of this contention: it is 
not at all certain that the task of unidimensional interval estimation 
induces subjects to judge unidimensional dissimilarity, and vice versa. 
What is more, models of unidimensional similarity are infrequent and 
highly controversial, since agreement between prediction and observation 
is in every case unsatisfactory. But of course, (dis)similarity is 
generally considered to be a muit^dA.imni'tonal concept: (dis) similarity 
is usually considered to be compounded of variations along several 
dimensions. It remains a mystery as to what extent unidimensional 
"difference" scales may represent "segments" of multidimensional 
dissimilarity structures. If dissimilarity is inherently 
multidimensional, current models of multidimensional (dis)similarity may 
hint at various muttid'LmenòA.onaZ preference functions. However, such 
functions are related to multidimensional preference models that are of 
a very different kind to the models proposed in this study. In one way 
or another therefore, models of similarity do not seem to be very 
helpful in the context of choosing unidimensional preference functions 
on a rational basis, essentially because the relationship between 
judgments of (dis)similarity and judgments of "difference" remains 
largely unknown: in both cases it is still unclear how subjects deal 
with the numerical assignment problem. 
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In Section III.6 we proceed to the analysis of further complications 
which will render (meaningful) simulation of our models altogether 
impossible. The first impediment is related to the error problem in 
psychology. By this we do not refer to problems that are merely 
statistical in nature, but to explicit error theories, i.e., to 
psychological models providing a link between the latent and the 
observable. It will be argued that, in the absence of any such tneory, 
simulation can only be regarded as a mirage of delusion. Another 
insuperable obstacle to simulation stems from our total ignorance of 
the comparability of sensory "differences" across dimensions. 
Unidimensional preference functions on different dimensions are not 
necessarily commensurable in that there is not necessarily a common 
unit. And when the unidimensional preference functions are supposed to 
constitute ordinal scales, the notion of interdimensional comparability 
is even more unpalatable. To simulate any of our models m a neaningful 
fash:on would presuppose a solution to the problem of the 
interdimensional comparability of preference intervals, a oroblom that, 
under another guise, is recognized to be a long-standing puzzle in 
utility theory. 
Ill,2, THE TRANSITIVITY ISSUE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 
The point of view adopted in this study is that the question whether 
or not (choice) behaviour satisfies transitivity should be settled 
empirically. One is thus quite naturally led into sifting the scientific 
literature in the hope of coming across some data that may be considered 
decisive in this respect. We would like to argue that this is an idle 
hope, i.e., that the literature can be of little — if any — help in 
this context. 
The m a m reason seems to lie in the ubiquity of the transitivity 
assumption. This is clearly the case in fundamental measurement 
theories, but it is equally true in a multitude of scaling methods for 
which no measurement theory is available. The omnipresence of the 
transitivity assumption is also striking in many behaviourally oriented 
theories, in particular those theories m which unidimensionality of 
behaviour is assumed (either overtly or tacitly). Our surmise is that 
data collected in many of these cases have little bearing on the 
empirical problem of the existence of genotypic intransitivity. 
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Although most psychological scales in current use can at best be 
considered to be ordinal, those who have worked on measurement theories 
have attempted to arrive at scales that are either interval or ratio. 
Scaling methods for which no measurement theory is available provide 
only dubious evidence as to the type of scale being obtained. Actually, 
one can seldom rely upon the fact that subjective scales are at the 
interval or ratio scale level. The great achievement of measurement 
theories lies in their capacity to warrant a definite scale type. 
In most measurement theories some psychological variable is idealized as 
a continuum that forms either an interval or a ratio scale. These 
theories invariably carry a transitivity axiom of some kind or another 
and most of them result in the transitivity of a particular behaviour. 
Transitivity is commonly introduced by a (transitive) relation > defined 
on the set of alternatives A , as, for instance, in the VON NEUMANN-
MORGENSTERN (1947) approach to the measurement of subjective utility. 
Quite often though, a transitive relation » is defined on a product set. 
This product set may be of the type AxA as in TVERSKY & KRANTZ's (1970) 
representation of similarity data; the transitivity on ΑχA then 
invariably induces a transitive relation on A although, occasionally, 
transitivity on A is postulated separately and in addition to the 
transitivity relation on AxA [as exemplified by SUPPES & WINET's (1955) 
axiomatization of absolute-difference structures]. When A has the 
structure of a product set, for instance when Α = Α..χΑ. , it is quite 
common to postulate a transitive relation on A.xA„ (more generally, on 
A..XA χ... χΑ ). The conjoint measurement theory provides a well known 
example of this. In an attempt to account for the cross-modality 
matching paradigm KRANTZ (1972) defined a transitive relation ^ on the 
set of all pairs from any of Α^Α.,.,.,Α χΑ . ^hpse and other 
measurement theories based on a transitive relation » defined on a 
product set all have a sensory basis in that they give rise to sensory 
magnitudes that guarantee the transitivity of some behaviour. The 
precise relationship depends of course on the nature of ^  and its 
connections with sensory processes but, unaccountably, in the literature 
we always find that one or more psychological variables are idealized as 
subjective scales, i.e., as mathematical continua purporting 
transitivity. 
When data are collected under the auspices of a measurement theory, they 
are rarely interpreted as contradicting the theory in question, unless 
one or more major assumptions of the theory are found to be so utterly 
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unsupportable that their falsity is unquestionable [see, for example, 
the scaling model KRANTZ (1967) tried to apply in the domain of colour 
similarities]. Generally, the data are regarded as supporting the 
theory, in spite of a number of "violations" which are, almost ritually, 
ignored. Actually, we suspect that data benefiting from a measurement 
theory are altogether useless for the corroboration of genotypic 
intransitivity. The reason should be clear: such data have been 
collected in the spirit of a transitive theory and have not at all 
been designed to elicit the existence of genotypic intransitivities in 
behaviour. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the literature reports some very few 
instances in which the transitivity axiom has been investigated by 
experiments that were guided by purposedly developed models. The value 
of these results is somewhat dubious though, since such experiments 
were not really designed to prove anything experimentally, but merely 
to illustrate the idea that when the alternatives are multidimensional 
it may be possible to create P-cycles by coupling "small" preferences 
on some dimensions with "large" preferences on another. This is 
substantially the case in MORRISON (1962), SHEPARD (1964), 
rVERSKY (1969), NAVARICK & FANTINO (1972) and MONTGOMERY (1975c). Their 
experiments should be considered as an appt-icat-Lon of a cyclic-choice 
model rather than a severe test of the model in question. The data of 
these experiments could be interpreted in terms of our own models; this 
would result in a pure teleology since the data collection has not been 
guided by any of our models... 
So much for experiments prompted by measurement theories. Apart from 
this the psychological literature is dominated by the wide-spread 
belief in the unidimensionality of behaviour. Unidimensional theories 
of behaviour assume that alternatives can be evaluated on the basis of 
a common criterion; these theories are based on the assumption that a 
unique factor controls at least the d^Hict^on of the pairwise choices. 
Except for some very rare models of choice mentioned in Chapter I, 
every unidimensional theory of behaviour assumes that the alternatives 
can be ordered in some way or another. Incidentally, this assumption 
should hardly trouble us since our conjecture is (see Chapter I) that 
genotypic intransitivity is impossible when behaviour is unidimensional! 
But what may be of some concern to the present study is that, although 
the assumption of unidimensionality is fundamental to many behaviourally 
oriented theories, there has been so little experimental examination of 
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this assumption. The assumption of unidimensionality carries the 
important implication that choice behaviour will satisfy weak stochastic 
transitivity (WST), so that theories which assume unidimensional control 
of the direction of choice should be concerned with the validity of WS1'. 
In addition, for theories that do not simply predict the direction of 
choice but also the exact choice probabilities, the validity of 
"substitutability" (see Section 1.4) should be tested, since such 
theories may be considered as instances of simple scalability, itself 
equivalent to substitutability. According to NAVARICK & FANTINO (1974) 
there are many theories that adopt the basic assumptions of simple 
scalability. The simple scalability model is based on the assumption 
that there is a common utility dimension underlying the choices and that 
the choice probabilities increase as utilities diverge. NAVARICK and 
FANTINO argue that similar assumptions are impij.cn.t in numerous models 
of choice, viz., in all those models where a set of variables is 
aggregated into one single dimension. These authors note that there 
have been few experimental tests of either WST or substitutability, 
although the unidimensionality assumption is prevalent in many theories 
of human and animal behaviour. If unidimensionality is to be based on 
experimental evidence rather than belief and assumption, data must be 
collected so that the empirical implications of unidimensionality can 
be thoroughly tested. Such data appear to be quite rare in the 
psychological literature. This constitutes a serious drawback when 
looking for data that might fit any of our models. All these models are 
dimensional models, i.e., they assume that judgments are made in a 
dimensional manner. 
When information is lacking about the dimensional structure of 
preference data, as happens to be the case in several reported 
experiments, dimensional models can hardly be applied. Incidentally, 
little — if anything — is known about the general applicability of 
dimensional models [for a recent discussion, see MONTGOMERY & SVENSON 
(1976)]. Although in many instances they may be quite appropriate, one 
should keep in mind that multidimensional alternatives may be processed 
according to models that are not dimensional, but, for instance, 
hierarchical in nature. At an empirical level, there is no clear basis 
to indicate when (or how frequently) dimensional processing is involved 
in choices between real-world alternatives. All that can be said is that 
dimensional models are not unreasonable when there is a high degree of 
control over the subjective dimensions. This is very likely to be the 
case in certain laboratory experiments where the dimensions may be 
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assumed to be known in advance, or at least when the experimental 
instructions define a corresponding dimensional structure to be used 
by the subject. But dimensional structures may be underlying many other 
choice situations, especially, perhaps, in the perceptual area. The 
circumstances under which a dimensional structure arises are themselves 
in fact of interest and require a separate analysis. 
The problem of the dimensional structure of a set of alternatives is 
indeed fundamental to the types of models we try to set forth as a 
"rational" explanation of the intransitivity phenomenon. Our surmise is 
that the multidimensional aspect of alternatives is likely to lead to 
violations of transitivity. This principle has not been universally 
recognized in the psychological literature which has usually been very 
reluctant to consider intransitivity as a natural phenomenon. The 
evidences of this prejudice are legion, as is shown by the number of 
experiments designed to support the general validity of the transitivity 
principle without paying attention to the dimensionality problem; the 
data resulting from these experiments are obviously irrelevant to our 
purpose. Occasionally, experiments are reported in which the dimensional 
structure of the alternatives is recognized but apparently without 
being related to the transitivity question. This is clearly so in the 
experiments of WIGGINS, WIGGINS & CONGER (1968) and of WIGGINS & WIGGINS 
(1969) concerning male preferences for pairs of nude female silhouettes 
differing along three dimensions (breast size, buttocks size and leg 
size). The data of these experiments were re-analyzed by SJÖBERG (1975a) 
who showed that they embrace an unusually high number of circular 
triads. But the data in question are so utterly incomplete that, what 
would appear to be a nice three-dimensional problem, is actually 
reduced to a set of two-dimensional subproblems which cannot be tackled 
by the models of this study. This is truly a pity because common sense 
suggests that an admirer of Rubens-like women might quite easily display 
intransitive judgments based on such simple models as those discussed 
in this study; this is readily confirmed by simulation. 
In conclusion, we may observe that the psychological literature appears 
to be so indoctrinated with the concept of transitive preference that 
data are not available for choices where intransitivities might be 
predicted by any of our models. This was of course to be expected in all 
those experiments that have not been guided by any theory. The same 
happens to hold, though for very different reasons, for investigations 
based on any of the current measurement theories: these theories 
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invariably extol the merits of the transitivity principle. The absence 
of appropriate models for genotypic intransitivity may account for the 
failure to reject the transitivity axiom in many investigations. In a 
few exceptional cases, such models have been developed so that 
transitivity could be zxpoizd to the. аа гійг cíímat oí hoitA.ie 
гх.реі<.тгпіі [EDWARDS (1961, p. 483)] ; unfortunately, these experiments 
were set up as demonstration studies so that their theoretical 
significance is somewhat dubious. In all the other experiments the 
prediction of intransitive choices cannot be derived from the criteria 
which were used to select the alternatives. To quote EDWARDS again, the 
corresponding pa.pe.Ai lepoit expe-t-tmen-ti -en wh-cch tlanij-t+v^ty ieemi 
quite tikeiy to hoid, &4.nd an acczptabte Іош percentage oí 
intianiitivit-t-ei, and, in eíízct, accept the hypothem they iet oat 
to accept (p. 483). 
In the absence of adequate data one may resolve to employ simulation. 
In order to be meaningful, any simulation must be justified in terms of 
psychological theories. The theory of intransitivity that is developed 
in the present study is not a substantive theory and hence does not 
hint at substantive consequences. It is much like a measurement theory 
and, as such, exhibits certain precise formal characteristics which 
will be discussed in the next Section. These formal aspects can be 
related to plausible assumptions about the choice process. But the 
plausibility of these assumptions would, of course, first have to be 
attested by analogies drawn from the psychological literature. In two 
subsequent sections (III.4 and III.5) we shall present and discuss two 
possible analogies, one based on the construction of sensory magnitude 
scales, the other making use of what is known as models of similarity. 
ІП.З. MORE ABOUT SOME FORMAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY, 
In the psychological literature it is quite common to assume that the 
subjective experience of a stimulus is independent of what other 
stimulus it is being compared to. Indeed, the dimensions of subjective 
space are often considered as scales of certain characteristics of the 
stimuli, so that the scale values are comparable over stimuli. In order 
to speculate about the precise nature of the unidimensional preference 
functions φ (χ ,y ) (ч. = 1 ,...,n) one can thus adopt the strategy of 
relating them to scale values. They then take on the general form 
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W ' V = WV' U , ( ^ ) ] ( І І І Л ) 
where x and y will generally be considered purely as values on a 
nominal scale (i.e., as names for elements of A ) although, 
occasionally, various physical measures may be used to identify 
elements of A . Equation (III.l) clearly indicates that the effect 
of each stimulus (or alternative) can be summarized by a single scale 
value. 
When one is not only interested in the d-LHtct-i-On. of unidimensional 
preferences, the unidimensional preference functions are alleged to 
have some bearing upon the notion of "intensity" of preference. It is 
thus supposed that there exists a continuous gradation of these 
intensities. This can be done by assuming the functions φ (<.= l,...,n) 
to be strictly increasing in their first argument and strictly 
decreasing in their second, or, more drastically, by requiring the 
stronger assumption that 
<)>(*,,ί/J = Ф Л " <*,> -",(«/,>! (III.2) 
These simple considerations bring with them level-of-measuremont 
problems. Since one is seldom able to trust that subjective scales are 
at the interval or ratio level — a requirement that seems sound, at 
least in the case of Eq. (III. 2) — one would like to search for 
la.tiona.t unidimensional preference functions ф (-t = 1 , . . . , η) , much in 
the spirit of KRANTΖ's (1967) attempt to construct "rational" distance 
functions for multidimensional scaling. By a rational unidmensional 
preference function we mean a numerical measure of unidimensional 
preference whose mathematical properties are deducible from 
psychological processes. We look for theories that are inherently 
multidimensional in that they should be able to deal simultaneously 
with several measures (viz., measures along several dimensions) 
together with the laws governing them. 
In his famous theorem on the additive difference model, TVERSKY (1969) 
proved that transitivity holds if and only if all unidimensional 
preference functions are linear (provided the dimensionality is strictly 
greater than two, i.e., и > 3 ) . When a unidimensional preference function 
is linear in the sense that íló(x,i/)l =¿6 ( X , Í / ) for some positive t , 
then the function φ is additive, so that 
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φ[6(χ,ί/)+δ(!/,ζ)]=φ[δ(χ,ι/)]+φ[δ(ι/,ζ)] 
or, in particular, 
ф[ц(х)-и(г)] =ф[и(х)-а(^)] + ф[и iy) -и (ζ) ] 
(ІІІ.З) 
(III.4) 
To show that this additivity property is closely related to the 
transitivity issue, we shall take the two-dimensional case η =2. In that 
case, Eq. (III.4) may be seen to have an interesting empirical 
correlate: if Eq. (III.4) holds under model Ml, then al~bq and bq ~ cp 
together imply ал.~ср, i.e., H-transitivity (see Figure III.l). But 
2 
Ρ ,, 
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Figure III.l. 
in the context of our models, this II-transitivity is interpreted as 
resulting from interdimensional matchings between sensed "differences". 
Defining dual relations ~ and —' in keeping with the dual relations 
introduced in Section II.7, the implication 
[a.K~bq and bq ~ cp] => ал. ~ cp 
is transformed into 
[ab ~' qi and be ~^ pq] ~ ac ~' pi 
The last property is a key axiom in many measurement theories based on 
an олаел-епд relation > on ΑχΑ , namely, in so-called interval 
measurement theories [see, for instance, KRANTZ, LUCE, SUPPES & TVERSKY 
(1971, p. 137); a proper relabelling of their alternatives will 
produce our relation]. In unidimensional preference measurement this 
property does indeed help to characterize "straightness" or, at least, 
constant curvature; it is needed in order to guarantee that the 
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concatenation of intervals (more precisely, the concatenation of 
equivalence classes of intervals) is well defined. In other words, it 
will be needed if a standard-sequence procedure on intervals is to 
yield consistent results so that the concatenation of a sequence of 
adjacent intervals m one part of the continuum equals the interval 
resulting from the concatenation of "equivalent" intervals in another 
part. In this sense, it is indeed an assumption of additivity. Replacing 
~ by > we may extend the same principle to strict ordenngs (>) as well 
as equivalences (~). This slight strengthening, which is known as the 
monoton-LCcty ox-tom or, also, as the icxtuple. condxt-ton, guarantees that 
pairs (interpreted as sensed intervals) behave qualitatively as 
differences with respect to the ordering » on AxA. In KRANTZ's (1972) 
account of the cross-modality matching paradigm, one comes across the 
same principle applied to two dimensions; in its -—form, the principle 
states that the concatenation of two end-to-end intervals in A1 (say 
ab and be yielding ac) is to produce a similar result as the 
concatenation of two eqm vaicn-t intervals in A (say pq and qi) . This 
is precisely what guarantees transitivity and that is why there is such 
a sharp distinction between measurement theories m which pairs can be 
ordered like intervals on a straight line (like the ordering of certain 
sensation intervals in psychophysics and of utility intervals in 
economics), and measurement theories that deliberately discard this 
possibility. In the case of cross-modality, this ordering is of course 
more subtle because there are two distinct dimensions along with a kind 
of homogeneity of concatenation with respect to those dimensions. 
It may be noted, incidentally, that it has for a long tine been known 
that there may be a subtle intercourse between additivity and 
transitivity. One of the oldest measurement procedures to obtain 
numerical evaluation of intervals or pairwise "differences" is given 
by the Thurstonian model. Thurstone's model relates an observable 
proportion to a subjective distance or difference. In the so-called 
case V, the goodness-of-fit of model to data is tested by checking 
the additivity of successive intervals, and since stochastic 
transitivity of the judgments is necessary for additivity, it is used 
for this check. 
Thus, if model Ml is not to outlaw α pfu Ο/ΙΊ. the possibility of 
intransitivity, the unidimensional preference functions should not be 
additive: one of them at least should be either a соп гк function 
[i.e., a function i such that Six + y) < Í(x) + ^ly)] or a coneau e 
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function [i.e., a function & such that ¿(x + y) > {, (x) + ¡5 (y) ] . Additivity 
is known to be a key property in physical measurement but it is seldom 
found in the area of psychology: the author is unable to confirm 
whether any additive psychological variable has yet been discovered. 
Contrary to physics, the properties dealt with in the behavioural 
sciences are hardly ever additive. Fortunately, measurement theories 
have been developed m the recent past which avoid this controversial 
requirement by proving that additive empirical operations are not at 
all essential to rigorous (psychological) measurement. This is not to 
deny the existence, in the psychological literature, of an additivity 
myth much in keeping with the omnipresence of its bedfellow, the 
transitivity assumption. This is plainly attested by many 
investigations, either theoretical or empirical. In a recent paper 
MAXWELL (1974) claims that thz plopzity oi ADDITIVITY л.& cieaiZy a 
dci-tnablz one ¿ол. a. [unidimensional] рле^елеисе icate. (p. 64). In 
another recent study, SCHNEIDER, PARKER, FARRELL & KANOW (1976) 
collected magnitude estimates of loudness difference which they 
assumed to be analogous to estimates of distance along a single 
continuum. In a similar vein, SCHNEIDER, PARKER & STEIN (1974) assumed 
binary comparisons of loudness intervals to be based on loudness 
differences, that is, they assumed that the binary comparisons of 
loudness intervals reflect loudness differences рел ¿e. In fact, the 
procedures used for the measurement of subjective intervals invariably 
result in a representation that maps sensed intervals into numerical 
differences (which, of course, are additive) or into numerical ratios 
(which is merely an alternative way of saying the same thing). We 
shall come to this point again in the next Section. Suffice it here to 
stress the overwhelming character of the additivity assumption. This 
results, for instance, in the assumption that psychological distance is 
related to the physical input through a "psychophysical function" that 
maps the physical values into psychological space, the distance simply 
being given by the absolute value of the difference of the subjective 
scale values. A similar account is found in KRANTZ's (1972) paper on 
cross-modality matching: one of the axioms of his so-called "relation 
theory" states that the mental estimation of length ratios is very 
likely physical measurement. In FALMAGNE's (1971) reformulation of 
Fechner's problem, an index of discnminability is ordinally related 
to the difference of scale values. These and other examples hint at 
what must be the cause of the insisting presence of additivity in 
theories of measurement of subjective intervals, namely, the fact that 
these measurement procedures invariably attempt the construction 
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of scales of sensory magnitudes (contrary to the aim of measurement 
theories dealing with intransitive behaviour). This is perhaps why 
these methods rely so heavily on numerical judgments on the part of 
the subjects. 
In a measurement model of intransitive choice the individual 
alternatives cannot be attributed individual scale values. If individual 
scale values can be used at all, it is at best to characterize the 
urt-td-cmen-i-tonai alternatives. This view is clearly consistent with the 
unidimensional preference functions represented by Eqs. (III.l) and 
(III.2). Both equations result from our reliance on numerical judgments 
of the individual unidimensional alternatives made by the observers. It 
is yet to be established that human beings generally function in this 
mode: it is not at all evident that unidimensional preference judgments 
have a sensory basis that gives rise to individual scale values. If the 
hope of obtaining rational unidimensional preference functions based 
upon comparisons of subjective intervals is not to be dismissed, we may 
well have to abandon the idea that unidimensional preference judgments 
are mediated by properties of single alternatives. It might be, for all 
we know, that the judgments of the agents are mediated by perceived 
relations within partii of alternatives. According to this view the 
fundamental object judged by an agent is not a single alternative, but 
a pair of alternatives. If an agent is able to experience only one 
quantitative relation between two alternatives, the pair itself, so to 
speak, becomes a "stimulus" — or, to be more precise, a perceived 
property of the pair becomes a stimulus. This would result in a call 
for theories that are formulated purely m terms of judgments of pairs 
of alternatives or, technically, for measurement theories based purely 
on a binary relation > on ΛχΑ . Properties of a pair of alternatives 
may or may not be related to properties of the individual alternatives. 
In general, this would depend on the nature of the binary relation on 
AxA and its connection with sensory processes related to the individual 
alternatives. When the existence of subjective scale values (for the 
individual alternatives) is secured, the perceived property of the pair 
may eventually be interpreted as an interval between sensed scale 
values, i.e., as a real sensation difference. But when unidimensional 
preference judgments are based on a perceived relation between tibO 
alternatives (rather than on sensations evoked by the individual 
alternatives) they take on the aspect of a real-valued function defined 
on A xA 
^'V'^-t' (III.5) 
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where χ. and y- are non-numerical objects; this is precisely the form 
of the unidimensional preference functions in model Ml. 
In the psychological literature it is not unusual to come across 
relations (almost always oidni-Lngi) on pairs. A modest instance is 
provided by direct rating methods of pairs; other cases are based on 
indirect indices such as reaction time or discriminability measures. 
More sophisticated examples are cross-modality matching and pair 
ordering according to sensation "differences" or sensation "ratios". 
In any of these scaling methods the data are expected to reflect a 
perceived relation between pairs of alternatives. What is being judged 
is an attribute pertaining to a pair of alternatives and this attribute 
is supposed to be present peí i e. in the perception. In the context of 
our preference models this perceived relation may be interpreted as a 
"preference interval". 
In the present Section we have reviewed some theoretical aspects 
concerning the measurement of unidimensional preference intervals. We 
have said that most of the scaling methods that have been designed for 
measuring subjective "differences" cannot be assumed to apply in model 
Ml of intransitive choice, since they would invariably lead to 
unidimensional preference functions that are linear and, hence, would 
allow transitive choices only. Strictly speaking, the unidimensional 
preference functions would be additive only, but it is well known 
[see DARBOUX (1875)] that, under a mild continuity condition, the 
functional relation ξ [x + y) =i(x) +Цу) admits only linear functions 
as its cont-cnuoui solutions. Continuity is of course a very appealing 
regularity condition: if it is ignored, we are forced to accept the 
discontinuous solutions of a functional equation, i.e., solutions that 
are known to be often so "wild" that they can hardly be thought to 
represent empirical laws. In the following two Sections we shall try to 
scrutinize the psychological literature in search of signposts that 
would point the way to the construction of plausible non-additive 
unidimensional preference functions. 
111,4. ON SIMULATION BASED UPON ANALOGIES TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SENSORY MAGNITUDE SCALES. 
For more than a century experimental psychologists have been interested 
in the quantification of subjective magnitudes and, more specifically, 
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in the functional relation between a subjective continuum and the 
physical continuum that is supposed to underlie it. For anyone 
concerned with the scaling of unidimensional preference functions it 
is tempting to discover whether this century-old effort has resulted 
in throwing light on the problem of the measurement of subjective 
intervals. 
Attempts to construct scales of sensory magnitude have employed a 
variety of methods. The scaling procedures for direct estimation of 
subjective magnitude fall into two well known classes: magnitude 
estimation and category scaling. The results obtained by these two 
different classes of scaling procedure pose a problem. Scales obtained 
from magnitude estimation and category rating procedures are supposed 
to be on the ratio and interval level, respectively. Tor this reason it 
has often been argued that an affine relation should obtain between the 
category scale and the magnitude scale of a given set of stimuli. 
However, there is a large amount of evidence indicating that the 
relationship between the two scales is clearly not affine for most of 
the continua studied and, particularly, for so-called intensive 
continua. According to KRANTZ (1972) one υ$ tke £оид-itand-eng puzzici 
ci νο/ι» thi. ica?e.ò obtained (¡nom cateßolij luting d-L^zi ^гот tkobc o<, 
mag η* tu.de cat-tma-t-ion (p. 196). Numerous causes have been advanced for 
this puzzling discrepancy and any attempt to present these in full 
would take us far beyond the irtended scope of this study. Taking the 
dichotomy for granted, we shall rather investigate whether the 
above-mentioned classes of scaling procedure are aole to provide a 
rational — or, at least, a plausible — basis for the form of the 
unidimensional preference functions to be used in our models. 
When one attempts to adapt current psychophysical results to the 
scaling of pairs of stimuli, where a pair is being interpreted as a 
sensed interval, there is the difficulty of identifying a physical 
counterpart of the "subjective interval" notion. In some of his 
experiments TORGERSON (1960, 1961) obtained direct magnitude estimates 
and direct category ratings of "differences" in observed lightness 
between pairs of gray stimuli (viz., gray Munsell papers), while, in an 
earlier experiment, he had estimated magnitude and category scale 
values of the individual stimuli. For any two Munsell papers χ and y, 
the direct category judgments of "differences", say φ lx., y), appeared 
to be linearly related to the differences computed from the original 
category scale values of lightness, which we shall call Mx) and liy); 
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in p a r t i c u l a r , 
φ^ ίΧ,Ι/) =/L(X) - fL{y) 
was found to hold. But when the direct magnitude estimates of 
"differences" φ (x,y) were plotted against the differences computed 
from the original magnitude scale of lightness [say, i (χ) -Mf/)] / no 
such simple relation was obtained. Instead, the logarithm of the 
magnitude estimate φ [χ,y) was found to be related to the difference 
of e.a.te.gon.y scale values by an affine correspondence, i.e., 
log Ф
т
(х,1/)=а[Л(х)-Л((/)] + 6 
Because the category scale values turned out to be logarithmically 
related to the physical attribute of reflectance, TORGERSON's findings 
may be resumed in the following equations ( ), 
Ф
с
(х,іО = Slogx - Sloqy (III.7) 
and, 
log ф
т
(х,£/) =a(logx - logy) + β (III.В) 
If Eq.(III.7)represented the form of the unidimensional preference 
functions in model Ml, then, of course, intransitive judgments would 
not be possible as a result of additivity. But, on the other hand, 
Eq. (III.8) would purport unidimensional preference functions of the 
form 
-И«,!/) =Y (| ) (III.9) 
(where logy = β) which, clearly, would allow the prediction of 
intransitive judgments. Assuming the validity of a multidimensional 
model such as Ml, it is child's play to simulate intransitive choices 
when Eq. (III.9) represents the form of the unidimensional preference 
functions or, at least, of one of them. But such a simulation exercise 
would exhibit a highly academic character, since we would like to argue 
that the situations where Eq. (III.9) might apply remain largely 
unknown, as will be stressed in a moment. 
Firstly, we would like to point out that Eqs. (III.7) and (III.8) 
permit the existence of a logarithmic relationship between each other. 
( ) We use physical scales to identify individual stimuli so that 
χ and у are reflectance values of Munsell papers, as well as 
names for the corresponding stimuli. 
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That is, the category scale of subjective "difference" can be seen to 
be an approximately logarithmic function of the magnitude scale of 
subjective "difference". It is already well known that, for intensive 
continua, precisely the same relationship appears to hold between the 
category scale values and the magnitude scale values of •cnd'LV-cdaat 
stimuli, at least for intensive or "prothetic" [as they are called in 
STEVENS' (1957) taxonomy] continua. In view of the general validity of 
the latter relationship, one might be tempted to canjtctuiz the 
above-mentioned logarithmic relationship between the category scale 
values and the magnitude scale values of subjective "differences". 
Consequently, it is quite tempting to condecíale the general validity 
of Eqs. (III.7) and (III.8). Incidentally, this is what MORRISON (1962) 
was apparently willing to endorse. In any case, this is the line he 
followed in his experiments on the perception of relative numerosity 
(see Chapter I). His justification was as follows: Tfie itA.matai 
d-uneи.4-ton об nume-toi-t-ti/ ωαά иіЫ [...] i-cnce. <.t itimzd лгаіопаЫг to 
expeci that ¿¿¿о ел. e ucea -en numbe-t od doti uioutd be combined by add-it-con, 
and because, ¿ike. thz it-cmatui d-anznaon -tnueó-t-tga-ted by Toigzlion, 
namzioàity -t-ò piotkít-LC І^  thz dj.$ ¡je-a ene e ^anct-ton ^оі питгіол<.іу 
шгкг thz ¿ame CLÒ {¡OÍ ¿A-ghinza [Eq. (III.8)] might be uòzd to p-tecUc-t 
zitimatzi o& d-c¡í¡^ елепсе^  [...] a.nd, iubizquzntZy, intn.a.niA.tJ.\n-ty (p. 24). 
In fact, we are reluctant to endorse MORRISON'S argument. Much evidence 
presented in the recent literature about subjective "differences" 
really fails to lend support to the form given by either Eq. (III.7) or 
Eq. (III.8). As MARKS (1974) notes, with certain intensive continua 
such as loudness or brightness, sensory "differences" turn out to be 
proportional to the differences between power transformations of the 
physical scale values: 
φ(χ,ι/) = λ(χμ - !/μ) (III.10) 
Unidimensional preference functions of this form would certainly allow 
the prediction of intransitive choices, but these intransitivities 
would not be the same as those purported by the unidimensional 
preference functions represented by Eq. (III.8). In the same vein, 
other investigators such as CURTIS & RULE (1972) have derived yet 
another relation, namely 
ф(х,сП =\(XV -
 ί
/ μ ) ν (III.11) 
where ν may take on a variety of values (reported values of ν range 
from one to zero). It has been argued [e.g., by RULE, CURTIS & 
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MARKLEY (1970)] that the difference between Eq. (III.10) and 
Eq. (III.11) stems from the non-linear manner in which subjects use 
numbers, subjective number being not at all identical to objective 
number [see, e.g., WAGENAAR (1975)]. In any case, it should be clear 
that unidimensional preference functions satisfying Eq. (III.11) would 
be consistent with genotypic intransitivity but, again, predictions 
would be (at least, partly) different from those based on unidimensional 
preference functions satisfying either Eq. (III.9) or Eq. (III.10). 
The present analysis indicates that there is no consensus of opinion 
about the form of unidimensional "difference" functions, not even for 
a single class of subjective continua. On the contrary, there may be 
reason to believe that the traditional taxonomy of sensory continua 
needs to be re-examined. We have already mentioned that different 
intensive continua appear to admit of different measures of 
unidimensional intervals. This is corroborated by (for instance) 
SCHNEIDER, PARKER, FARRELL & KANOW (1976) who indicate a difference 
between two examples of intensive continua: line length (linear extent) 
and unidimensional loudness. In the case of the line length continuum, 
subjects generate different ordenngs when they are instructed to rate 
sensation "differences" or sensation "ratios"; however, when loudness 
is examined, it appears that there is only one single perceptual 
relationship, but two monotonically related reporting strategies. These 
and other results suggest a reconsideration of the traditional division 
of sensory continua. 
We should like to stress that our presentation has so far really been 
an oversimplification. In fact, many procedural variables appear to 
influence the value of the power-function exponents in either of 
Eqs. (III.9-11). Even when stimulus conditions are held constant, there 
may be a sizeable variation found from experiment to experiment in the 
value of the power-function exponent obtained on any given continuum. 
Exponents depend, for instance, on the scaling procedure: somewhat 
different types of procedures (although belonging to the same class!) 
may yield systematically different sets of functions. Another source 
of variation is provided by the range of the stimuli used: differentt 
ranges do not give rise to exactly the same exponents. Intra-individual 
differences may also be important to the point that, when results are 
obtained on individual subjects operating under identical experimental 
conditions, the value of the exponent is still not constant. We are, 
thus, forced to conclude that the size of an exponent may change not 
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only from continuum to continuum, but also from procedure to procedure 
as well as from condition to condition and from subject to subject! The 
influence of such procedural variables should really come as no 
surprise. It is by now a well established fact that they greatly 
influence the value of another exponent, namely, the exponent of the 
power function which is so often found to hold between the physical 
intensity of a single stimulus, and its subjective value as measured on 
a magnitude scale. Nowadays, in this area of psychophysics, traditional 
as it is, the discrepancies are so patent that, faced with such a 
gallimaufry, one is apt to become bewildered. Note that the prevailing 
confusion pertains to intensive continua, that is, to sensory continua 
that, in many respects, are thought to be better understood than 
qualitative dimensions or continua. 
The present discussion is further complicated by the existence of a 
third class of unidimensional scales, namely, con^ ui-con or 
diic>L-Lm¿nat-Lon icaíti. They are obtained from measures of uncertainty 
or scatter in the observer's judgments, by for instance summing jnd's. 
FECHNER's (1860) celebrated contribution was essentially his proposal 
to measure sensation using discrimination thresholds. STEVENS (1957) 
referred to these methods of scaling as ¿nd-i/Lect measurement of 
sensation magnitude. Could it not be that subjects follow the same 
(indirect) strategy in evaluating unidimensional preference intervals? 
In the psychophysical controversy about the incongruity of magnitude 
and category scales, it has often been claimed that the discrepancy 
results from category ratings being based on discrimination, either 
partly Lsee STEVENS (1957)] or wholly [see, e.g., EISLER (1962)]. 
STEVENS argues that subjects are unable to judge equal intervals at 
different locations on an intensive (or prothetic) continuum — a fact 
related to Weber's law — and this may cause subjects to confuse true 
category rating with discriminability. This may jeopardize the idea of 
measuring subjective "difference" by the simple concatenation of jnd's. 
On the other hand, in a number of papers, EISLER and his colleagues 
have argued that, at least under certain conditions, category scales 
are in fact discrimination scales. They produced considerable evidence 
showing that the Fechnerian model allows accurate prediction of the 
category scale values, but then it turned out that the equal 
discriminability spacings failed to yield equal category scale intervals 
between successive stimuli [e.g., in EISLER & MONTGOMERY (1974)]. Here 
too then all is not as serene as one would desire, and this is all the 
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more so in that one further interpretation has been offered of the 
category scale. EKMAN, GOUDE & WAERN (1961) hypothesized that what is 
actually being equated in category scaling is the similarity between 
successive pairs of categories, that is, they assume that equal 
differences in category rating reflect equal degrees of similarity 
between stimuli. This, incidentally, brings us into the realm of yet 
another class of scales, unidimensional similarity scales, which will 
be approached in the next Section. 
The following is quite a different problem. The direct comparison of 
sensory "differences" belonging to a single dimension may not be at all 
the same as the •Lntzid-ime.nò.iona.t matching of sensory "differences". If 
during an empirical investigation, all dimensions except one are held 
constant, a scale may be obtained that is not obviously relevant to a 
scale determined by another method: in other words, it is not at all 
certain that a seperate scaling of the dimensions will result in scale 
values consistent with those generated by a multidimensional analysis. 
Let us tie this all together. The literature lends support to a 
variety of measures for sensed "differences". The least that can be 
said is that the literature provides strong evidence in favour of a 
monotonie relationship between perceived "differences" and a power 
transformation of the ratio of physical scale values or, equivalently, 
between perceived "differences" and the difference between power 
transformations of the physical scale values themselves. But the class 
of monotonie relations is known to be rather large: to count its 
members is almost like trying to fill a Danaidean vessel so that 
nothing definite is to be expected about the precise form of 
unidimensional preference functions in general. Incidentally, it is not 
at all obvious that subjective "differences" can be related in any 
straightforward manner to, say, the difference between two physical 
values, or even, transformations of those values. In fact, the very 
assumption that a single-valued relation may exist between physical and 
psychological difference begs the entire question. It might well be 
that, to paraphrase KRANTZ (1967, p. 229), equal physical differences, 
in different parts of the scale, go over into grossly unequal 
psychological "differences". Suppose that there exists a physical 
measure that permits us to identify two distinct elements of a sensory 
continuum so that, in going from one element to the other, one can 
think in terms of an increase or a decrease. Even then it is not clear 
whether a subject will turn to numerical difference or to numerical 
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ratio (if not to some other scaling device!) in order to account for 
the sensed "difference". The problem seems to be that, in spite of a 
hundred years of psychophysical scaling, we still do not know enough 
about the process of judging in either direct or indirect scaling 
procedures. Since a comprehensive examination of scales obtained by 
direct estimation procedures is still missing, further investigations 
of the perceptual basis of magnitude estimation and category rating 
might be in order, although much progress has been made in recent 
years [see, e.g., KRANTZ (1972) and MONTGOMERY (1975a,b)]. Likewise, 
further insight must be gained into the relationship between the 
magnitude and category scales on the one hand, and discrimination 
scales on the other. In the absence of an adequate understanding of 
the scales that may underlie judgments of sensation "differences", the 
choice of any precise unidimensional preference function would rest on 
a fragile basis indeed — on a basis really too fragile to support 
meaningful simulation. In the next Section we shall turn to similarity 
models, m search of more dependable bases. 
ΙΠ.5. ON SIMULATION BASED UPON ANALOGIES TO MODELS OF SIMILARITY. 
In the preceding Section we havo related the apparent inconsistency 
TORGERSON found when he let his subjects estimate differences directly 
and compared the results with differences computed from magnitude 
estimates of the stimuli. EISLER (1962) offers another explanation of 
this phenomenon when he puts forward the hypothesis that Toigilion'ò 
иЬігі &>іі pnobabZy zit-tmatzd d-t^aiznczi λη thz òzniz o{ thz leveiiz о\ 
iA.mitaXA.tij. I ij k<? had tiibtfiuzted then to eit-Lmatz bznioiy d-tiiance 
¿ntitzad, thz outcome mtght ihzlt have beza di^zfient (p. 84). 
In the psychological literature it is not unusual to find speculations 
about the precise relationship between judgments of sensory 
"differences" and judgments of similarity. Judgments of "differences" — 
which are often confused with dissimilarity judgments — may be related 
to similarity in various ways. The usual result is that difference 
judgments are almost perfectly negatively correlated with similarity 
judgments, and it is quite common to consider difference judgments 
simply as the inverse of similarity judgments. Several different 
measurement procedures are currently employed to obtain numerical 
evaluations of pairwise dissimilarities among stimuli, and one wonders 
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whether any of these procedures might be applicable to unidimensional 
scaling and, thus be able to serve as a model for unidimensional 
preference functions. 
There exist quite a few techniques to assess subjective similarities 
or subjective dissimilarities. Whatever technique is being employed, 
however, there is always the question of what exactly is being judged, 
and of how subjects deal with the numerical assignment problem. This 
problem centres on the question of how subjective similarity arises 
and, in particular, of how it is related to individual scale values. 
In a study on the mechanism of perception of un-id-imtni-ionat similarity, 
EISLER & EKMAN (1959) proposed as a "similarity function" 
Цх.,У) ^ - ^ [i(x)<i{y)] (III.12) 
U U ) + A(y)]/2 
where i(x,y) is the subjective similarity between two (unidimensional!) 
stimuli χ and y , while i(χ) and ¿{y) are the corresponding subjective 
magnitudes (measured on a ratio scale). The authors came upon 
Eq. (III. 12) after they had rejected several other specific hypotheses. 
It was Eq. (III.12) that served as a starting point to the so-called 
"category scale equation" derived by JUNGE (1960) in order to account 
for the logarithmic relationship between the category scale and the 
magnitude scale. His deduction hinges on the assumption that the 
concepts of similarity and difference are quantitativzty complementary. 
Following this recipe, we may construct measures of subjective 
"difference" which could serve as a basis of unidimensional preference 
functions that are non-additive. The problem is here that, when 
EISLER & EKMAN's model was subjected to further empirical 
investigations, the data did not support it; according to SJÖBERG (1975) 
these later studies appear to suggest much simpler models. The least 
that may be said is that there is no consensus with regard to any 
mechanism of unidimensional similarity, and no proper understanding 
of the relationship between judgments of unidimensional (dis)similarity 
and judgments of unidimensional "difference" ( ). To plunge into this 
domain in search of a rational basis for unidimensional preference 
functions is like escaping Scylla in pursuit of Charybdis. 
In many instances, similarity is inherently a multidimensional concept. 
( ) A study by LUNDBERG & DEVINE (1972) seems to indicate that a 
distinction may be made between lack of similarity and actual 
"oppositeness". 
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In the current models of mu.tt-Ldi.me.ni-<.ona.¿ similarity scaling, the 
numbers characterizing each pair of stimuli are determined by one of 
several different d-citancc mode-li. A psychological distance, as 
determined through the use of one of these models, is then considered 
as a quantitative measure of the degree of similarity between two 
stimuli. In the distance models the stimuli are regarded as points in 
a multidimensional space and similarity is assumed to be a function of 
the distances between the points. A quite different account of 
similarity is given by another class of models, the so-called contint 
modzti. In these, stimuli are considered either as sets or as vectors. 
Similarity is then regarded as a function of certain set-theoretical 
measures or as a function of the vector lengths and the angles between 
the vectors. Let us consider the set-theoretical model, that is, let 
A be a non-empty set of alternatives and let there be a mapping that 
associates with each x c A a non-empty set X = {α,Β,γ,...} of elements 
which are interpreted as the aipzcti of χ ; an alternative x. is said 
to include an aspect Ί whenever α с X . In the content models, 
similarity is conceived as a function (usually, a ratio) of the 
sensory experience common to two alternatives and the totat sensory 
experience resulting from the two alternatives. Content models of 
similarity differ in their definitions of these common and total parts. 
This is essentially what distinguishes such models as those provided 
by EKMAN (1961, 1963), EKMAN, ENGEN, KÜNNAPAS & LINEMAN (1964), 
EKEHAMMAR (1972) or EISLER & ROSKAM (1977) . 
In a particular content model of similarity, GOUDE (1966), rather than 
concentrating on the part common to two alternatives, investigated the 
question of what is not common to them: this part, divided by the total 
part, was assumed to be equal to the d-cósimilarity. Then, assuming that 
similarity and difference are complementary, he arrived at his version 
of the similarity concept. Might we not be able to devise 
multidimensional preference functions by following GOUDE's strategy of 
relating them to the parts two alternatives do not have in common? 
Content models of similarity are often based on the idea that the 
dissimilarity between two alternatives cannot be significantly 
influenced by the elements those alternatives have in common. In 
set-theoretical terms, this means that the dissimilarity between χ and 
y should not increase with any measure ntxit/) of their intersection. 
On the other hand, preference or dissimilarity functions may well be 
increasing with measures for the parts not in common. In this way, 
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one may conceive of (multidimensional) preference functions that are 
based on measures of set-theoretical difference. Let K\V 
( ЧХ , respectively) represent the difference of X and У {V and X, 
respectively), and let ХдУ denote the symmetric difference of X and V, 
i.e., ΧΔ/= (Х\У)и(У\Х) . A highly appealing multidimensional preference 
functions would seem to be 
A ly „i - м(Х\У) 
т(ХД ) 
although the following expression may be attractive too: 
Ф,(х,у)- "•<*""-"(^) 
т(ХЬ ) 
It is readily shown that these (and other) multidimensional preference 
functions fail to permit the prediction of intransitive choices, at 
least under any intuitive interpretation of choice as a result of the 
value taken by the preference function. It may be that other 
multidimensional preference functions, or other interpretations of the 
choices, do indeed permit the prediction of intransitive judgments. 
But this problem will not be pursued here though, as its solution 
would lead in the direction of models of intransitive choice that are 
of a very different nature than those proposed in this study. Indeed, 
when the alternatives (x, (/,...) are simply characterized in terms of 
their aspects (Х,У,...) as in set-theoretical models of similarity, 
these aspects do not have to represent values along some fixed 
quantitative or qualitative dimensions; they may very well be 
arbitrary features of the alternatives that do not fit into any simple 
dimensional structure, so that the corresponding models would be 
incompatible with our dimensional models. 
In conclusion, we should like to say that models of similarity do not 
appear to be very helpful when one is looking for rational bases for 
the construction of preference functions. The problem seems to be that 
judgments of subjective similarity continue to invite questions 
concerning the proper interpretation of the numbers assigned by the 
subjects. Furthermore, the relation between judgments of similarity 
and judgments of "difference" is far from being clearly understood 
so that, for anyone interested in unidimensional preference functions, 
there is, at present, no hope in sight. 
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Ш.б, ON THE GENERAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SIMULATION. 
The two preceeding Sections have related why simulation of any of our 
models proves to be so intractable. Taking the bull by the horns, we 
shall now try to show that the task is in fact an impossible one. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the models presented in this study 
are very much idealized models. They all assume that the empirical 
relations are given in a highly stable fashion, free from any "error", 
and that, in particular, measurement observations will yield exact 
measures. What these models provide are theories of "true score" 
behaviour. The tacit assumption of the possibility of exact measurement 
is a well known defect in current theories of measurement. This 
property does not square well with what we know to be the case, namely, 
that perfectly exact measurement is not possible. The idea of exact 
measurement does not accord with careful scientific practice in which 
the results of measurement are stated within given margins of possible 
error [see, on this, ADAMS (1965)]. Ideally, our models should be 
submitted to modifications which would aim to accomodate the fact that 
exact measurement is not possible as a result of the ever-present error 
problem. 
To get the error problem in the behavioural sciences straight, one 
should make a clear-cut distinction between two kinds of "error". There 
is, first of all, a well known statistical problem. Our unidimensional 
assumptions take on the form χ > t/ ; if χ and у are compared, we 
-ΐ, -С -L л, -χ, 
may pose the conventional statistical question of whether the 
probability that χ is judged as "more preferred" exceeds one-half. 
This of course can be dealt with by binomial methods. To this point, 
the problem of error may be tractable indeed. In a sense, this sort of 
error should not prove to be more of a problem in our models than in 
any other theory which is non-statistical in nature. 
Another error problem, which is much more pervasive in the behavioural 
sciences, is the problem of the variability within a theory. This 
problem entails the acceptance of discrepancies between data and theory. 
These discrepancies call for explicit error theories, i.e., for 
psychological theories that provide a link between the latent 
behaviour and the observed behaviour. Such an explicit error theory 
would allow the appreciation of discrepancies between theory and data 
by formulating precise criteria that would permit us to attribute a 
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discrepancy between theory and data to error rather than to an 
inadequacy in the theory. In a simulation exercise, we could of course 
simply ignore this (psychological) error theory. We could indeed 
generate data perfectly consistent with any of our models, but such 
data would, of course, merely act as a boomerang: nothing could be 
expected that is not already embodied in the data. In the absence of 
an appropriate error theory, simulation can only be delusive, and may 
therefore be immediately dismissed. 
In the last two Sections we have indicated that any simulation 
exercise would entail delicate choices with regard to the precise nature 
of the unidimensional preference functions. Yet, one could of course 
make a particular choice and, hoping for the best, expect the chosen 
upf to apply in at least one (as yet unknown) situation. The 
psychological literature provides instances in which a upf of the 
type given by Eq. (III.2) is related to pairwise choice probabilities 
through an appropriate ica.¿¿ng (¡unct-Lon F. 
p{X¿'iJ¿) =,:¿í'S'¿[aÍ{X¿) ~иі{У<.)]] (III.13) 
If, in any particular simulation exercise, F. is assumed to be a 
known function (embodying much of one's theory about the choice 
process), then it is possible to test the scaling assumption obtained. 
Such a test would, of course, rely on a specific assumption regarding 
the shape of the scaling function and, as different scaling functions 
may fit the (artificial) data equally well, the "correct" one may be 
difficult to pin down. 
Quite another problem is related to the multidimensional character of 
the models. If preference scales φ • (x . ,y.) are to be estimated 
separately for different dimensions — as is likely to be the case in 
a simulation exercise — then interdimensional correspondences would 
be left completely undefined. This would be an unhealthy state of 
affairs because our models do not merely require the specification of 
unidimensional preference functions, but also of comparisons between 
those functions. Without the latter specification it would be enough 
to, say, double the units of measurement along one dimension (leaving 
the units on the other dimensions the same) in order to alter the 
interdimensional trade-offs and, possibly, the resulting choices! 
This topic is related to similar questions in economy, namely, in the 
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domain of welfare economics. A well known problem which has been 
hindering many applications of the utility concept is this: when can 
or should a utility increment for one person be considered equal to an 
increment for another? At interval level, the problem amounts to 
selecting a general unit in terms of which to measure utility, in 
other words, of requiring that all the utility measures be elements 
of the same interval scale — a condition called <nietpeisonai 
compaiab* ί-itij of¡ ut-it-tty. This notion is particularly relevant to the 
problem of amalgamating individuals' preference patterns into a single 
preference pattern. When individual utility is measured on an interval 
or ratio scale, we can compare each person's gain and loss with 
alternative values of his own gains and losses, but, in the domain of 
social welfare, distributional judgments would seem to demand some 
idea of the relative gains and losses of d-L{¡ ¿e-ten-t persons. Likewise, 
in our models, the preference aggregating function embodies the idea 
of the interdimensional comparability of preference intervals. 
Whether we add upf's, or multiply them, or combine them in some other 
way, the fact that their units and origins may both be chosen 
indepcndentiif for distinct dimensions, poses a problem. 
The problem is closely related to the measurement levels of the upf's. 
It was pointed out by LUCE (1959b) that there exists a formal principle 
of theory construction that severely limits the functional relations 
that can hold between two variaoles. This principle requires that 
transformations of an independent variable that are admissible under 
some measurement theory shall not result in inadmissible transformations 
of the dependent variable, and that the form of the functional 
relation between the two variables shall not be altered by admissible 
transformations of the independent variable. Let us refer to 
Mx,'/) = J ( X ) -u((/) as the independent variable ( ), the dependent 
variable being •ΊΓΜ*,'/) 1 where Ì is the unknown functional law relating 
them. Let us assume that both variables are measured on ratio scales. 
Then, according to the above-mentioned principle, if the unit of the 
independent variable is changed by multiplying all values by a positive 
constant fe, then a change in the dependent variable, say , · Kf , may 
depend upon fc but should iwt depend upon N(X,Í/) I see LUCE 
(1959b, p. 86)I. Formally, this is expressed by letting К depend 
upon fe ; in mathematical terms, we thus obtain a functional equation 
( ) For simplicity, we omit the traditional index < characterizing the 
dimensions. 
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Φ Ik Цк,у)] =К(к)ф16(к
г
у)] 
where fe>О and Kik) >0. Other functional equations can be obtained 
when the independent and/or dependent variables have other scale types. 
These various functional equations show that the principle stated 
above severely restricts the relations that may exist between an 
independent and a dependent variable. The same principle holds when 
we admit more than one independent variable. When we assume φ^.,.,φ 
to be и independent variables and when Φ is considered as the 
dependent variable, then there emerges the problem of the effect on 
the dependent variable (Φ) of admissible transformations of the 
independent variables (Φ^,...,Φ
Λ
). This issue entails the problem of 
the interdimensional comparability of unidimensional preference 
intervals. 
In order to formulate three traditional measurement assumptions, let us 
associate with every dimension 4. (ч. = 1 ,. . . ,n) a set Ф^ of upf's, each 
ф^ being defined over A^*^. If unidimensional preference intervals 
are ordinally measurable, then every element of Ф^ is a positive 
monotonie transformation of every other element and, furthermore, every 
positive monotonie transformation of any element of Ф^ belongs to Ф^. 
If, on the other hand, unidimensional preference intervals are 
measurable at an interval level (ratio level, respectively), then 
every element of Ф^ is a positive affine (positive linear, respectively) 
transformation of every other element, and every positive affine 
(positive linear, respectively) transformation of any element of Ф^ 
belongs to Ф^. Similarly, in welfare economics (where every individual -t 
has a set il of real-valued welfare functions α ), individual welfare 
is said to be "cardinally measurable" when we require that all positive 
linear transformations of any utility function attributed to any 
individual are permitted. Is it permissible to assume that any 
individual's utility unit and origin can be shifted without any regard 
to the origin and the unit of another person's utility? Actually the 
origins are irrelevant since only differences in utility are added for 
all individuals to generate a social ordering, so that the origins 
subtract out. But the units are certainly crucial, and any change in 
unit may be fatal to the resulting social ordering, unless variations 
in units for one individual are systematically related to variations 
in units of others. If we assume that we can put everyone's welfare 
unit into a one-to-one correspondence, then the resulting ranking of 
social states should not be very sensitive to changes in units. 
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Exceptional cases are provided by various measurement theories in 
which different scales have a common unit. This is not only the case 
in additive con]oint measurement [see LUCE & TUKEY (1964) ], but also 
ir TVERSKY & KRANTZ's (1970) additive difference measurement model for 
dissimilarity, while an analogous situation is prevalent in KRANTZ's 
(1972) account of cross-modality. In these theories the construction 
of measurement scales involves a counting-of-units procedure based 
on some appropriate definition of a standard sequence; since the 
countinq-of-units process is applied on each dimension, the resulting 
scales admit of a common unit or, in the case of cross-modality, of 
a common power transformation. 
In regard to interpersonal comparability, GOODMAN & MARKOWITZ (1952) 
have suggested that a possible measure of the intensity with which an 
alternative is preferred to another is the number of just discriminably 
different alternatives that can be introduced between their. This, they 
suggest, can sometimes bo Laken as a solution to the interpersonal 
comparison problem since we can equate ]ust noticeable differences 
between two people and then say tnat an interval spanning a given 
number ot jnd'b is larger than one spanning fewer. The difficulties 
involved in treating jnd's as real units are fairly obvious. Apart 
from STcltNb' (1957) clain that a person's sensitivity to jnd's is not 
u'іГогщ over the entire range of a scale (at least, for prothe*ic 
continua...), there is the practical problem that th ' nurberinq 
system aeponds on the actual availability of alternatives as the 
addition of new alternatives nay alter the discrimination levels. 
Turthermore, as stressed by SEN (1970, p. 94), another thorny difficulty 
( ( t' i οι the ctl icaf a \ Jii'iipf < an that tkc i < "fin {ι с aiic г усч 5(>c<at -¿iya'c 
(i) a clianQC Zron cm. Jt iCmrinatwn ік^сі. ί\' f'u' m χ t <J tb¿ Sivu1 iti 
ait { nu' ( i' (duai Ί. Vif ( I Î C <4 t'mi an arbitrait! as iutvp t < о и , < t <J 
("iiuu'iifti/ cbj i'c t < ruât t\ w/u'» rfiditng at-f/i { d'i ti (.dual' 5 a'/u aujii'itt tu 
d t < < t ι tu the ι en J ι 111 t f ч ο-ί theii peicept-ian. I...I Indeed, tlieie aie 
t iid с ι· t iaat i Lelio tend te be e ¡tiieni-ti t i and ^ < nd thing i eitnci 
""ia ri' ( < ι с ent" ci "liufiibLe", uiíuíe ctliexi ¿¡tneHtj di. < <c lenii ate betueen 
iucn f»i(iif|l ai "exci t'ífiíf", "qcod", "medicee", "poer" and "ме^аі". It 
i ее m J iiiaiM^ esfît/ aurait te mafct' the etiucat abbampticn that tlte u-eiìaie 
6 tf|ii( ί < caiict' о <! mevinq tlie ^iibt individuai' ^Ίοηι 'yliat he legaidi as 
" ΙιοΊ ΐ( bu t" ft d'il a f /к1 {indi ai "maqni \< с e η t" li ut more than »и ν ι .ig tin 
lee und indiy, idua( <¡rcm κ/iaf he -J ( »id s "pour" and 'ehat it^ilei ІІІЧІ ai 
"mediL'Cie". We believe that a similar argument may be advanced in the 
case of interdincnsional preference comparisons. 
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Although the problem of the construction of social welfare functions 
has been of primary interest to economists, it is also seen to be of 
some interest to psychologists because of its intimate relation with 
the problem of interpersonal comparability of utility. Every time an 
experimenter averages ratings, he is assuming interpersonal 
comparability of utility. This may be the case not only whenever 
Thurstone's model of comparative judgment is used by replicating over 
individuals, but also in many other psychological scaling procedures. 
Each of these procedures aie actually employed as social welfare 
functions when the observations are preferences. It is interesting to 
note that, for economists, none of the psychological measurement models 
are acceptable social welfare functions exactly because they all 
involve interpersonal comparability of utility as a gratuitous 
assumption. In the economic literature an astonishing amount of energy 
has been devoted to avoiding interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
According to the dominant tradition in economics, the use of 
interpersonal comparisons is held to be arbitrary, and many professional 
economists view these comparisons as "meaningless". SEN (1970) has 
argued that this widespread allergy to interpersonal comparisons 
results from their collusion with the notion of complete unit-to-unit 
comparability. According to this author, the historic controversy on 
the difficulty of interpersonal comparisons could be settled by 
distinguishing between (total) comparability of units and pafit-taZ 
comparability. SEN has indeed developed an approach which permits the 
interpersonal comparison notion to vary from complete comparability of 
units to non-comparability. Non-comparability requires that any 
transformation (permitted by the measurability assumption) of any 
individual's welfare function leaves the social ordering unchanged; 
given non-comparability, the preference intensities of individuals over 
any pair can be varied in any way we like, except for sign-reversal. 
But SEN's method has at least one serious drawback in that it leads to 
social rankings that may be utterly incomplete. 
As a result of the alleged impossibility of interpersonal comparisons, 
economists and others have tended to avoid this controversial assumption 
and have sought social welfare functions based only upon individual's 
ordinal utilities. Similarly, in our models, we might assume a 
distribution of preference functions φ (χ ,y ) over the different 
dimensions. Preference aggregating rules might then be based on 
statements about the central tendencies or other parameters of the 
distribution, such as variance and skewness (which, by the way, may not 
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be completely irrelevant to a choice). But this would be to venture 
into ten/ia л. не о g vu ta, not to speak of the kind of comparability that 
one might expect to find with ordinal-type unidimensional preference 
functions. Certainly, a subtle interplay between some particular 
measurability and comparability assumptions is likely to yield strong 
results, but little — if anything — is known about them at present. 
Like the problem of the interpersonal comparability of utility, the 
question of the legitimacy of interdimensional comparisons of preference 
intervals is an unsolved matter, so that there is no basis at all for 
simulation That the simulation exercise is so barren reflects the fact 
that it essentially involves a solution to the problem of the 
interdimensional comparability of unidimensional preference functions. 
This problem can only be tackled on the basis of highly questionable 
and unpalatable assumptions. In fact, at the present time, the 
existence of interdimensional comparisons can only be accepted on faith, 
and faith is really no ground for simulation. 
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EPILOGUE 
The psychological literature has usually been very reluctant to 
consider genotypic intransitivity as a theoretical possibility, let 
alone as a natural phenomenon that may occur in human or animal 
behaviour. Until now, most experimenters have tended to believe that 
genotypic intransitivity is a very rare phenomenon, if it exists at all! 
This study supports the contention that preferences (and the resulting 
choices) may be genotypically intransitive. It proclaims genotypic 
intransitivity as a real possibility and, for that matter, it orovides 
appropriate models so that it nay no longer be unreasonable to consider 
genotypic intransitivity as a phenomenon that may really exist in human 
or animal behaviour. In any case, it will be wise to remember the words 
of Lewis Carroll I see DODGSON (1876)] when, m a similar situation, he 
advocated the possibility of persistent intransitivities in voting 
procedures : 
Î am qiMfp picpaiad to be told, ui-tth tiegaid to the caiei I have 
hele piopoied, ai I have alieady been told with tiegald to otheKi, 
'Oil, THAT (i an extieme cade: it cculd nevei leally happen1' Vow) 
I have obienved that th<i aniuici a alwayi given ¿nitantly, uxth 
pt'fi^ect confidence, and uuthout any examinat-ton o^ the detaili 
of, the pnopoied cate. It muli theie {¡оке heit on лоте депечаі 
pu ( ne i pi e : the mental ploceii being рчоЬаЫу iome thing like thii 
— 'I have (¡oimed a theoiy Thu caie contn.adi.cti my theoiy. 
THEREFORE thi i a an extreme caie, and could nevei occun. m 
practice.' 
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SUMMARY 
The psycholoq].cal literature on choice behaviour appears to be 
dominated by a wide-spread belie1" in transitivity. This is not only the 
case in many behaviourally oriented theories, but also in fundamental 
measurement fheoncs and in scalirq methods for which no neasurement 
troory i' available. DesDitc the universal acceptance oí" the 
tr insitivitv assumption, experimental evidence exists indicative of 
sytlomatic failures of transitivity. Tf transitivity is to be based on 
erppirical grounds rather than on belief or assumption, data must be 
collected π order to document its general validity in human and animal 
choice behaviour. The oresent study is devoted to a theoretical aporoach 
to this question: models are oresented that yield intransitive choices 
as a theoretical possibility. 
Chapter L is concerned with the notions of preference and choice. It is 
well known that agents (persons or animals) are not very ccusiitvut in 
their choices in that they do not always make the same choices under 
seemingly identical conditions In order to account for this observed 
inconsistency, choice behaviour is viewed in a probabilistic fashion. 
In probabilistic theories of choice, transitivity of choice is a 
orobabilistic phenomenon. Hence, probabilistic theories of choice 
authori7e agents to act intransitively not by virtue of any inherent 
ιntransitivity, but as a result of inconsistencies in the choices. 
However, the whole issue of transitivity cannot be settled by 
interoretιnq every observed violation of transitivity as an 
epiphenomenon of consistency. This would preclude the possibility of 
inherent or ιμ'ΐιι ttipic intransitivity. Experiments designed in the past 
can hardly be regarded as decisive in this respect since they ignore 
precisely the essential distinction between genotypic and apparent 
intransitivity. The same may be said about most of the "models" for 
intransitive choice that have been proposed in the literature: apart 
from a few excoDtional ones (for instance, the method of majority 
decision and the additive difference model) they all fail to specify 
the triples for which intransitive choices will be oredicted. In the 
absence of appropriate models, the empirical verification or 
falsification of intransitivity remains undefined! Although intransitive 
choices have been commonly interoretcd as <1 la t< c u a t, the nresent study 
attempts to set forth a tat < ouai explanation of the intransitivity 
phenomenon by introducing a particular preference notion as a primitive 
1Γ)0 
concept. Traditionally, studies in preference theory require a 
preference relation that induces an oldel on the set of alternati\es. 
This work is based on a strict preference relation that is assumed to 
be an asymmetric, not necessarily transitive, binary relation. The 
advantage of taking a strict preference relation as a basic construct 
relies on the possibility of intransitive indifference. Since the 
notion of preference is enmeshed in a binary relation, the discussion 
is limited to pan ките, choices, preference being connected to choice 
by the logical equivalence between a so-called binary preference 
structure and a so-called binary choice structure. Because the 
preference relation need not be transitive, the present theory 
proclaims intransitivity as a theoretical possibility and, for that 
matter, provides models capable of predicting truly, i.e., genotypically 
intransitive choices. 
In Chapter II a particular class of models for intransitive choice is 
developed. It is noted that genotypic intransitivity is impossible when 
behaviour is unidimensional. Therefore, it is assumed t^t the 
alternatives are multidimensional in that they vary along и (ι 1) 
latent attributes. When the preference between any two alternatives is 
to be understood as depending on several dimensions, it is natural to 
think of the preferences as being compound, i.e., as aggregates of 
component preferences on the different dimensions. This approach 
suggests some kind of independence amorg the dimensions, which is 
formulated in an appropriate axiom. Indeed, when the basic preference 
relation satisfies independence, this relation induces a binary 
relation on each dimension. The latter binary relations are interpreted 
as unidipensional preference (or, possibly, indifférence) relations. 
Where the alternatives are mal tidjn· ι ,ional, the (holis'-ir) urof erenec s 
can be thought to result from the aggregation of . anidi-nensional 
preferences. Although the unidinensloral preference relations are 
res' »-i etions of the holistic preference relation, the Гогтіег may all 
bo transitive without the latter havina t ι be so. Iho models that are 
presented are based on the assuirptio that the unidimensional 
preference relations are transitive by requiring them to be either of 
three particular asymmetric binary relations: a strict weak order, a 
iLorder or an interval order. This approach recognizes that the 
ι damental objects judged by in agent are not the single alternatives, 
bi t pa((5 of unidimensional aspects of alternatives. The present 
approach is indeed based on the assumption that the alternatives are 
piirwi··! compared with respect to each relevant dimension, and that the 
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results of the coranansons are pooled to reach a (holistic) preference. 
This entails the question of moving from η unidiirensional preferences 
to a single holistic oreference; this oroblerr is solved by a so-called 
preference aggregating rule. The aggreaation o'" unidimensional 
preferences hints at the possibility of interdimensional comoarisons 
and, m particular, of interdimensional compensations. (All the 
presented models purport the oossibility of indifference as a 
consequence of certain compensations between unidirensional 
nreferenccs). Those ideas lead to the notion of unidimensional 
preference "intervals", and to their representation by what are called 
unidimensional oreference functions. The asymnetry of the unidimensional 
^reference relations authorizes the unidimensional oreference functions 
of so-called opoosite intervals to be related by either of two scaling 
conditions, labelled sign-reversal and strict sign-reversal. 
lurthermoro, in order to capture the idea that the unidimensional 
oreferences are generated along one single attribute, the unidimensional 
preference functions are required to satisfy either of three 
assumotions, christened intradimensional subtractivity, intradimensional 
simple scalability, and intradimensional strict dual-monotonicity. In 
order to provide choices between multidimensional alternatives with a 
rational basis, several conditions of rational choice making are 
considered; these conditions are formulated as restrictions on the 
preference aggregating rules (or functions). The combination of one 
out of several intradimensional assumptions with one out of several 
interdimensional assumptions, nrovides a variety of choice models of 
which the well known additive difference model is a oarticular 
instance. The different models are not presented in detail; rather, one 
of them (labelled model Ml) is taken as representative of the whole 
class, and discussed more fully for η = 2. In accordance with the 
theoretical orientation of this work, a few numerical examples are added 
for illustrative purposes only. These show that the models are not at 
all restricted to intransitive triples orly, but are capable of 
producing larae intransitive cycles, a property that, within the 
literature, is certainly very rare indeed. 
Chapter III is devoted to the immediate applicability of the presented 
models. It is argued that several factors combine to render this task 
very difficult indeed. First, there is the paucity of appropriate data: 
the psvchological literature appears to be so indoctrinated with the 
concept of transitive preference that data are not available for choices 
where genotypic intransitivities might be predicted by any of the 
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proposed models. The transitivity issue appears to be related to the 
additive character of the unidimensional preference functions. Although 
the properties dealt with in the behavioural sciences hardly ever turn 
out to be additive, there exist almost no measurement theories that 
avoid this requirement. Theories oí unidimensional "difference" 
neasurement are, in fact, based on an additivity assumption so that 
they cannot be assumed to be useful if model Ml is to yield 
intransitive data. A review of the literature in search of empirical 
evidence supporting the existence of non-additive difference functions 
that could be interpreted as (non-additive) unidimensional preference 
functions within a simulation exercise, turns out to be very deceiving. 
In the absence of adequate data, the possibility of meaningful 
simulation is further examined. In order to be meaningful, simulation 
must be justified m terms of psychological theories or results, i.e., 
by analogies drawn from the scientific literature. Two possible 
analogies are presented and discussed, one based on the construction 
of sensory magnitude scales, the other making use of certain similarity 
models. Quantification of subjective magnitudes is an old psychological 
problem. Few experiments, though, have produced data about magnitude 
estimates of "differences" between alternatives, the data required to 
estimate the form of unidimensional preference functions. In the case 
of a few exceptional intensive continua some results have been obtained 
recently, but they are invariably still entangled with old 
psychophysical controversies. An analysis of the relevant literature 
in fact indicates that there is no consens JS of opinion about the form 
of unidimensional "difference" functions, not even for a single class 
ot subjective continua. In particular, further insight must be gained 
into the relationship bftween magnitude and category scales on the one 
hand, and discrimination scales on tne other. In the absence о г an 
adequate understanding of the scales that may underlie judgments of 
"differences", it is argued that the choice of any boecific 
unidimensional preference function would rest on a basis really too 
fragile to support meaningful simulation. In search for more dependable 
bases, models of similarity are then taken into consideration. In the 
psychological literature it is not unusual to find speculations about 
tne precise relatior.snip between judgments of sensory differences and 
judgments of (dis)simiIanty. But models of unidimensional similarity 
are scarce and highly controversial to the ooint that they do not seem 
to be very helpful in the context of choosing unidimensional oreference 
functions on a rational basis. (Of course, similarity is usually 
considered to be a miu' t < di nit и \ ι она» concept; as such, it hint ^  at 
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multidinensional preference models that are very unlike the models 
proposed xn this study). Last but not least, it is shown how further 
complications render meaningful simulation altogether impossible. First, 
there is the error question, not the traditional statistical oroblems, 
but the absence of an explicit error theory. It is argued that, in the 
absence of any such theory, simulation can only be regarded as pure 
vanity. Then there is the question of the legitimacy of interdinensional 
comparisons of preference intervals. The multidimensional character of 
the proposed models does not merely require the specification of 
unidimensional preference functions, but also of comparisons between 
those functions. That the simulation exercise is so barrer reflects the 
fact that it essentially requires a solution to the problem of the 
interdimensional comparability of unidimensional preference functions, 
a Droblem that, under another guise, is known to be a long-standing 
puzzle ir collective choice. 
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SAMENVATTING 
De psychologische literatuur over keuzegedrag is doortrokken van de 
veronderstelling van intransitiviteit. Dit blijkt niet alleen uit vele 
gedragstheorieën maar ook uit systemen van fundamenteel meten alsmede 
uit talloze schaalmethoden waarvoor geen meettheoretische basis bestaat. 
Ondanks de alomtegenwoordigheid van de transitiviteitsassumptie zijn er 
empirische gegevens te vinden die wijzen op de mogelijkheid van 
systematische schendingen van deze assumptie. Waar transitiviteit geen 
kwestie van vertrouwen is maar empirisch moet worden vastgelegd, is het 
noodzakelijk data te verzamelen in verband met het universele 
karakter van transitiviteit in het keuzegedrag van mens en dier. In 
deze studie, die een bijdrage vormt tot een theoretische benadering van 
dit probleem, worden modellen gepresenteerd die intransitiviteit 
inhouden als een theoretische mogelijkheid. 
Hoofdstuk I is gewijd aan de begrippen preferentie en keuze. Het is een 
algemeen bekend feit dat de conn iíen-t-í e van vele subjecten (personen 
of dieren) in die zin te wensen overlaat dat zij niet steeds dezelfde 
keuzen maken onder ogenschijnlijk identieke condities. Probabilistische 
keuzetheorieën pogen deze inconsistentie op te vangen. In 
probabilistische kiestheorieën is de transitiviteit van de keuzen 
echter een stochastisch fenomeen ; deze theorieën maken intransitieve 
keuzen mogelijk, niet bij de gratie van een of andere dwingende 
intransitiviteit, maar als gevolg van de inconsistentie van de keuzen. 
Niet ledere schending van transitiviteit kan echter door deze 
inconsistentie worden verklaard. Dit zou de mogelijkheid tot echte of 
genotyp-i iahe intransitiviteit a priori uitsluiten. In het verleden 
gedane experimenten kunnen in dit verband geen uitsluitsel geven omdat 
zij voorbijgaan aan het essentiële onderscheid tussen genotypische en 
schijnbare intransitiviteit. Hetzelfde geldt voor bijna alle "modellen" 
voor intransitief kiezen uit de literatuur. Behoudens enkele 
uitzonderingen (zoals de regel van de enkelvoudige meerderheid en het 
additieve verschilmodel) verzuimen deze modellen die triaden aan te 
duiden waarbij intransitiviteit voorspeld kan worden. Bij gebrek aan 
adequate modellen is het probleem van de empirische verifieerbaarheid 
van intransitiviteit evenmin gedefinieerd als dat van haar empirische 
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falsificeorbaarheid. Ondanks het feit dat intransitieve keuzen 
gewoonlijk als ilxatiuiiCK'H worden bestempeld, poogt de onderhaviae 
studie voor het intra^si tivitei LsCenomcen een •¡afuMici'ι' verklaring te 
vinder door een geschikte préférer t lerelatie als pniritief gegeven te 
introduceren. In studies over preierentie wil de traditie dat 
preferentierelaties als ( tríe ι i'i'i 1 ι .' J op de verzameling van alternatieven 
worden gedefinieerd. Deze studie gaat uit van een strikte 
preferentierelatie en wel van een asymiretrische binaire relatie die ім e f 
per se transitief is. Len strikte preferentierelatie heeft hel voordeel 
dat de mdifferentierelatie intransitief kan zijn. Omdat het begrip 
preferentie als een binaire relatie wordt opgevat, wordt in het betoog 
alleen rekening gehouden met paarsgewijze keuzen. Daar de 
preferentierelatie niet transitief behoeft te zijn, bevat de 
onderhavige theorie intransitiviteit als theoretische mogelijkheid; zij 
brengt daarbij modellen die echte, d.w.z. genotypisch intransitieve 
keuzen mogelijk maken. 
In hoofdstuk ΙΓ wordt een bepaalde klasse van modellen voor 
intransitieve keuzen gepresenteerd. Aangestipt wordt dat genotypische 
intransitiviteit een onmogelijkheid is wanneer het keuzegedrag 
ééndimensioneel is. Daarom wordt ervan uitgegaan dat de alternatieven 
multidimensioneel zijn met dien verstande dat zij beoaald worden door 
il (II^ - 1) onderscheiden latente attributer. Wanneer de preferentie 
tussen twee willekeurige alternatieven slechts begrepen kan worden bij 
de gratie van verschillende criteria of dimenbies, dan ligt het voor de 
hand om deze preferent ie als --anengest cid te beschouwen, en wel als 
samengesteld uit evenzoveel preferent ιekomponenten als er dimensies 
zijn. Deze benadering suggereert een ?ekere огт van onafhankelijkheid 
tussen de dimensies; do/e ondj-hankel ι jkneid wordt door een pabbend 
axioma vertolkt. len pre ferent ι erelat ie die aan dit амопа voldoet leuit 
tot een binaire relatie O D elk van ae i' dimensies. Do/o laatste relaties 
worden geïnterpreteerd als ééndimenslonole preferentie- c.q. 
ιndι f ferenLι ere latice. Waar Je alternatieven nultidin.enslonoe1 /ijn is 
het mogelijk holistische preferenties als een samenstel lu g van и 
éCndinensionele prefercntieb te Ы schol jjen. Alhoewel Ie verschi 1 lorde 
ééndirrensionole préférertiere1 at les evenzoveel restricties zijn van de 
holistische preferentierelatie, kunnen de eerstgenoemde relaties 
tiansitief /ijn /onder transitiviLe 11 te imoliceren van de 
laatstgenoemde relatie. De voorgeste 1 de modellen vergen transit ivj teit 
VI P de éóndimensionele préférertι ore lat ι es die, met na^e, moeten 
samenvallen met óCr ui' drie тюдеtι jke restricties van een asyi net ra sehe 
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binaire relatie: een strikte zwakke orde, een semiorde of een 
intervalorde. Deze benadering huldigt het principe volgens welke de 
fundamentele ob3ecten die door een subject beoordeeld worden niet de 
individuele alternatieven zijn, maar wel panen van ééndimensionele 
aspecten van deze alternatieven. Deze studie is inderdaad gebaseerd 
op de assumptie dat de alternatieven op elke dimensie paarsgewijs tegen 
elkaar worden afgewogen om, vervolgens, de resultaten van deze 
vergelijkingen samen te stellen tot één (holistische) preferentie. Het 
probleem van deze samenstelling wordt opgelost aan de hand van een 
zogenaamde preferentie aggregatieregel. Aggregatie van ééndimensionele 
preferenties wijst op de mogelijkheid van interdimensionele 
vergelijkingen en, in het bijzonder, van interdimensionele compensaties. 
(Alle voorgestelde modellen leiden tot indifferentie als gevolg van 
bepaalde compensaties tussen ééndimensionele oreferenties). Deze 
gedachtegang steunt op het idee van ééndimensionele "preferentie-
intervallen" die kunnen worden afgebeeld door zogeheten ééndimensionele 
preferentiefunkties. De asymmetrie van de ééndimensionele 
preferentierelaties schept de mogelijkheid de ééndimensionele 
preferentiefunkties van zogenaamd tegengestelde intervaller aan elkaar 
te relateren via één uit twee passende schaalcondities, resoektievelijk 
"sign-reversal" en "strict sign-reversal" geheten. De gedachte dat de 
ééndimensionele preferenties bij de gratie van een uniek onderliggend 
attribuut ontstaan, leidt voorts tot nieuwe specifieke eisen waarbij de 
ééndimensionele preferentiefunkties moeten voldoen aan één uit drie 
mogelijke assumpties: intradimensionele aftrekbaarheid, 
intradimensionele eenvoudige schaalbaarheid en intradimensionele 
strikte duale monotonie. Voorts worden een aantal restricties 
geformuleerd voor preferentie aggregatieregels (c.q. funkties) met de 
bedoeling een rationele basis te vinden voor keuzen tussen 
multidimensionele alternatieven. Tenslotte wordt aangetoond hoe een 
verzameling van keuzemodellen ontstaat door één uit meer 
intradimensionele assumpties te koopelen aan één uit meer 
interdimensionele assumpties; van deze modellen vormt het bekende 
additieve verschilmodel een speciaal geval. De modellen worden niet 
allen in detail behandeld; één van hen (het zogenaamde model 41) is 
typerend voor de hele verzameling en wordt dap ook verder ontwikkeld, 
althans voor м=2. Overeenkomstig het theoretisch karakter van deze 
studie worden er een aantal numerieke voorbeelden slechts ter 
illustratie toegevoegd. Deze voorbeelden laten zien dat de modellen 
geenszins beperlt blijven tot de verklaring van intransitieve triples 
maar, integendeel, ook grote intransitieve cycles toestaan, een 
I ъв 
raoqoli]kaoid dio in de лчід toratuur hooast 7olü7aar\ voorlvoml . 
In hoofdstuk III wordt do orniiddol11^ko tocnasbaarhoid van de ποα"]Ion 
besproken. Botoogd wordt dat voi sol 11 lede faktoren ertoe bindrajen 
de7o toopasbaarheni te bcnocilijko-i. Ліч eernte reien is er het- qebrek 
aan bruikbare data: de vakliteratuur 13 'ó doordronien van do 
transitiviteitsassumotie dat er nauwel1iks da La bestaan aar de pand 
waarvan intransitieve keuzen Члгеп worder voorspeld door oen vai de 
gegeven modellen. De vraag over '-ransi t ivi teit houdt verband iret hot al 
dan m o t additieve karakter var ééndimensionelo nrefercntiefunktíes. 
Alhoewel de in de sonalo wotonscNiDoen bestudeerde feroTioner zelden 
additief rijn, bestaat er praktisch geen neetthoorotisoh svsleon dat 
de7e eigenschap versnaalt. Léndinonsionelo theorieën over het meten van 
verschillen zijn in feite gebaseerd on additivitoit en kunnen dtrnalvo 
niet worden gebruikt rodra een model als Ml intransitieve» keuzon moet 
voorspellen. In de literatuur 71jn nauwelijks ^eg^vens te vipden die 
zouden kunnen wijzen op het bestaan van niet-additio\e 
preforcntiefunkties /odat hier geen aanleiding is gevonden tot ^ot 
simuleren van de modellen. Het sinuloren van modellen heelt trouwens 
slechts 7in wanneer oen rechtvaardiging mogelijk lijkt aan d •> hand van 
theorieën of resultaten uit de nsychologie. De nogolij4beid lot zinvolle 
simulatie rfordt onderzocht aan de hard van twee analogieën: één in 
verband met de constructie van S U D J C C - I O V O magnitudescnalen O" één 
gebaseerd op modellen voor gelijkenis. Alhoewel het αaar ti'iceron van 
subjectieve grootheden oen oud psychologisch -эгоЫеоті is, /ij" er •Чс.аі 
weinig experimenten te vinden die data bevatten over de grootteschattma 
van "verschillen" tussen alternatieven, d.w./. data die ho., ir ormcitx 
mogelijk naken de vorm van ééndi-nensiopo lo oreíeronLiofunk*- ios le 
schatten. Voor ее" aantal inLonsievo continua zijn er rocerto jogovons 
beschikbaar maar de/e zijn gokoooold aan oude osvchoTysisc'io 
strijdvragen: in de vakl itera t 1 ^ r bes'aat geen oensterri'' ^ eu over i'o 
vorm van '"ónd imo.'sionolo vorschi 1 rui к^юь, al was hot -ai" voor oir 
klasse van subjoctj.evo continua. Ac nane is beter in/icht wen oiijs jn 
de relaties tussen .schalen voor grootten on с at »gor ιοοι' сгог.'і)1>, on 
voor ondorschoidingo" ardorzijd,. Π ] jebrek a in oen (jood bot, 1 in va dr 
schalen dio ton grondslag liggen .lan oorJolen vai versoi il U 1, '¡at и 
botoogd dat iedere soooifioko Чоі /( va" cVn lil юпьппс lo 
pi of erent icf untt íes ^loo'Ms ка"1 b< 1 iston on οο^ /odanK, , ••акгсо liisis 
da' si lulitio /ondor br t < 1 ο 11 s /ou /ijn. In de hooo e-o^  ' oor 
betrouwbare basis to vinden g ι.it ele enlatóte vjr volge іь Ui' IT­
TI xi Ol 1 e-η voor <!(> 1 1 j NOI ι . ')o ns 'e' 10 io ' L se ^ о " ι torali ir b' •' η . ι η ι an' 1 ' 
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speculaties over de relatie tussen oordelen van subjectieve verschillen 
en (on)geli^kenissenoordelen. Modellen voor ééndimensionele gelijkenis 
komen echter niet veel voor en blijken zó controversieel dat zij geen 
rationele basis vormen voor de keuze van ééndimensionele 
Dreferentiefunkties. (Meestal wordt gelijkenis als een multidimensioneel 
begrip beschouwd; als zodanig duidt het op Tiultidirensionele 
Dreferentiemodellen die van een heel andere aard zijr dan de voorgestelde 
modellen). Tenslotte wordt duidelijk gemaakt dat twee nieuwe 
moeilijkheden iedere poging to zinvol simuleren (vooralsnog) in de weg 
staan. De eerste moeilijkheid bestaat in het ontbreken van eer exoliciet 
foutennodel, waardoor iedere simulatie slechts als een ijdele bezigheid 
kan worden bestemoeld. De tweede en laatste roeilijkheid slaat on de 
rechtvaardiging van interdinensionele vergelijkingen tussen 
préférer.tierunkties. Het nultidimersionele karakter van de modellen vergt 
niet alleen kennis van de ééndimensionele Dreferentiefunkties, maar ook 
van de vergelijkingen tussen deze funkties. ledere noging tot zinvol 
simuleren struikelt uiteindelijk over het probleem van de 
interdimensionele (on)vergelijkbaarheid van ééndimensionele 
nreferentieiunkties. In een ietwat andere forirulering staat deze 
problematiek bekend als een onoDgelost probleem bij de theorie over 
rechtvaardige groepsbeslissingen. 
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CJR'7¡C'JLU4 VITAE 
De schri^vor van dit nrocf sebr i r t word on 28 aiqustus ITÎ'b acboren i i 
do qcmccnLc Ukkel bij Lirussel ίΒο'πιί). [ii] •»Ludoerdo іч- es 
njt-jurkundc лап dt^  satholioko llnvorsi toi t lo Leuvor OP .i^ n do Vi i 10 
Univorbitoit to Hriisscl. Aan de/c laaísto іпчіеііпі· іь hl·) in l'J'î'1 
afgestudeerd mot e^r studio op hel qob ιed var de theorot ι sehe 
natuurkunde. Sinds eniqo ]dron qaat ^jj" bol jnqstol linq uit naar 
na thonat ι чс'ю modellen in do sonalo wot onsrhaooen. Sedert ι (H ч is nij 
vorb'inao ι als wotonschaoDO 11 τ1, hoofdnodo^orkor aa-. do "ik-ro1) 
•'athoiiat isohe I'sycliol ogio var. do Katholieke Universiteit ι-ο Nijroi"". 
STELLINGEN. 
1. Het is gebruikelijk een ordinale schaal te definiëren als 
een homoraorfe afbeelding ƒ van een empirisch systeem in een 
formeel systeem, waarbij ƒ invariant is onder een monotone 
transformatie. Deze definitie houdt onvoldoende rekening met 
de topologische eigenschappen van beide systemen. 
2. In vele schaalmethoden worden empirische objecten homomorf 
afgebeeld in de verzameling der reële getallen. Een 
afbeelding in de verzameling van rationele getallen is 
dikwijls beter gerechtvaardigd. 
3. In hun betoog voor het lineaire psychofysische model beroepen 
BOCK & JONES (1968, p. 25) zich op de mogelijkheid dat de 
relatie tussen de fysische waarde van een stimulus en het 
gemiddelde van het corresponderende discrimínele proces 
beperkt blijft tot een "moderately well-behaved monotonie 
function". De waarde van het betoog van deze auteurs is 
uiteraard afhankelijk van de interpretatie van deze 
beperking. 
[BOCK, R.D. and JONES, L.V., The Measurement and 
Prediction of Judgment and Choice. San Francisco: 
Holden-Day, 1968] 
4. Het is waarschijnlijk dat een zogenaamd strikt utiliteitsmodel 
onverenigbaar is met een stochastisch utiliteitsmodel waarvan 
de kansdichtheidsfunktie symmetrisch is. 
5. In het kader van ARROW's (1951) visie op de constructie van 
een rechtvaardige groepsbeslissingsregel betoogt HANSSON 
(1969) dat een dergelijke regel aan twee voorwaarden van 
neutraliteit moet voldoen. Omdat deze voorwaarden niet in 
ARROW's kader passen, ziet HANSSON in zijn resultaten een 
kritiek op het principe van de onafhankelijkheid van 
irrelevante alternatieven. HANSSON's studie kan echter 
worden geïnterpreteerd als een argument tegen ARROW's 
visie op groepsbeslissingen. 
[ARROW, K.J., Social Choice and Individual Values. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951 
HANSSON, В., Group preferences. Econometrica, 
1969, 37, 50-54] 
6. Het verdient aanbeveling de resultaten van WIGGINS, WIGGINS & 
CONGER (1968) en WIGGINS & WIGGINS (1969) te analyseren aan de 
hand van het type inodellen voorgesteld in COOMBS, McCLELLAND & 
COOMBS (¡973). 
[WIGGINS, J.S., WIGGINS, N. and CONGER, J.C., 
Correlates of heterosexual somatic preference. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1968, 10, 82-90. 
WIGGINS, N. and WIGGINS, J.S., Λ typological 
analysis of male preferences for female body 
types. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 1969, 
4, 89-102. 
COOMBS, см., MCCLELLAND, G.H. and COOMBS, L.C, 
The Measurement and Analysis of F\wily 
Composition Preferences. Michigan: Michigan 
Mathematical Psychology Program, Report 73-5] 
7. "There is a very remarkable difference between spaces of two 
and three dimensions, while spaces of three and more dimensions 
are comparatively similar in their properties" [ROBINSON 
(1963, pp. 12-13)1. Deze mededeling, die een bekende toepassing 
kent in muitidimensionele meetmodellen voor gelijkenis, geldt 
evenzeer in multidimensionele preferentiemodellen. 
[ROBINSON, G. de В., The foundation!· of geometry. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. 
(first ed. 1940)] 
8. "The primary test for vnidineaslanciity [...] is the 
transitivity requirement" [TORGERSON (1958, p. 247)1. In de 
psycho! ogisL'he literatuur wordt deze :rededeling onvoldoende 
au sérieux g enome τι. 
[TORGERSON, W.S., Theory and Method.· of Scaling. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958] 
9. Een anticiperend artikel over de rol van computers heeft de 
wijsgeei—logicus LADRIERE (1952) beëindigd met de woorden "le 
chiffre est la mort de la parole" (p. 177). Deze (onheilspellende) 
uitspraak is betekenisvol voor het psychologisch onderzoek. 
[LADRIERE, J., Les machines à penser. La Revue 
nouvelle, 1952, 16, 9-25 en 169-177] 
10. Bij vole promoties in de psychologie is het nuttig te beschikken 
over de apparatuur die gangbaar is bij lezingen en congressen; 
bij promoties in de mathematische psychologie is bovendien een 
degelijk schoolbord wolkom. 
Nijmegen, 25 maart 1977. P.O.F.C. van Acker. 


